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A DANGEROUS CONCOCTION: PHARMACEUTICAL
MARKETING, COGNITIVE BIASES, AND FIRST AMENDMENT
OVERPROTECTION
CYNTHIA M. HO*
This Article argues that pharmaceutical marketing to doctors should be more
critically evaluated and entitled to less First Amendment protection, contrary to a
trend dating back to the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Sorrell. In particular, the
Article argues that more information to doctors in the form of pharmaceutical
marketing does not necessarily result in better patient outcomes. The Article adds a
significant critique based on the existence and impact of cognitive bias literature that
has thus far not been recognized in this area. If courts fully embrace this
understanding, they should recognize that the government, through the Food and
Drug Administration, has a right to limit statements that may encourage doctors to
prescribe unapproved uses of drugs with potentially fatal consequences.
This Article reveals that recent expansion of First Amendment jurisprudence is
based on key cognitive biases and assumptions. First, courts, and even some doctors
themselves, improperly assume that doctors are adequately sophisticated, such that
doctors are protected from self-interested marketing, which this Article demonstrates
as inconsistent with reality. Second, current case law assumes that the availability
of more information necessarily promotes better decisions so long as it is not patently
false, a proposition that this Article shows is especially unfounded in the unique
market of prescription drugs. Importantly, such assumptions can have critical health
consequences since they promote uses of drugs for which there is often inadequate
scientific basis and serious health consequences.
Finally, this Article builds upon the revealed cognitive biases to suggest
empirically-informed changes to cabin the expansion of First Amendment protection
of pharmaceutical marketing as well as broader structural reform. This Article
proposes to treat potentially misleading information differently than entirely truthful
speech, thus giving states greater discretion to regulate potentially misleading
information. In addition, this Article proposes that the burden of proof in such cases
should be reversed, so that courts will no longer consider disclaimers as a true
alternative to speech restriction without proof that companies will actually promote
more informed decisions. The Article also suggests structural changes to medical
education, drug development, and marketing informed by the cognitive biases
revealed here.
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INTRODUCTION
Is more information always better? First Amendment commercial speech
jurisprudence takes this as a given. 1 However, when information is only available
from a self-interested and marketing-savvy pharmaceutical company, more
information may simply lead to more misinformation. Notably, doctors are also
misled. This can result in public health harms when companies are promoting
unapproved uses of prescription drugs that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
has approved for other purposes—commonly referred to as “off-label” uses.
Contrary to judicial presumptions, as well as the presumptions of some doctors and
scholars, doctors are not sophisticated enough to always discern what is true versus
misleading information. Doctors are susceptible to the same largely unconscious
cognitive biases as all individuals;2 this means that they operate on “schemas”
(mental presumptions) that impact how they interpret marketing information.3 Courts
also rely on schemas about how doctors interact with marketing. These schemas have
contributed to a First Amendment jurisprudence that has serious consequences for
public health because it fails to account for how doctors actually interact with
marketing of off-label uses, and such uses are associated with adverse health
consequences.
This Article argues that pharmaceutical marketing, especially regarding “offlabel” uses, should be more critically evaluated and entitled to less First Amendment
protection—contrary to recent court trends, beginning with the 2011 Supreme Court
case Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.4 In other words, this Article is taking a new approach
to address court cases that a number of scholars have criticized as unduly expanding
the scope of First Amendment protection for pharmaceutical marketing with negative

1. E.g., Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 110
(1990); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 206 n.20 (1982); Bates v. Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 374–75
(1977) (rejecting suggestion that public is better off with incomplete, but correct, information
versus potentially misleading information in the context of attorney advertising).
2. See infra Section II.A.
3. The term “schema” is used here to refer to an organizing mental framework for
processing information. See MARTHA AUGOUSTINOS, IAIN WALKER & NGAIRE DONAGHUE,
SOCIAL COGNITION: AN INTEGRATED INTRODUCTION 68–69 (3d ed. 2014).
4. 564 U.S. 552 (2011); see United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012);
Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); see also infra Section
III.A.1 (explaining expansion of commercial free speech through these cases).
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policy repercussions for public health. 5 Not only are many off-label uses medically
unsupported, but permitting broader promotion of such uses undermines incentives
for companies to scientifically study those uses.6 Whereas prior articles have tended
to focus on how to adapt to the new law7 or advocate rejecting the existing law based
primarily on policy grounds,8 this Article uses cognitive bias literature to explain

5. E.g., Stephanie M. Greene, After Caronia: First Amendment Concerns in Off-Label
Protection, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 645 (2014); Loren Jacobson, Don’t Fix What Ain’t Broken
– Off-Label Marketing, the FDA’s Regulatory Regime, and the First Amendment, 5 EMORY
CORP. GOV & ACCONTABILITY REV. 19 (2018); Aaron S. Kesselheim, Michelle M. Mello &
Jerry Avorn, FDA Regulation of Off-Label Drug Promotion Under Attack, 309 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 445 (2013); David Orentlicher, Off-Label Drug Marketing, the First Amendment, and
Federalism, 50 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 89 (2016); Joshua M. Sharfstein, Public Health and
the First Amendment, 93 MILBANK Q. 459 (2015); Patricia J. Zettler, The Indirect
Consequences of Expanded Off-Label Promotion, 78 OH. ST. L.J. 1053 (2017). Of course,
there are also some scholars that embrace the judicial expansion of First Amendment rights.
E.g., Coleen Klasmeier & Martin H. Redish, Off-Label Prescription Advertising, the FDA and
the First Amendment: A Study in the Values of Commercial Speech Protection, 37 AM. J.L. &
MED. 315 (2011); Lars Noah, The Little Agency That Could (Act with Indifference to
Constitutional and Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (2008); Rodney A. Smolla,
Off-Label Drug Advertising and the First Amendment, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 81 (2015). In
addition, others argue for further expansion. E.g., Jeffrey Chasnow & Geoffrey Levitt, OffLabel Communications: The Prodigal Returns, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 257 (2018); Christina
Sandefur, The FDA’s Approach to Off-Label Communications: Restricting Free Speech in
Medicine?, REG. TRANSPARENCY PROJECT (May 10, 2018), https://regproject.org/paper/fdasapproach-off-label-communications-restricting-free-speech-medicine
[https://perma.cc/FR5B-29CQ]; see also Carl Wiersum, No Longer Business as Usual: FDA
Exceptionalism, Commerical Speech, and the First Amendment, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 486
(2018) (arguing FDA rules regarding off-label promotion as well as claims for dietary
supplements and graphic ciagarette warnings are inconsistent with First Amendment).
6. E.g., Zettler, supra note 5; Memorandum from the Food & Drug Admin. on Pub.
Health Interests and First Amendment Considerations Related to MFR. Commc’ns Regarding
Unapproved Uses of Approved or Cleared Med. Prods. 4–5 (Jan. 2017) [hereinafter FDA
Memorandum].
7. E.g., Constance E. Bagley, Joshua Mitts & Richard J. Tinsley, Snake Oil Salesmen or
Purveyors of Knowledge: Off-Label Promotions and the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 23
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 337 (2013) (providing suggestions for FDA regulation after
Caronia that arguably meet the stricter heightened scrutiny announced in Sorrell); Aaron S.
Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, Prospects for Regulation of Off-Label Drug Promotion in
an Era of Expanding Commercial Speech Protection, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1539 (2014) (providing
suggestions for future FDA action since Caronia).
8. E.g., Orentlicher, supra note 5, passim (arguing that courts should reject the reasoning
of Caronia); Christopher Robertson, The Tip of the Iceberg: A First Amendment Right to
Promote Drugs Off-Label, 78 OH. ST. L.J. 1019 (2017) (challenging arguments in favor of offlabel marketing and noting that if these are adopted, all premarket approval of drugs are at risk
and also undermine other statutory regimes beyond the FDA); Christopher Robertson & Aaron
S. Kesselheim, Regulating Off-Label Promotion – A Critical Test, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED.
2313, 2314 (2016) (arguing that courts should reject Caronia on its merits and that the FDA,
not courts, should be evaluating whether corporate claims are valid); Christopher Robertson
& Victor Laurion, Tip of the Iceberg II: How the Intended-Uses Principle Procedure Medical
Knowledge and Protects Liberty, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 770 (2017) (explaining why
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why recent cases actually fail to achieve key First Amendment goals. This Article
further provides an empirically supported argument against expansion of First
Amendment law for off-label promotion.
Marketing of off-label uses is a unique area where First Amendment commercial
law concepts may not work well because of an essentially imperfect market. As will
be explained, commercial law jurisprudence recognizes commercial speech as
valuable to listeners to the extent it provides information. Even though the law
realizes some information is potentially misleading, it errs on the side of permitting
such information on the assumption that the marketplace of ideas can provide
competing information.9 However, there is no functioning marketplace of ideas with
new drugs. Drugs are developed and sold initially only by self-interested companies
who must provide clinical data to the FDA, but not to the public.10 Manufacturers of
competing drugs for the same condition do not contribute to a functioning
marketplace of ideas because companies tend to only promote attributes of their own
drug, but not in comparison to others; this is likely because regulations do not require
a drug be superior to existing treatments.11 Accordingly, the only objective source of
information would be from independent scientists unassociated with self-interested
companies seeking approval. However, it takes years before independent scientists
can evaluate already approved drugs. Sometimes independent scientists will find
important caveats to the initial assertions. 12 This is not entirely surprising since the
data submitted to the FDA is developed by the self-interested company.13 However,

existing FDA regulation are important to produce information and that it functions similar to
other regulations). There is also substantial scholarship questioning expansion of First
Amendment commercial speech, including Sorrell. E.g., Julie E. Cohen, The Zombie First
Amendment, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1119 (2015); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 133
WIS. L. REV. 133 (2016).
9. See, e.g., supra note 1.
10. See infra Section I.A.
11. E.g., infra note 33; see also Richard A. Friedman, What Drug Ads Don’t Say, N.Y.
TIMES (April 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/24/opinion/sunday/what-drug
-ads-dont-say.html [https://perma.cc/5MZP-UVEZ] (noting that most “new” drugs are
unlikely to “substantially outperform” existing drugs). Even when companies tout a feature of
their drug, it may misleadingly suggest that this is an improvement when in fact other
companies simply did not seek similar approval. E.g., CYNTHIA M. HO, ACCESS TO MEDICINE
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON PATENTS AND RELATED RIGHTS
31 (2011) (explaining that Zyrtec was marketed as the first approved allergy drug for indoor
and outdoor allergies even though other allergy drugs are effective for this purpose as well).
In addition, companies may intentionally not conduct studies in comparison to other drugs for
fear that their drug may perform suboptimally. See, e.g., Ron Winslow, For Bristol-Myers,
Challenging Pfizer Was a Big Mistake, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 9, 2004, 12:01 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB107876021684949151
[https://perma.cc/X76M-V2HH]
(noting that companies rarely do such studies in the context of discussing Bristol Myers
Squibb’s failed attempt to establish that its cholesterol-lowering drug compared well to
Pfizer’s Lipitor).
12. See infra Section I.A.
13. Some have suggested that given public interests, it would be better for the government
to pay for clinical trials and create independence. E.g., STAN FINKELSTEIN & PETER TEMIN,
REASONABLE RX: SOLVING THE DRUG PRICE CRISIS (2008); Tracy R. Lewis, Jerome H.
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before independent scientists can do their own studies, corporate marketing lacks any
counterbalance. Moreover, although the claims are allegedly based on scientific
facts, it is nonetheless possible to selectively present facts. Even if doctors are aware
of the financial incentives to misrepresent, given the lack of competing information,
they may nonetheless be influenced by these “facts.” This is especially true since
cognitive bias literature shows that repeated facts are often presumed true. 14
The time is ripe to address the existence and impact of largely subconscious
cognitive biases to First Amendment case law. Other areas of the law and regulation
are increasingly recognizing that subconscious cognitive biases should be given more
credence;15 for example, the Obama Administration issued an Executive Order to use
insights from behavioral science research to direct federal policies for better
outcomes.16 Although a few scholars have recognized that modern marketing is often
intended to target subconscious biases, they have not addressed the unique situation
of alleged “facts” that cannot be verified and instead focused on general marketing,
or information presumed to have no factual content based on images, packaging
color, or product placement. 17 In contrast, no one has yet addressed the existence and
impact of cognitive biases on allegedly factual statements concerning off-label drug

Reichman & Anthony D. So, The Case for Public Funding and Public Oversight of Clinical
Trials, ECONOMISTS VOICE (Jan. 2007).
14. See infra notes 146–150.
15. There is robust legal scholarship aimed at identifying and addressing unconscious,
typically racial biases in areas of policing, prosecuting, judicial decision-making, as well as
Eighth Amendment excessive punishment. E.g., Justin D. Levinson, Mark W. Bennett &
Koichi Hioki, Judging Implicit Bias: A National Empirical Study of Judicial Stereotypes, 69
FLA. L. REV. 63 (2017); Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith, Systemic Implicit Bias, 126
YALE L.J. F. 406 (2017); Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin
Tone, Implicit Racial Bias, and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 307
(2010); L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143,
1144 (2012) (arguing that the legal test of “reasonable suspicion” is particularly susceptible to
implicit bias); Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on
the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795 (2012).
16. Exec. Order No. 13,707, 3 C.F.R. § 13707 (2015).
17. E.g., Micah L. Berman, Manipulative Marketing and the First Amendment, 103 GEO.
L.J. 497 (2015) (explaining how modern marketing is intended to take advantage of consumer
cognitive biases and proposing that “noninformational” marketing such as product placement
and color should be granted less First Amendment protection in a manner consistent with the
Central Hudson test); Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal
Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L. REV. 1165 (1948) (recognizing the powerful
influence of advertising with respect to trademarks); Yoav Hammer, Expressions Which
Preclude Rational Processing: The Case for Regulating Non-Informational Advertisements,
27 WHITTIER L. REV. 435, 482 (2005); Christine Jolls, Debiasing Through Law and the First
Amendment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1419–36 (2015) (providing empirical data that compelled
disclosure of images in three situations may inform consumers contrary to current First
Amendment case law that dismiss the ability of images to inform as not factual); see also
Tamara R. Piety, Merchants of Discontent: An Exploration of the Psychology of Advertising,
Addiction, and the Implications for Commercial Speech, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 377, 407–21
(2001) (discussing the psychology of advertising).
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promotion whereas companies have for years been aptly relying on the existence of
cognitive biases of doctors with their marketing methods. 18
This Article argues that cognitive biases make doctors susceptible to these
alleged facts marketed by companies and that judges, too, have their own cognitive
biases that have thus far prevented them from seeing doctors’ vulnerability to
manipulation. A better understanding of the cognitive biases at issue reveals that the
current trend towards greater First Amendment protection of commercial speech for
pharmaceutical promotion is unlikely to achieve the traditional goal in First
Amendment commercial speech jurisprudence of promoting informed decisions.
Moreover, recognizing cognitive biases helps to establish why disclaimers are
ineffective, contrary to assumptions in First Amendment case law that such
disclaimers are an easy alternative to speech restrictions. 19
This Article complements existing knowledge and concern about pharmaceutical
marketing, as well as broader commercial influences on the practice of medicine. For
example, in recent years, scholars and policymakers have expressed concern that
doctors may be unduly influenced by pharmaceutical marketing, gifts, industryfunded continuing medical education, and even “opinion leaders” with financial ties
to the industry.20 Some of this concern resulted in the Sunshine Act, which imposed
new regulations to minimize financial conflicts of interest between doctors and
industry through disclosure of payments and items of certain value, but excluding

18. E.g., Sunita Sah & Adriane Fugh-Berman, Physicians Under the Influence: Social
Psychology and Industry Marketing Strategies, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 665 (2013) (noting
effective use of social psychology principles by pharmaceutical marketing to which doctors
are generally unaware).
19. See infra Section II.C.
20. E.g., CARL ELLIOTT, WHITE COAT, BLACK HAT: ADVENTURES ON THE DARK SIDE OF
MEDICINE (2010); INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN MEDICAL
RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND PRACTICE (Bernard Lo & Marilyn J. Field eds., 2009); see also
Rosa Ahn, Alexandra Woodbridge, Ann Abraham, Susan Saba, Deborah Korenstein, Erin
Madden, W. John Boscardin & Salomeh Keyhani, Financial Ties of Principal Investigators
and Randomized Controlled Trial Outcomes: Cross Sectional Study, 356 BRIT. MED. J. 6
(2017) (linking financial conflicts with publication bias); William Fleischman, Shantanu
Agrawal, Marissa King, Arjun K. Venkatesh, Harlan M. Krumholz, Douglas McKee, Douglas
Brown & Joseph S. Ross, Association Between Payments from Manufacturers of
Pharmaceuticals to Physicians and Regional Prescribing: Cross Sectional Ecological Study,
354 BRIT. MED. J. 4–5, 7 (2016) (financial conflicts linked to prescribing more expensive
drugs); Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a
Gift?, 283 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 373 (2000); Charles Ornstein, Mike Tigas & Ryann Grochowski
Jones, Now There’s Proof: Docs Who Get Company Cash Tend to Prescribe More BrandName Meds, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 17, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article
/doctors-who-take-company-cash-tend-to-prescribe-more-brand-name-drugs [https://perma
.cc/E83G-X4VY] (providing data concerning higher prescriptions of expensive drugs by
doctors who received more money as well as the fact that about seventy-five percent of doctors
in five common medical specialties received at least one payment in 2014). Even a single meal
can influence physician prescribing. E.g., Colette DeJong, Thomas Anguilar, Chien-Wen
Tseng, Grace A. Lin, W. John Boscardin & R. Adams Dudley, Pharmaceutical IndustrySponsored Meals and Physician Prescribing Patterns for Medicare Beneficiaries, 176 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 1114 (2016).
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others, such as drug samples.21 However, not only is disclosure an incomplete
solution, but also the problem is not solely limited to conflict of interest. 22 After all,
even doctors with no financial interest may have biases. This Article complements
recognized problems with commercial influences on the practice of medicine but
provides a richer explanation than prior scholarship focused on conflicts of interest.
Although some issues could be addressed through changes to malpractice law, the
focus of this Article is on addressing schemas in First Amendment law.23
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background to understand the
key issues. Part I begins with some fundamental concepts of how prescription drugs
are developed and approved for sale. In addition, it discusses the unique nature of the
prescription drug market, as well as how off-label uses are regulated. Finally, this
Part provides an overview of commercial speech law and policy.
Part II provides an introduction to schemas, as well as related cognitive biases as
a backdrop to establishing two previously unrecognized schemas that have played a
key role in promoting First Amendment fallacies concerning commercial speech.
The first schema is that doctors are adequately sophisticated to evaluate
pharmaceutical marketing of prescription drugs without being confused or misled
(the “sophisticated doctor schema”). The second schema is that more information is

21. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7h (2012). Of course, there are still some outliers that claim
conflict of interest is a mere narrative without adequate evidence of negative patient impacts.
E.g., D. Barton, T. Stossel & L. Stell, After 20 Years, Industry Critics, Bury Skeptics, Despite
Empirical Vacuum, 68 INT’L J. CLINICAL PRAC. 666 (2014).
22. See Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting Medical Judgment? False Assumptions in the
Pursuit of False Claims Regarding Off-Label Prescribing, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 63–
64, 74–76 (2008) (considering conflicts of interest at best a partial accounting of off-label
prescribing and that doctors may be simply skeptical about clinical trials); Lisa Rosenbaum,
Understanding Bias – The Case for Careful Study, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1959, 1960 (2015)
(noting that conflict of interest disclosure may be interpreted by viewers as a reason to be more
trusting of the information because the disclosure is viewed as a sign of honesty). Moreover,
even if disclosures of conflicts of interest provide some value, it seems that disclosures are
incomplete since publications seem to rely on authors to voluntarily disclose and do not
impose penalties. E.g., Cole Wayant, Erick Turner, Chase Meyer, Philip Sinnett & Matt
Vassar, Financial Conflicts of Interest Among Oncologist Authors of Reports of Clinical Drug
Trials, J. AM. MED. ASS’N ONCOLOGY (2018) (noting that about a third of authors in a sample
of cancer trials did not report all payments); see also Charles Ornstein & Katie Thomas, Top
Cancer Researcher Fails to Disclose Corporate Financial Ties in Major Research Journals,
(Sept.
8,
2018),
https://www
N.Y.
TIMES
.nytimes.com/2018/09/08/health/jose-baselga-cancer-memorial-sloan-kettering.html [https://
perma.cc/LD4Q-ESLU] (noting a doctor who failed to disclose conflicts of interest in dozens
of research articles from a variety of prestigious journals and that most journals do not verify
accuracy of information).
23. Although not the focus here, if doctors are less sophisticated in evaluating information
than commonly believed, that could suggest changes to medical malpractice laws. Indeed,
some have previously suggested that malpractice laws are ineffective in limiting off-label use
that could be dangerous. E.g., Phlip M. Rosoff & Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Case for
Legal Regulation of Physicians’ Off-Label Prescribing, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649, 666–71
(2011) (suggesting direct regulation of off-label use by limiting prescriptions by doctors for
scientifically unsupported uses). However, even if medical malpractice might address some
issues, that does not undermine the issue this Article addresses.
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always desirable so long as it is not patently false, even if it is potentially misleading
(the “more information schema”). Although each of these schemas has some basis in
reality, current jurisprudence unduly relies on these schemas to an extent not
supported by empirical data. As will be explained, First Amendment case law has
thus far assumed that doctors will not be improperly swayed by “facts,” given their
sophistication, contrary not only to cognitive bias literature, but growing recognition
that doctors are vulnerable to marketing practices as recognized by the enactment of
the Sunshine Act. In addition, although First Amendment jurisprudence regarding
commercial speech consistently promotes a robust marketplace of ideas, this is
contrary to literature about how all individuals incompletely process information, as
well as the fact that the pharmaceutical marketplace is an unusual one where there is
generally no competing viewpoint.
Part III then considers the implications of the revealed schemas. Importantly, the
schemas are not intended to suggest that all off-label marketing is problematic, or
that courts should permit an absolute ban on such promotion. This part considers key
themes in recent cases and also explains the mismatch between First Amendment
policy with the unique and imbalanced marketplace of patented pharmaceuticals.
Part IV provides concrete suggestions for how to combat the revealed schemas.
This Part first suggests changes to the law to better align the law with reality,
including modifications to commercial speech law relating to off-label use, as well
as related suggestions regarding judicial deference to FDA evaluation, and
suggestions for future FDA guidance. In addition, this Part suggests reforms that
would help address the undue influence of schemas on the practice of medicine
generally. Although these strategies would help address the revealed schemas in the
context of off-label marketing of drugs, they have broader implications. Some of the
proposed changes to the law impact how commercial speech regarding dietary
supplements, and especially disclaimers regarding such supplements are evaluated.
In addition, some proposed structural changes, such as limiting drug samples would
impact all prescription drugs. The implications also extend to broader issues in the
field of medicine, such as the need for more independent data, including comparative
effectiveness data, as well as questioning the current system of drug development.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Development and Approval of Prescription Drugs
The development and approval of prescription drugs is important to understand
since it impacts both marketing and commercial speech implications. Importantly,
although drugs can be considered public goods that benefit society, they are
developed by for-profit companies.24 Since companies have incentives to maximize
profits, rather than focus on public health imperatives, regulation is important.
Currently, before a new drug can be legally sold, its manufacturer must provide
clinical data to the FDA that establishes that the drug is safe and effective for

24. Given this conflict of interest, some have suggested public funding should promote
drug development, and especially clinical trials needed to establish regulatory approval. E.g.,
Lewis et al., supra note 13, at 1.
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intended use(s), in what is referred to as premarket approval. 25 The current regulatory
scheme was established to avoid public health tragedies of an earlier era where drugs
were not regulated at all, or were only regulated for safety, but not efficacy. 26
When the FDA evaluates whether a proposed new drug has adequate data to
establish safety and efficacy, it focuses on the drug’s specific “indication(s),” i.e.
use(s) for which the manufacturer seeks approval.27 Basically, the FDA is
considering whether a drug’s overall benefit versus risks for a specific use are
satisfactory. After all, a drug is unlikely to be effective and/or safe for all conditions
or all individuals.28 In addition, more risk may be tolerable for some conditions where
there are no strong alternatives. The evaluation of drugs based on intended use is
important to the FDA’s mission in preventing unnecessary public harm. 29 In
particular, premarket approval for each intended use is essential to prevent a
company from obtaining approval for one use, but then promoting it for a different
unapproved use, without adequate scientific basis for the new use.30 In addition,
approval based on specific uses encourages companies to conduct studies to establish
whether uses are supported.
While companies must provide substantial clinical data involving multiple phases
of human testing to the FDA that indicate the drug is safe and effective for its
proposed use(s), FDA approval does not completely guard against problems. First of
all, the self-interested company is designing studies to show that its drug is safe and
effective. In addition, although the company must submit the results of all clinical
studies,31 the FDA may approve a drug despite equivocal clinical studies 32 since the

25. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012).
26. Drug Industry Antitrust Act of 1962: Hearing on H.R. 6245 Before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 67 (1962) (“[T]he physician is bombarded with seductive
advertising which fails to tell the truth . . . . This often misleads him into prescribing a new
drug without adequate warning or information about its possible side effects and, indeed,
without any solid clinical evidence that the drug is effective or is even as safe as the advertisers
claim.”); Henry A. Waxman, A History of Adverse Drug Experiences: Congress Had Ample
Evidence to Support Restrictions on the Promotion of Prescription Drugs, 58 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 299, 301–08 (2003).
27. If approved, the drug “labeling,” which includes not just the physical label on a drug,
but also anything distributed in connection with the drug, must reflect the approved indication.
21 U.S.C. § 355(d); 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2017).
28. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555 (1979); see STEPHEN J. CECCOLI, PILL
POLITICS: DRUGS AND THE FDA 165–68 (2004).
29. What We Do, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo [https://perma.cc
/FW7W-SHMR]; see also FDA Memorandum, supra note 6 (noting that the FDA approval
based on intended use was developed by Congress in response to public health tragedies).
30. S. REP. No. 87-1744 (1962).
31. 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2018).
32. For example, a FOIA request revealed that the six most widely prescribed
antidepressants approved between 1987 and 1999 had a combined total of forty-seven efficacy
studies, and that more than half of these showed no significant difference between the
approved drug and placebo. Irving Kirsch, Thomas J. Moore, Alan Scoboria & Sarah S.
Nicholls, The Emperor’s New Drugs: An Analysis of Antidepressant Medication Data
Submitted to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, PREVENTION & TREATMENT, July 2002,
at 3 [hereinafter Kirsch et al., Analysis of Antidepressant]; Irving Kirsch, Antidepressants: The

2019]

A DA N GE R OUS C O N CO C TIO N

783

legal standard only requires there be “substantial evidence” of the “intended effect,”
with the intended effect defined by the company.33 Importantly, the full results of
clinical studies are generally not available to the public including researchers.34 Even
though companies may publish scientific articles relating to approved drugs, they
generally selectively publish positive results,35 and even then, the articles are likely
far less detailed than the clinical data available to the FDA. 36 Accordingly, it is not

Emperor’s New Drugs?, HUFFPOST (Nov. 17, 2011), https://www.huffpost.com/entry
/antidepressants-the-emper_b_442205 [https://perma.cc/P5RH-9CTZ]. Moreover, an FDA
memo concerning Celexa noted that two controlled efficacy trials showed significant
differences between the drug and placebo whereas three others “[f]ailed to provide results
confirming the positive findings,” but the FDA nonetheless concluded that “there is clear
evidence from more than one adequate and well controlled clinical investigation” that the drug
had an antidepressant effect. Kirsch et al., Analysis of Antidepressant, supra. About a third of
drugs are approved based on a single pivotal trial. Nicholas S. Downing, Jenerius A.
Aminawung, Nilay D. Shah, Harlan M. Krumholz & Joseph S. Ross, Clinical Trial Evidence
Supporting FDA Approval of Novel Therapeutic Agents 2005-2012, 311 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
368, 372 (2014).
33. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(5)(iv) (2012); see also Jonathan J. Darrow, Pharmaceutical
Efficacy: The Illusory Legal Standard, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2073 (2013) [hereinafter
Darrow, Pharmaceutical Efficacy] (criticizing FDA approval standard for lacking any specific
level of efficacy and instead simply mandating precise calculation of efficacy). Traditionally,
the FDA required at least two clinical trials to suggest a drug is superior to a placebo or
conventional treatment. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: PROVIDING
CLINICAL EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR HUMAN DRUGS AND BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS 3
(1998). However, there could be other contrary studies. This was definitely true for a number
of antidepressants. See supra note 32. ln addition, as a result of congressional amendments,
the FDA can now approve a drug based on positive results from a single trial. 21 U.S.C. §
355(d).
34. The FDA has traditionally considered clinical studies to be a trade secret and fall
within an exemption to FOIA requests and courts have concurred. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Food
& Drug Admin., 449 F.3d 141, 149 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding that FDA was entitled to
withhold some data sought by FOIA request regarding approved drug RU-486 for medical
abortion based on the exemption which covers some information contained in NDAs); Public
Information, 42 Fed. Reg. 3093, 3094 (Jan. 14, 1977) (noting FDA has treated clinical trial
data as trade secret since 1938); 21 C.F.R. § 20.85 (1994); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(l) (creating
an exemption to FOIA requests in the event of likelihood of substantial competitive harm).
However, the FDA position on trade secrecy of clinical data based on 21 U.S.C. § 331(j) has
been criticized since clinical data are arguably not a method or process. E.g., Christine D.
Galbraith, Dying to Know: A Demand for Genuine Public Access to Clinical Trial Results
Data, 78 MISS. L.J. 705, 752–42 (2009). In addition, recent laws permit proactive disclosure
by the FDA. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355(r) (instructing FDA to have website to provide better access
to drug safety information for patients and providers and mandating FDA post safety alerts,
warning letters, as well as “other material determined appropriate” by the FDA); Amy
Kapczynski & Jeanie Kim, Clinical Trial Transparency: The FDA Should and Can Do More,
45 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 33, 35 (2017) (noting that FDA should be routinely releasing clinical
data, as well as summary results as “other material”). Moreover, even though clinical studies
have recently been obtained through FOIA, that was notably a highly time-consuming process.
E.g., Kapczynski & Kim, supra.
35. See infra notes 46, 59–60 and accompanying text (discussing selective publication).
36. E.g., Kapcyzinski & Kim, supra note 34, at 34.
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unusual for problems with drugs to be discovered years later by independent
researchers who must do their own tests. These researchers may find out that the drug
does not work as advertised and sometimes even works contrary to how it is
advertised.37 These issues have prompted calls for full disclosure of clinical trial
results.38 Although the FDA does not currently require complete disclosure, it does
require companies that seek FDA approval of drugs to publicly register details of

37. For example, for years, hormone replacement drug therapy was promoted to not only
treat menopause, but also to prevent heart disease based on industry-financed data until
independent researchers at the NIH discovered that the drugs actually increased the risk of
heart disease. Nancy Krieger et al., Hormone Replacement Therapy, Cancer, Controversies,
and Women’s Health: Historical, Epidemiological, Biological, Clinical, and Advocacy
Perspectives, 59 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMMUNITY HEALTH 740, 740 (2005); see also Lisa A.
Ladewski et al., Dissemination of Information on Potentially Fatal Adverse Drug Reactions
for Cancer Drugs from 2000 to 2002: First Results from the Research on Adverse Drug Events
and Reports Project, 21 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 3859 (2003) (discussing serious, including
fatal, adverse drug reactions that are only discovered years after FDA approval); Heidi D.
Nelson, Miranda Walker, Bernadette Zakher & Jennifer Mitchell, Menopausal Hormone
Therapy for the Primary Prevention of Chronic Conditions: A Systematic Review to Update
the U.S. Preventative Services Task Force Recommendations, 157 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
104, 109–10 (2012) (systematic review of studies that confirms increased risk of stroke).
38. E.g., Peter Doshi, Tom Jefferson & Chris Del Mar, The Imperative to Share Clinical
Study Reports: Recommendations from the Tamiflu Experience, PLOS MED., Apr. 2012, at 1–
2 (noting that clinical study reports have the same information as journal papers, but more
detail); Ben Goldacre, What the Tamiflu Saga Tells Us About Drug Trials and Big Pharma,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 10, 2014, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/apr/10
/tamiflu-saga-drug-trials-big-pharma [https://perma.cc/4DMV-CG88]; Katie Thomas,
Breaking the Seal on Drug Research, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2013), https://www
.nytimes.com/2013/06/30/business/breaking-the-seal-on-drug-research.html [https://perma.cc
/TT5F-8EBH]. These suggestions were prompted by eventual public disclosure that off-label
promotion of Tamiflu to reduce hospital complications was found to be unjustified based on
complete data, but only two of ten studies were published and none of published data disclosed
negative side effects. Yogendra Gupta, Meenaskshi Meenu & Prafull Mohan, The Tamiflu
Fiasco and Lessons Learnt, 47 INDIAN J. PHARMACOLOGY 11 (2015); Shannon Brownlee &
Jeanne Lenzer, The Truth About Tamiflu, ATLANTIC (2009), https://www.theatlantic.com
/magazine/archive/2009/12/the-truth-about-tamiflu/307801 [https://perma.cc/8GL6-ZGP3];
see also Jeanne Lenzer, Conflicting (Conflicted?) Info, Tamiflu and Unquestioning News
Reporting, HEALTHNEWSREVIEW (Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.healthnewsreview.org
/2015/02/conflicting-study-reports-tamiflu-and-unquestioning-news-reporting [https://perma
.cc/DRS7-XYWB] (noting that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
promotion of off-label use of Tamiflu was based on a supposedly independent article, but three
quarters of the authors received funding).
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clinical trials when initiated, as well as provide summary results. 39 However,
companies thus far have not fully complied with even these limited disclosures.40
B. Marketing of Prescription Drugs
When a prescription drug is initially approved by the FDA, the only source of
information regarding the drug is provided by the self-interested drug company.

39. 42 U.S.C. § 282(j)(2)(C)((ii)) (2012) (requiring new clinical trials to submit the trial
information to a registry no later than 21 days after first patient is enrolled); 42 C.F.R. §
11.24(a) (2016) (requiring submission of clinical trial registration); 81 Fed. Reg. 64,983 (Sept.
21, 2016) (noting summary data must be submitted in tabular form with key information
including primary and secondary outcomes); see also Darrow, Pharmaceutical Efficacy, supra
note 33, at 2101 (noting a 2007 change to FDA laws that required all clinical trials to be
included as part of Food and Drug Administrative Amendments Act, instead of only serious
or life-threatening conditions under 1997 legislation). In addition, the FDA recently
announced a pilot program to reveal summary data concerning pivotal trials, although this is
on a voluntary basis and still does not reveal all underlying clinical data. Press Release, FDA,
FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on New Steps FDA Is Taking to Enhance
Transparency of Clinical Trial Information to Support Innovation and Scientific Inquiry
Related to New Drugs (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom
/pressannouncements/ucm592566.htm [https://perma.cc/6FYV-VP46]. In contrast, Europe is
moving towards proactive publication of clinical trial data, even without a specific request.
EUROPEAN MEDS. AGENCY, EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY POLICY ON ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS
(RELATED TO MEDICINAL PRODUCTS FOR HUMAN AND VETERINARY USE) (2010); EUROPEAN
MEDS. AGENCY, EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY POLICY ON PUBLICATION OF CLINICAL DATA
FOR MEDICINAL PRODUCTS FOR HUMAN USE (2014) (permitting online publication of all
clinical study reports on a proactive basis since most information is not confidential); see also
Commission Regulation 726/2004, art. 80, 2004 (EC) (providing basis for Policy 0070);
Commission Regulation 536/2014, art. 81, 2014 (EC) (requiring all clinical trials conducted
in the European Union to be made available to the public through a publicly available database
although with the possibility for some commercially confidential information to be withheld);
see also Elisa Stefanini, Publication of Clinical Trials Data: A New Approach to Transparency
in the European Legislative Framework, POINT CARE (2017) (explaining the change in
regulations). The EU Regulation is expected to come into effect in 2019. European
Commission,
Clinical
Trials
–
Regulation
EU
No.
536/2014,
https://ec.europa.eu/health/human-use/clinical-trials/regulation_en [https://perma.cc/P76THECC].
40. Current reporting is just under sixty percent. Who’s Sharing Their Clinical Trial
Results?, FDAAA TRIALSTRACKER, http://fdaaa.trialstracker.net/?status%5B%5D=overdue
&status%5B%5D=overdue-cancelled&status%5B%5D=reported-late
[https://perma.cc
/G6RD-NSUY]. Although this is not ideal, it is an improvement. Andrew P. Prayle, Matthew
N. Hurley & Alan R. Smyth, Compliance with Mandatory Reporting of Clinical Trial Results
on ClincialTrials.gov: Cross Sectional Study, 344 BRIT. MED. J. 3 (2012) (finding seventyeight percent of trials from 2009 were not reported). In addition, although the FDA could
enhance compliance by imposing statutorily permitted penalties of up to $10,000 a day, it has
yet to do so. FDAAA TrialsTracker, supra (interactive and constantly updated website noting
uncollected fines of over $300 billion to date); Ben Goldacre, Health Care’s Trick Coin, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 1, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/02/opinion/health-cares-trick
-coin.html [https://perma.cc/6EVD-367Y] (noting no fines levied for violation); see also 21
U.S.C. § 333(f)(3)(B) (2012) (authorizing penalties of up to $10,000 a day).
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Unlike other consumer goods where there are competing manufacturers in the same
class that compare their products to each other, or evaluations by unbiased third
parties, that does not happen with these drugs. 41 This is partially because FDA
approval is generally based on establishing safety and efficacy, but not on superiority
compared to other drugs. 42 So, companies often provide data only comparing their
drug to a placebo, known to have no effect, rather than existing treatments. 43 Then,
each company that makes and sells one drug in the same class of drugs, such as those
that treat heartburn, will market its drug as effective, but generally without any clear
indication to doctors or consumers of which drug is better. In addition, in some cases
where a company markets its drug as better than a competitor’s, the marketing may
fail to emphasize key limitations of the comparison, such as the fact that the
supporting study compared a weaker dose of the competitor’s drug. 44
In the unique marketplace of prescription drugs, there is initially no unbiased
information and advertising looms large in spreading information that may later be
determined to be false. Companies can easily present misleading information by only
advertising positive information about drugs. In some cases, it is subsequently
revealed that companies intentionally concealed known negative information or
selectively only presented positive results in marketing45 and academic

41. For example, although consumers rely on sources like the magazine Consumer
Reports, as well as other third-party reviews, nothing similar exists in the more complex area
of prescription drugs since reviews are more complex than evaluating goods such as appliances
or cars. There are some independent newsletters that provide doctors with information about
new drugs. E.g., HEALTH ACTION INT’L, FACT OR FICTION?: WHAT HEALTHCARE
PROFESSIONALS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION 52–53 (noting independent sources such as the monthly Prescriber’s Letter concerning
new treatments as well as “Worst Pills, Best Pills” that provides information on prescription
and over-the-counter drugs). However, doctors do not seem to refer to these in studies
regarding sources of information.
42. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2017).
43. E.g., MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUG COMPANIES 112 (2004); see also
CENTER FOR INFORMATION AND STUDY ON CLINICAL RESEARCH PARTICIPATION, WHAT IS A
PLACEBO CONTROLLED CLINICAL TRIAL? (explaining placebo controlled clinical trials); Gary
T. Chiodo, Susan W. Tolle & Leslie Bevan, Placebo-Controlled Trials: Good Science or
Medical Neglect?, 172 W.J. MED. 271, 271 (2000) (noting that the gold standard for clinical
trials has traditionally been randomized trials comparing experimental treatment with
placebo). However, placebos are not typically used in studying treatments regarding serious
and life-threatening conditions including cancer. Clinical Research Versus Medical
Treatment,
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
(Mar.
22,
2018)
https://www.fda.gov/forpatients/clinicaltrials
/clinicalvsmedical/default.htm [https://perma.cc/7MS7-2H8U].
44. ANGELL, supra note 43, at 78–79. Although this is not helpful to consumers,
corporations have incentives to not only promote their bottom line, but to avoid clinical studies
that end up helping competitors. E.g., Winslow, supra note 11 (discussing Bristol Myers
Squibb’s failed attempt to establish that its cholesterol-lowering drug compared well to
Pfizer’s Lipitor in a rare head to head comparison of competing drugs).
45. Sometimes companies instruct sales representatives to not disclose relevant
information. E.g., Shannon Hall & Jeanne Lenzer, The Problem with Medicine: We Don’t
Know if Most of It Works, DISCOVER (Feb. 11, 2011), http://discovermagazine
.com/2010/nov/11-the-problem-with-medicine-dont-know-if-most-works
[https://perma
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publications;46 there are even reports that companies sometimes threaten
independent doctors or scientists who raise issues.47 Although companies can be

.cc/A8JG-VBDE] (noting that Pfizer representatives were instructed not to provide relevant
study showing that inexpensive generic drugs were equally effective as brand name drugs for
reducing heart attacks and actually safer). At other times, sales representatives are instructed
to provide messages that are not firmly supported by data. For example, Purdue trained its
sales representatives to tell doctors the risk of addiction from OxyContin was less than one
percent. This was based on a study involving burn victims treated with opioids that had no
bearing on the long term use of opioids to treat chronic pain, and in fact, contradicts many
studies showing high incidence of abuse for chronic pain. Art Van Zee, The Promotion and
Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public Health Tragedy, 99 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 221, 223 (2009).
46. A famous example involves the anti-inflammatory drug sold as Vioxx, that was at one
point the best-selling drug with over $2 billion a year in sales—before it was removed from
the market after initially suppressed studies revealed that it was associated with an increase in
heart attacks and strokes. HOLLY PRESLEY, INSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS: VIOXX AND THE MERCK
TEAM EFFORT (2009); see also ELLIOTT, supra note 20, at 103 (noting that although company
disclosed study showing that Vioxx led to a 500% increase of risk of heart attacks compared
to naproxen, Merck stated that naproxen protected the heart); Rita Rubin, How Did Vioxx
Debacle Happen?, USA TODAY (Oct. 12, 2004, 12:00 AM), https://usatoday30
.usatoday.com/news/health/2004-10-12-vioxx-cover_x.htm [https://perma.cc/SD2M-7789].
In some cases, companies have been found to fail to adequately notify the public of known
risks. E.g., Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., Grassley, Baucus, Release Committee
Report
on
Avandia,
(Feb.
20,
2010),
https://www.finance.senate.gov
/release/grassley-baucus-release-committee-report-on-avandia
[https://perma.cc/T5CQ
-WA9A] (discussing Senate Report concluding that GSK failed to warn patients regarding
cardiovascular risks from its drug Avandia and that the company instead improperly
intimidated independent doctors to not discuss problems). Along somewhat similar lines,
companies sometimes financially support entities that appear independent to the public, but
essentially advocate the corporate position; these could be seemingly independent
associations, as well as patient advocacy groups. E.g., Celine Grounder, Who Is Responsible
for the Pain-Pill Epidemic?, NEW YORKER (Nov. 8, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com
/business/currency/who-is-responsible-for-the-pain-pill-epidemic
[https://perma.cc/LZK9
-TN9A] (noting the role of the Joint Commission, which controls accreditation of health
facilities and was funded by companies to penalize physicians for undertreatment of pain that
helped to encourage more use of opioids); Charles Ornstein & Tracy Weber, American Pain
Foundation Shuts Down as Senators Launch Investigation of Prescription Narcotics,
PROPUBLICA (May 8, 2012, 8:57 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/senate-panel
-investigates-drug-company-ties-to-pain-groups [https://perma.cc/R4BK-4HV5] (noting
financial ties between the now defunct American Pain Foundation and the industry); Charles
Ornstein & Tracy Weber, The Champion of Painkillers, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 23, 2011, 9:15
AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-champion-of-painkillers
[https://perma.cc
/EA9V-Q5UT] (noting American Pain Society’s role in encouraging aggressive treatment of
pain, including use of narcotics).
47. E.g., ELLIOTT, supra note 20, at 103–04 (noting Merck attempts to neutralize and
discredit those that raised concerns regarding Vioxx and heart disease included threatening
withdrawal of funding to researcher’s university); Gardiner Harris, Research Ties Diabetes
Drug to Heart Woes, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com
/2010/02/20/health/policy/20avandia.html [https://perma.cc/4PEU-SVF6] (noting that
GlaxoSmithKline intimidated independent doctors and investigators with potential legal
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sanctioned,48 the reality is that before problems are discovered, public health may be
at risk for a number of years.49 Moreover, public health may suffer even after
independent scientists debunk pharmaceutical claims; a pivotal example is the opioid
epidemic that resulted from aggressive industry marketing that included
affirmatively false information, such as the assertion that opioids were not addictive,
which resulted in a settlement of criminal charges in 2007, as well as more recent
litigation for continuing misrpresentation.50
Companies seem well aware of the relevance and impact of their advertising since
they spend substantial resources advertising not only to consumers in the United

action for suggesting heart risks with its drug Avandia even though the company was aware
of risks, yet continued to market the drug aggressively).
48. For example, Paxil was sued for fraud for concealing negative information about
Paxil, that included four negative clinical trials and only one positive one. Complaint, United
States v. GlaxoSmithKline (D. Mass. Oct. 26, 2011) (No. 11-10398-RWZ) (suit for false
claims act).
49. For example, Paxil was sued for fraud for concealing negative information about
Paxil, that included four negative clinical trials and only one positive one. Complaint, United
States v. GlaxoSmithKline (D. Mass. Oct. 26, 2011) (No. 11-10398-RWZ) (suit for false
claims act). Gupta, supra note 38, at 11, 13 (noting that serious adverse events were reported
after approval of Tamiflu that were not in the selectively published articles). Indeed, one
scholar has suggested that newly approved FDA drugs are de facto tested on the general public
since it is impossible for “clinical trials to detect rare adverse events.” Jonathan J. Darrow,
Crowdsourcing Clinical Trials, 98 MINN. L. REV. 805, 805 (2014).
50. United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569 (W.D. Va. 2007);
Complaint, Oregon v. Purdue (Or. Cir. Ct., Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.doj.state.or.us/wpcontent/uploads/2018/09/State_v._Purdue_Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZK3H-WGND];
Barry Meier, In Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 Million, N.Y. TIMES (May 10,
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/business/11drug-web.html [https://perma.cc
/D7DH-585S]; Barry Meier, Origins of an Epidemic: Purdue Pharma Knew its Opioids Were
Widely Used, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/29
/health/purdue-opioids-oxycontin.html [https://perma.cc/RK2V-GB4M]; Joanna Walters,
Oxycontin Maker Expected ‘A Blizzard of Prescriptions’ Following Drug’s Launch,
GUARDIAN (Jan 16, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jan/15
/oxycontin-purdue-pharma-massachusetts-opioid-crisis [https://perma.cc/94F7-238U]; Katie
Zezima & Lenny Berstein, Hammer on the Abusers’: Mass. Attorney General Alleges Purdue
Pharma Tried to Shift Blame for Opiod Addicition, WASH. POST (Jan 15, 2019), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/national/hammer-on-the-abusers-mass-attorney-general-alleges
-purdue-pharma-tried-to-shift-blame-for-opioid-addiction/2019/01/15/4af25c4c-190c-11e9
-88fe-f9f77a3bcb6c_story.html?utm_term=.40c054446211 [https://perma.cc/3RNP-ZM92].
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States,51 but also especially to doctors.52 Most money is spent on “detailing,” which
refers to work done by individual sales representatives who visit doctors to
personally inform them of new drugs with presentations and brochures, as well as
provide samples.53 Unsurprisingly, this information has been found to be incomplete
and misleading.54 Although doctors generally recognize that detailing is likely
biased, they may still rely on it because it is convenient. 55 Along somewhat similar
lines, companies have developed relationships with doctors who are perceived as key
opinion leaders to influence peers and even provide specific presentation slides for

51. The United States is one of two countries permitting companies to advertise drugs
directly to consumers (the other being New Zealand); in both cases, such advertising is of
relatively recent vintage. Sandra Coney, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription
Pharmaceuticals: A Consumer Perspective from New Zealand, 21 J. PUB. POL’Y &
MARKETING 213, 213–14 (2002) (explaining that New Zealand laws were not explicitly
written to cover advertising, but the industry exploited them in the late 1980s and despite
subsequent proposal to ban such advertising, it has remained). Spending on such ads has since
grown substantially. Avinandan Mukherjee, Yam Limbu & Isaac Wanasika, A Review of
Research on Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs: Directions for Future
Research, 7 INT’L J. PHARMACEUTICAL & HEALTHCARE MARKETING 226, 226–27 (2013)
(noting a 330% increase between 1996 and 2005).
52. See Lisa M. Schwartz & Steven Woloshin, Medical Marketing in the United States,
1997-2016, 32 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 80, 82, 87 (2019) (finding that marketing to medical
professionals accounted for the highest proportion of spending during the time studied);
Persuading the Prescribers: Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing and Its Influence on
Physicians and Patients, PEW (Nov. 11, 2013), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and
-analysis/fact-sheets/2013/11/11/persuading-the-prescribers-pharmaceutical-industry-mar
keting-and-its-influence-on-physicians-and-patients [https://perma.cc/75CU-EJBD] (noting
that the industry spent $27 billion in 2012, including more than $24 billion marketing to
doctors alone); Nicole Van Groningen, Big Pharma Gives Your Doctor Gifts. Then Your
Doctor Gives You Big Pharma’s Drugs, WASH. POST (June 13, 2017), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/opinions/big-pharma-gives-your-doctor-gifts-then-your-doctor-gives
-you-big-pharmas-drugs/2017/06/13/5bc0b550-5045-11e7-b064-828ba60fbb98_story.html
?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b80b1f9ee8fd [https://perma.cc/XT7V-URWX] (noting that the
industry spent $24 billion marketing to health care professionals in 2012, which is eight times
the amount spent advertising to consumers). It is estimated that the industry spends $8000–
$13,000 per year on an individual doctor. See Wazana, supra note 20, at 373.
53. Marc-André Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of
Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States, PLOS MED., Jan. 2008, at 29–
31 (finding that detailing and samples constituted the majority of marketing expenditures); see
also Schwartz & Woloshin, supra note 52, at 84, 86 (finding the cost of detailing to doctors
far exceeded medical journal advertising and that companies spent even more on the cost of
samples).
54. E.g., Smita Mali, Sujata Dudhgaonkar & N. Bachewar, Evaluation of Rationality of
Promotional Drug Literature Using World Health Organization Guidelines, 42 INDIAN J.
PHARMACOLOGY 267 (2010). John Oliver has exposed this problem to the public at large.
Marketing to Doctors: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO), YOUTUBE (Feb. 8, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQZ2UeOTO3I [https://perma.cc/85EE-RJ88].
55. See HEALTH ACTION INT’L, supra note 41, at 13 (noting that health professionals are
short on time and thus may be vulnerable to marketing); see also infra note 168 and
accompanying text (noting that some doctors’ belief in the value of marketing is so strong that
they joined a lawsuit against the FDA to permit more marketing).
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such opinion leaders.56 In addition, companies finance scientific studies to be
published in peer reviewed journals to support their drugs. 57 Although peer review
journals are often presumed to be unbiased, especially by courts, 58 in recent years,
studies have found problems with such articles since there is a general publication
bias towards positive results, with some results incapable of reproduction.59
Moreover, studies published by self-interested companies are four times more likely
to have favorable outcomes.60 This is not surprising since the industry has no interest
in publishing unfavorable data; so, even though the FDA has all the data, the public
knowledge is incomplete. There are some notable instances of public harm during
the period after drug approval when independent scientists conduct their own studies
without access to original data.61 In addition, the incomplete public knowledge from

56. E.g., Sergio Sismondo, Key Opinion Leaders and the Corruption of Medical
Knowledge: What the Sunshine Act Will and Won’t Cast Light on, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 635
(2013). Of course, after the Sunshine Act, payments to physicians need to be disclosed, which
might limit payments. However, this nonetheless is an example of how companies are invested
in utilizing all possible avenues of influencing doctors, including methods that other doctors
may not perceive as marketing.
57. E.g., ELLIOTT, supra note 20, at 28–39 (discussing the ghost writing of articles); Joel
Lexchin, Those Who Have the Gold Make the Evidence: How the Pharmaceutical Industry
Biases the Outcomes of Clinical Trials of Medications, 18 SCI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 247
(2011). Journals have their own self-interest to consider when publishing articles from the
industry that sponsors lucrative ads. See ELLIOTT, supra note 20, at 39 (noting that in 2004
medical journals generated twice as much from advertising revenue as from subscriptions);
Kamran Abbasi & Richard Smith, No More Free Lunches, 326 BRIT. MED. J. 1155 (2003)
(“[T]he stark reality is that without pharmaceutical sponsorship many journals would not
survive.”). Moreover, companies that publish articles will also pay hefty fees for reprints of
the articles to then distribute to doctors. ELLIOTT, supra note 20, at 41.
58. E.g., Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 67 (D.D.C. 1998) (noting
that the “FDA exaggerates its overall place in the universe” in suggesting that FDA review
was necessary to ensure accuracy of data in peer review publications that companies wanted
to promote).
59. E.g., John P. A. Ioannidis, Why Most Published Research Findings Are False, PLOS
MED., Aug. 2015, at 0696, 0697; SILAS BOYE NISSEN, TALI MAGIDSON, KEVIN GROSS & CARL
T. BERGSTROM, ELIFE, PUBLICATION BIAS AND THE CANONIZATION OF FALSE FACTS 1, 13
(2016).
60. Joel Lexchin, Lisa A. Bero, Benjamin Djulbegovic & Otavio Clark, Pharmaceutical
Industry Sponsorship and Research Outcome and Quality: Systematic Review, 326 BRIT. MED.
J. 1167 (2003); Richard Smith, Medical Journals Are an Extension of the Marketing Arm of
Pharmaceutical Companies, PLOS MED., May 2005, at 364; see also Donald W. Light, Joel
Lexchin & Jonathan J. Darrow, Institutional Corruption of Pharmaceuticals and the Myth of
Safe and Effective Drugs, 14 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 590, 595 (2013) (noting that positive results
can be published twice). This can be done “by asking the ‘right’ questions,” such as comparing
the drug with a treatment known to be inferior, or low doses of competitor drugs, as well as
publishing the same results multiple times. Smith, supra, at 365; see also Christopher T.
Robertson, The Money Blind: How to Stop Industry Bias in Biomedical Science, Without
Violating the First Amendment, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 358, 370–71 (2013).
61. Vioxx is an excellent example of this problem since a published article failed to
disclose all data and misrepresented heart risks. Harlan Krumholz et al., What Have We Learnt
from Vioxx?, 334 BRIT. MED. J. 120, 121 (2007).
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published literature is further complicated by the fact that some seemingly
independent articles may actually be ghost written by the industry. 62
Studies repeatedly show that pharmaceutical promotion efforts do influence
which drugs doctors prescribe. Some studies indicate that doctors who rely more on
marketing information tend to prescribe more. 63 Meetings with pharmaceutical
representatives impact prescriptions, as well as doctor requests for drugs to be added
to formularies, even when not superior to existing drugs.64 Pharmaceutical marketing
can be highly effective at driving demand for drugs, even when those drugs are not
superior to existing drugs. 65 The effectiveness of marketing to persuade doctors is

62. ELLIOTT, supra note 20, at 28–39 (discussing ghost-writing articles).
63. E.g., Roberto Cardarelli, John C. Licciardone & Lockwood G. Taylor, A CrossSectional Evidence-Based Review of Pharmaceutical Promotional Marketing Brochures and
Their Underlying Studies: Is What They Tell Us Important and True?, BMC FAM. PRAC., Mar.
2006, at 1, 2; T. Shawn Caudill, Nicole Lurie & Eugene C. Rich., The Influence of
Pharmaceutical Industry Advertising on Physician Prescribing, 22 J. DRUG ISSUES 331 (2012).
64. Wazana supra note 20, at 375 (noting multiple studies showing that meeting with
pharmaceutical representatives was associated with increased prescriptions and formulary
requests and that these drugs generally presented no therapeutic advantage); see also Wash.
Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 63–64 (D.D.C. 1998) (noting substantial
evidence that meeting with representatives increased prescription sales, such that
manufacturers would want to disseminate information even though the court ultimately found
it impermissible for the FDA to limit information from representatives). The impact of
detailing is also underscored by the fact that when detailing is limited, prescriptions fall. Ian
Larkin, Desmond Ang, Jerry Avorn & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Restrictions on Pharmaceutical
Detailing Reduced Off-Label Prescribing of Antidepressants and Antipsychotics in Children,
33 HEALTH AFF. 1014, 1020–21 (2014) [hereinafter Larkin et al., Restrictions] (finding that
after strict detailing policies, there was a reduction in market share of more than one-third of
drugs detailed and approved for use in children and even for uses unapproved in children, even
though these should theoretically never have been promoted); see also Ian Larkin et al.,
Association Between Academic Medical Center Pharmaceutical Detailing Policies and
Physician Prescribing, 317 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1785 (2017) [hereinafter Larkin et al.,
Physician Prescribing] (finding association between limiting representatives and change in
prescribing).
65. E.g., Cardarelli et al., supra note 63, at 2 (noting that marketing of expensive new
drugs using calcium channel blockers resulted in the new drugs commanding a greater market
share than older and equally effective drugs); Hall & Lenzer, supra note 45 (quoting Dr.
Hoffman, a professor of emergency medicine at the University of Southern California, who
says that repeatedly “[s]ome expensive new drug becomes a blockbuster best seller following
extensive marketing, even though the best one might be able to say about it is that it seems
statistically ‘non-inferior’ to an older, cheaper drug”). Moreover, this can lead to public health
problems, such as with Vioxx, which was not only not better than prior drugs, but actually less
safe, as well as OxyContin, which provided no advantage over existing opioids, but aggressive
promotion has promoted an opioid addiction crisis. Van Zee, supra note 45, at 221–24 (noting
studies that indicate the drug’s only improvement is reduced dosing, but that marketing of
false information, together with generous bonuses to representatives for such marketing,
resulted in a nearly tenfold increase of prescriptions for non-cancer pain relief, as well as
addiction). Indeed, OxyContin was the most prescribed brand name opioid in 2001 for
moderate to severe pain, even though it had not been shown to be superior to other opioids.
Id. at 225.
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not surprising since companies have relied heavily on methods known in marketing
literature to be persuasive.66 Moreover, companies also indirectly influence doctors
by marketing directly to consumers. Studies have shown that some doctors feel
pressure to prescribe a specific drug requested by a consumer, even when a doctor
may not be personally persuaded that it is a superior treatment. 67 Some policies
intended to limit pharmaceutical company interaction with physicians to decrease
conflicts of interest have resulted in changes to some prescription behavior.68
C. FDA Regulation of Off-Label Uses
An important subset of pharmaceutical marketing involves the extent to which
companies are permitted to regulate so-called “off-label” uses of drugs that the FDA
has approved. This Section briefly explains what off-label use is, and then explains
the current FDA position on regulation of the marketing of such uses.
The first question is what constitutes an “off-label” use. As previously discussed,
the FDA approves a specific drug not for any purpose, but only for intended
purpose(s) that a company requests. So, when a company requests FDA approval of
a drug, it focuses its clinical tests on the intended purpose(s) it wishes to establish as
safe and effective, rather than all possible purposes. Notably, although FDA approval
is based on particular intended use(s), once approved, a drug may be prescribed by a

66. E. E. Roughead, K. J. Harvey & A. L. Gilbert, Commercial Detailing Techniques
Used by Pharmaceutical Representatives to Influence Prescribing, 28 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. MED.
306, 307 (1998) (techniques include reciprocity for gifts, friendship, social validation, appeal
to authority, and scarcity); Allen F. Shaughnessy, David C. Slawson & Joshua H. Bennett,
Separating the Wheat from the Chaff: Identifying Fallacies in Pharmaceutical Promotion, 9
J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 563 (1994) (noting that although information on its own almost never
persuades, all advertising, including advertisement of drugs, is successful by appealing to
emotions and vulnerabilities).
67. E.g., Barbara Mintzes, Morris L. Barer, Richard L. Kravitz, Ken Bassett, Joel
Lexchin, Arminée Kazanjian, Robert G. Evans, Richard Pan & Stephen A. Marion, How Does
Direct-to-Consumer Advertising (DTCA) Affect Prescribing? A Survey in Primary Care
Environments with and Without Legal DTCA, 169 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 405, 408, 411
(2003) (finding that advertising leads to patient requests for drugs and that doctors in roughly
half of cases prescribed a drug that was “unlikely” or only “possibly” relevant); Joel S.
Weissman, David Blumenthal, Alvin J. Silk, Michael Newman, Kinga Zapert, Robert Leitman
& Sandra Feibelmann, Physicians Report on Patient Encounters Involving Direct-toConsumer Advertising, HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVE) 219, 225 (2004) (finding that thirtynine percent of doctors prescribed advertised drugs, with less than half believing the prescribed
drug was the most effective drug for the patient). Some have suggested that doctors yield to
patient requests to avoid disappointment, as well as switching physicians. E.g., Robert A. Bell,
Michael S. Wilkes & Richard L. Kravitz, Advertisement-Induced Prescription Drug Requests:
Patients’ Anticipated Reactions to a Physician Who Refuses, 48 J. FAM. PRAC. 446 (1999).
68. Larkin et al., Physician Prescribing, supra note 64, at 1786, 1793 (2017) (providing
an evaluation of U.S. academic medical centers in five states with largest number of
academically affiliated physicians found eight of eleven institutions with policies regulating
gifts and representative access to have statistically significant results, as well as statistically
significant changes in market share for six of eight drug classes).
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doctor for any purpose, including uses not approved by the FDA. 69 In other words,
when a doctor prescribes an approved drug for a different purpose or use, it is
considered “off-label.”
At first glance, it may seem inefficient for the FDA to only evaluate a drug based
on one, or even a few limited, intended purposes. However, the FDA regulatory
system involves a delicate balance. The FDA wants to protect public health and also
wants the regulatory system to incentivize companies to develop and submit data to
support specific uses. So, for example, a company that obtains approval for one initial
use of a drug can later request approval for additional uses—if it provides data
establishing these new uses as safe and effective.70 However, since FDA jurisdiction
covers drugs, but not the practice of medicine, the FDA does not bar doctors from
prescribing drugs for off-label use.71
The FDA did not initially set out to regulate off-label uses, or marketing of such
uses. Rather, it only considered regulating off-label use after a specific off-label use
touted in a journal article led to serious concern that ultimately prompted
congressional pressure for the FDA to rigorously regulate off-label use.72 The FDA
initially proposed direct regulation of off-label use, but after opposition from doctors,
the FDA asserted it would not limit medical treatment and nixed a proposal to bar
shipments of drugs for off-label use.73 Since then, the FDA has developed its current
position that focuses on limiting dissemination of information by self-interested
companies about possible uses that it has not evaluated. This focus arises out of
concern that such communications, although potentially helpful, might not fairly
represent reliable scientific information because of a potential to mislead, given that
the FDA has not had any opportunity to verify whether the communication is
scientifically supported.
The FDA currently regulates off-label use of drugs through a complex and indirect
scheme focused on companies;74 this regulation incentivizes companies to conduct
scientific studies to establish whether new uses are supported.75 There is no express
legal prohibition of off-label promotion under the existing statute.76 Rather,

69. E.g., United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2012).
70. This is consistent with the fact that the FDA evaluates whether a drug is safe and
effective for a stated indication. See supra Section I.A. In addition, companies can and do
often obtain approvals for many different uses of a drug. For example, Abbvie has obtained
many approvals for different uses of its blockbuster drug Humira. 10th New Indication for
Humira Approved by FDA, PHARMALETTER (Jan. 7, 2016) https://www.thepharmaletter.com
/article/10th-new-indication-for-humira-approved-by-fda [https://perma.cc/CLG7-VUC6].
71. 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2012).
72. Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 5, at 321–22.
73. Id. at 322–23.
74. See Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); see also
Nathan Cortez, The Statutory Case Against Off-Label Promotion, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE
124 (2016) (explaining why FDA regulation of off-label promotion is justified).
75. FDA Memorandum, supra note 6.
76. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The FDCA and its
accompanying regulations do not expressly prohibit the ‘promotion’ or ‘marketing’ of drugs
for off-label use.”). However, labeling that suggests an unapproved use may cause a drug to
be “new,” for that use, such that a company could be liable of introducing a new drug into
interstate commerce without approval. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4)(i)(a) (2017).
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companies, and their representatives, may be subject to criminal liability if they
introduce, or conspire to introduce, a “misbranded” drug into interstate commerce. 77
What constitutes a “misbranded” drug, in turn, includes if its “labeling” is inadequate
for “intended use.”78 Labeling is defined to include not just the actual label on a drug,
but also accompanying documents, even if separately distributed.79 Intended use can
be established by advertising as well as oral or written statements by representatives
of a company.80 Given the complex web of statutory provisions involved, as well as
First Amendment challenges, the FDA has issued a series of guidance documents
over the years concerning what actions would immunize a company from
prosecution for misbranding.81
Misbranding is a serious issue for companies not only because it may result in
criminal liability. In particular, a criminal conviction against a company due to
misbranding can result in the complete exclusion of all of its drugs from participation
in federal health care programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid, which serve as
significant sources of revenue for most pharmaceutical companies. 82 In addition, a
company that promotes a drug for off-label use may face substantial fines under the
False Claims Act based on the theory that marketing of off-label use caused false
claims to be submitted for government programs, such as Medicare, knowing that
such claims cannot be properly reimbursed.83

77. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2012).
78. 21 U.S.C. § 352 (a), (f) (2012).
79. 21 U.S.C. § 321(m) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(l)(2) (2017).
80. 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (2017). In addition, a recent revision added a “totality of
evidence” requirement. 82 Fed. Reg. 2193 (Jan. 9, 2017) (revising the standard of intended
use for 21 C.F.R. § 201).
81. Thus far, guidance documents have increasingly liberalized what companies may do,
especially in light of recent commercial speech cases. Indeed, the most recent guidance
documents issued in June 2018 are a further expansion of the 2017 proposed guidelines.
Compare U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CTR. FOR DRUG
EVALUATION & RESEARCH, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, CTR. FOR DEVICES
& RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH & OFFICE OF THE COMM’R, DRUG AND DEVICE MANUFACTURER
COMMUNICATIONS WITH PAYORS, FORMULARY COMMITTEES, AND SIMILAR ENTITIES—
QUESTION AND ANSWERS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND REVIEW STAFF (2018), with U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION &
RESEARCH, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, CTR. FOR DEVICES &
RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH & OFFICE OF THE COMM’R, DRUG AND DEVICE MANUFACTURER
COMMUNICATIONS WITH PAYORS, FORMULARY COMMITTEES, AND SIMILAR ENTITIES—
QUESTION AND ANSWERS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND REVIEW STAFF (2017); see also ROPES
& GRAY, FDA ISSUES FINAL GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS RELATING TO MEDICAL PRODUCT
MANUFACTURER COMMUNICATIONS (2018) (referring to guidance documents as providing
more flexibility to manufacturers, as well as noting specific changes such as expanding the
safe harbor to include new uses in addition to investigational products).
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(f) (2012); see also Katrice Bridges Copeland, Enforcing
Integrity, 87 IND. L.J. 1033 (2012).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2012); 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012); see also Joan H. Krause, Truth,
Falsity, and Fraud: Off-Label Drug Settlements and the Future of the Civil False Claims Act,
71 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 401 (2016).
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Despite the serious legal implications of off-label promotion, companies may be
acting rationally in accepting these risks and promoting off-label drugs. Companies
seem to consider possible fines simply as part of the cost of doing business given that
virtually all major pharmaceutical companies have settled for eye-popping amounts
yet continue to promote drugs off-label.84 For example, Pfizer paid $2.3 billion for
illegally marketing the painkiller sold as Bextra, which was a record amount in 2009,
yet it constituted less than three weeks of sales. 85 In addition, although the financial
implications of being barred from Medicare and Medicaid is a substantial threat,
because the federal government has never barred a company and instead has settled
suits for a fraction of possible profits, it has not been a serious one.86 Companies also
have an incentive to promote drugs for all possible uses—even if not legally
permitted—due to the fact that such drugs are oftentimes patented but with a
relatively short window for companies to recoup profits. In particular, a patent on a
drug permits a company to exclude all others from making the identical drug during
the effective patent term, which is roughly ten years after FDA approval. 87 Moreover,
since not all drugs investigated by a company make it to the marketplace, companies
have an incentive to maximize profits for FDA-approved patented drugs before the
patent expires and other companies can make identical versions (i.e., low-cost
generics) which can substantially undermine profits. Although a company could seek
approval for a use currently not approved, that takes time and money, and may not
be considered worthwhile if the patent term has expired or is soon to expire.
Although off-label use of drugs is not a new phenomenon, and in some situations
is reasonable,88 recent expansion of commercial speech to permit greater promotion

84. See, e.g., SAMMY ALMASHAT, SIDNEY M. WOLFE & MICHAEL CAROME, TWENTY-FIVE
YEARS OF PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PENALTIES: 1991 THROUGH 2015
(2016), https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/2311_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/3B25-73BY];
Lena Groeger, Big Pharma’s Big Fines, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 24, 2014), http://projects
.propublica.org/graphics/bigpharma [https://perma.cc/K5X4-T6HS]; see also Aaron S.
Kesslehim, Devan Darby, David M. Studdert, Robert Glynn, Raisa Levin & Jerry Avorn, False
Claims Act Prosecution Did Not Deter Off-Label Drug Use in the Case of Neurontin, 30
HEALTH AFF. 2318 (2011).
85. Gardiner Harris, Pfizer Pays $2.3 Billion to Settle Marketing Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
2, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/03/business/03health.html [https://perma.cc
/26NK-AUC5].
86. E.g., Copeland, supra note 82, at 1035.
87. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). Although the patent term is longer than this, since a patented
drug can’t be sold without FDA approval, which usually comes several years after the patent
is granted, the commercially effective term is shorter. Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon,
Effective Patent Life in Pharmaceuticals, 19 INT’L J. TECH. MGMT. 98, 109 (2000) (finding
mean of 11.7 years for analyzing drugs approved between 1990 and 1995). However, recent
studies suggest that due to patent protection of multiple aspects of a marketed drug, the
combined effective patent term could be longer. Amy Kapczynski, Chan Park & Bhaven
Sampat, Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): An Empirical Analysis of
“Secondary” Pharmaceutical Patents, PLOS ONE, Dec. 2012, at 6 (finding secondary patents
can add four to eleven additional years of patent term).
88. E.g., Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d. 196, 201–03 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
(noting that off-label uses are widely recognized, including by the FDA itself). This may be
true where there is no FDA approved treatment for a condition. See FDA Memorandum, supra
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of off-label uses creates a public health concern.89 Studies indicate that about three
quarters of off-label uses have little or no scientific evidence to support them.90 This
can be problematic since even before the expansion of commercial speech for offlabel marketing, one study suggested that approximately twenty percent of
prescriptions were for off-label uses.91 Similarly, before the commercial speech
expansion, there have been documented instances of death or serious injuries
including heart problems92 and strokes,93 based on off-label marketing.94 Fatal
reactions from off-label uses of drugs may even result in the FDA adding warnings
to the packaging even though the off-label use is not officially FDA regulated. 95

note 6. Similarly, since most drugs are tested on adults, rather than children, off-label usage is
also important in that context. Alicia T. F. Bazzano, Rita Mangione-Smith, Matthias Schonlau,
Marika J. Suttorp & Robert H. Brook, Off-Label Prescribing to Children in the United States
Outpatient Setting, 9 ACAD. PEDIATRICS 81 (2009); Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn,
Pharmaceutical Promotion of Physicians and First Amendment Rights, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1727, 1730 (2008).
89. In particular, off-label use can be the norm where there are no alternative treatments,
such as some types of cancer. Similarly, off-label use is common for children since most drugs
are approved for use only on adults. Accordingly, the FDA has stated that off-label uses may
be important or even constitute medically recognized standard of care in some situations. FDA
Memorandum, supra note 6, at 17.
90. See Tewodros Eguale, David L. Buckeridge, Nancy E. Winslade, Andrea Benedetti,
James A. Hanley & Robyn Tamblyn, Drug, Patient, and Physician Characteristics Associated
with Off-Label Prescribing in Primary Care, 172 J. AM. MED. ASS’N: INTERNAL MED. 781,
783 (2012) (finding that seventy-nine percent of off-label prescriptions in Canada lacked
strong scientific basis based on actual prescription data); David C. Radley, Stan N. Finkelstein
& Randall S. Stafford, Off-Label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N: INTERNAL MED 1021, 1025 (2006).
91. Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use—Rethinking the Role of the FDA,
358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1427 (2008).
92. HEALTH ACTION INT’L, supra note 41, at 29 (noting deaths from benfluorex, sold as
Mediator when used off-label as appetite suppressant); Kate Cohen, Fen Phen Nation, PBS
(Nov. 13, 2003), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/prescription/hazard
/fenphen.html [https://perma.cc/S4N9-V6S4] (noting that the FDA had to withdraw drugs
commonly combined as “Fen Phen” from the market in 1997 after studies by the Mayo Clinic
revealed the unapproved combination led to heart valve disease).
93. For example, Risperdal was marketed to doctors for elderly patients and used off label
for dementia but can cause stroke-like attacks. Two years after such use, the manufacturer
finally sent a warning to doctors regarding this problem after Canadian drug regulators issued
a warning and only after FDA officials had enough information to compel the company to
issue the warning. Alison Young & Chris Adams, Prescribing Drugs “Off-Label” Is Routine,
but Can Injure, Kill Patients, MCCLATCHY DC BUREAU (Nov. 2, 2003, 6:32 PM),
https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-government/article24476629.html
[https://
perma.cc/74AP-KJG7] (noting that a patient suffered stroke-like heart attacks while using
Risperdal off-label).
94. In addition, sometimes off-label use puts patients at increased risk for serious diseases,
such as cancer or Alzheimer’s. This was the case with off-label prescribing of hormone
replacements to address menopause symptoms such as hot flashes. Nelson et al., supra note
37, at 110–11 (explaining how hormone replacement is associated with risk of cancer).
95. For example, Rituxan was approved for non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, but when offlabel prescriptions for a variety of unapproved uses led to severe and sometimes fatal reactions,
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Notably, a recent study showed that adverse drug effects are more likely with offlabel use, especially for those without strong scientific evidence, which constitutes
the majority of such uses.96 Finally, even if off-label use does not affirmatively harm
patients, it may still be a poor use of drugs for essentially ineffective treatments and
result in waste of resources. One prominent example involves Tamiflu, which was
promoted off-label to reduce complications based on industry-financed articles;
many governments stockpiled Tamiflu based on off-label promotion, as well as
selective publication of only two of ten studies made available to the FDA. 97
D. Introduction to Commercial Speech Law and Policy
The extent to which the FDA can regulate corporate speech surrounding off-label
use of drugs fundamentally raises commercial speech issues under the First
Amendment. Accordingly, this Section first explains what constitutes commercial
speech. Then, this Section explains fundamental distinctions between how
commercial and noncommercial speech are treated, as well as the reasons for the
distinctions. Finally, this Section explains the test that has historically been used to
assess whether government regulation of commercial speech is consistent with the
First Amendment. This Section is intended to introduce the general issues, whereas
later sections address how recent courts have addressed commercial speech that
impacts off-label marketing more specifically.
An initial question is what constitutes commercial speech, since the government
generally has more ability to regulate commercial speech. 98 There is more than one
way that speech can be commercial, and thus subject to some governmental
restrictions. Traditionally, speech has been considered commercial pursuant to a
three-part test: (1) if it constitutes an advertisement, (2) refers to a specific product,
or (3) is made with an economic motivation.99 Speech that does all three of these is
definitively commercial; drug company distribution of scientific articles regarding

the FDA issued alerts and then a warning to the label. Rituximab (Marketed As Rituxan)
Information, FOOD & DRUG. ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/ucm109106
.htm [https://perma.cc/PP5M-DYSM]; see also Rosoff & Coleman, supra note 23, at 669–70
n.71.
96. Tewodros Eguale, David L. Buckeridge, Aman Verma, Nancy E. Winslade, Andrea
Benedetti, James A. Hanley & Robyn Tamlyn, Association of Off-Label Drug Use and
Adverse Drug Events in an Adult Population, 176 J. AM. MED. ASS’N: INTERNAL MED. 55
(2016); see also Aaron S. Kesselheim, John Connolly, James Rogers & Jerry Avorn,
Mandatory Disclaimers on Dietary Supplements Do Not Reliably Communicate the Intended
Issues, 34 HEALTH AFF. 438, 438 (2015) [hereinafter Kesselheim et al., Mandatory
Disclaimers] (noting poor efficacy or harm in recent years with promotion of off-label uses).
97. E.g., HEALTH ACTION INT’L, supra note 41; Brownlee & Lenzer, supra note 38 (noting
only two of ten studies published). This may have been an extreme case where the off-label
use was suggested by the CDC, which has subsequently been revealed to have relied on
industry funding. Lenzer, supra note 38.
98. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 781
(1976). However, before then, the Court had considered there to be no Constitutional restraint
on “purely commercial advertising” that was well within the realm of “legislative judgment.”
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
99. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 426 U.S. at 761, 781.
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off-label uses of their drugs to doctors has been found to meet all three.100 In addition,
what is considered commercial speech has expanded in recent years. 101
First Amendment jurisprudence has traditionally treated commercial speech
differently than noncommercial speech. Noncommercial speech that is traditionally
considered at the core of the First Amendment, such as political or religious speech,
is generally immune from government restriction since restrictions are invalid unless
they pass strict scrutiny.102 Commercial speech, on the other hand, has traditionally
been evaluated under a more lenient intermediate scrutiny test, as explained below. 103
The differing levels of scrutiny have generally resulted in individuals having a right
to freely express opinions, including false ones, whereas governments have
traditionally been permitted to regulate clearly false and misleading commercial
statements.
The reason for the difference relates to the underlying policy distinctions. In
particular, all speech of individuals is considered to promote a “marketplace of ideas”
that fosters better-informed citizenry, and is consistent with democratic selfdetermination;104 the democratic tie-in is important to permitting any individual to
freely express opinions, including ones that are false. 105 This rationale also explains
the few situations where individual speech is not protected, including fighting words
and obscenity, which do not involve reasoned and deliberative response.106 Although
a “marketplace of ideas” has been referenced in the context of commercial speech, it
is generally only in the context of making intelligent decisions based on the free flow
of commercial information without any tie to democratic principles. 107
Notably, commercial speech has historically only been protectable under the First
Amendment because the information is valuable to the audience, but not because the
speaker has any right to speak.108 This policy distinction is why the government can

100. Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 64 (D.D.C. 1998).
101. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 568–71 (2011); Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
102. Of course, this does not apply to speech that has no informational value, such as
obscenity or fighting words. See infra note 106.
103. Sorrell obviously suggests that commercial speech regulation is subject to heightened
scrutiny based on viewpoint targeting, although what this means is still unclear. 564 U.S. 552.
104. See id. at 583.
105. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 718 (2012); Jennifer M. Keighley, Can
You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 539, 551 (2012).
106. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (denying First Amendment protection to
sexual materials with no “literary, artistic, political, or scientific value”); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (barring speech that is likely to incite imminent lawless action);
Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (noting that profane, libelous,
and “fighting” words “are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality”).
107. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 760
(1976).
108. E.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (noting that the state
right to regulate some commercial speech is because commercial speech is not a speakeroriented autonomy right and thus gets more limited protection); Keighley, supra note 105, at
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sometimes regulate commercial speech and, even in some cases, mandate that
commercial speakers provide information to consumers under some situations based
on the same principle that commercial speech should inform consumers. 109 Although
one scholar has argued First Amendment law, including commercial speech,
recognizes speaker rights,110 courts have thus far not explicitly noted any reason to
depart from the traditional audience-centric rationale for commercial speech.111
The traditional framework for analyzing whether regulation of commercial speech
is permissible is according to the intermediate scrutiny test first announced by the
Supreme Court’s 1980 decision in Central Hudson.112 More recently, the Supreme
Court majority in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. applied the Central Hudson test113 even
though it controversially suggested that a regulation targeting commercial speech of
pharmaceutical companies should be subject to stricter scrutiny. 114 The Sorrell

554; Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 165,
170, 172 (2015); Shanor, supra note 8, at 146 (noting that commercial speech doctrine was
created as a tool of consumer protection during the consumer protection movement, and not
to promote autonomy interests of commercial speakers). In addition, many believe that the
doctrine of free speech generally is intended to focus on right of audiences to access ideas
without governmental interference, rather than the rights of speakers. E.g., Daniel A. Farber,
Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV.
554, 558–59 (1991); Eugene Volokh, The Freedom of Speech and Bad Purposes, 63 UCLA
L. REV. 1366, 1370–71 (2016).
109. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985). However, the
government can only compel speech that is purely factual and noncontroversial, which has
recently been at issue with FDA regulations that aimed to require mandatory images on
tobacco labeling. As one court noted, although the images are not “patently false,” they can
also be misunderstood or intended to evoke an emotional response. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1216–17 (D.C. Cir. 2012); see also Dist. Tobacco City & Lottery,
Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 560–61 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding that pictures are inherently
persuasive).
110. Leslie Kendrick, Are Speech Rights for Speakers, 103 VA. L. REV. 1767 (2017).
111. One commentator suggests Sorrell’s majority was wrong to ignore the value, or,
rather, lack of value of detailing information for doctors. Alan B. Morrison, No Regrets
(Almost): After Virginia Board of Pharmacy, 25 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 949, 959 (2017).
112. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
113. 564 U.S. 552 (2011). Since the government regulation did not pass the intermediate
test, arguably there was no need to consider whether it would pass a heightened test. Id. at
583–84.
114. Id. at 564–67. However, this is contrary to traditional commercial speech law that
generally permits direct regulation of content, even though this is not permissible regarding
speech of individuals. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6. As some have noted, commercial
speech regulation is, by its very nature, content-based, such that this suggested standard would
threaten widely accepted regulatory activity. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 589 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (noting that “regulatory programs necessarily draw distinctions on the basis of
content” and that it is not unusual for some regulations to be “speaker-based” affecting only a
class of entities, i.e. the regulated ones); Tamara R. Piety, “A Necessary Cost of Freedom”?
The Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012) (“Sorrell’s reasoning
eviscerates the rationale on which Virginia Pharmacy was based—protection of listeners’
interests—and substitutes for it a rationale which elevates the interests of commercial speakers
over that of listeners, such that even where the speech presents a detriment to listeners, it is
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majority opinion did not articulate a specific test and subsequent courts have
similarly applied the same Central Hudson test.115 Accordingly, that remains the
current framework for analysis. There are four parts to analyze under Central Hudson
in terms of whether expression can be properly regulated by the federal or state
government. For commercial speech to be potentially protected, it must first concern
lawful activity and not be actually misleading. Second, the government interest in
regulating the speech must be substantial. Assuming both of those are satisfied, the
third and fourth questions are whether the government regulation directly advances
that interest, and whether it is more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.
The first aspect of the Central Hudson inquiry permits the government to entirely
ban commercial speech that is false or misleading. There is no First Amendment
protection for such speech because there is no information value in inaccurate speech
that is more likely to deceive than inform.116 Although the Supreme Court has framed
this inquiry around whether information is false or misleading, the only type of
information that is absolutely barred is inherently, rather than only potentially, false
or misleading information. The government has the burden to establish inherently
misleading information, which is a high standard. This tough standard has been
rationalized as applicable because the government would otherwise get a “free pass”
without considering other Central Hudson factors.117 On more than one occasion,
courts have been reluctant to accept FDA assertions that the relevant audience will
be misled without empirical support of such confusion. 118
If information is truthful, but potentially misleading, government regulation
depends upon the three other factors. In particular, the government must have a
“substantial interest” in the regulation, the regulation must “directly” advance the

protected because of its value to the speaker.” (emphasis in original)); Shanor, supra note 8,
at 146 (noting that commercial speech is content based).
115. See, e.g., Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
Caronia’s majority stated that strict scrutiny applied, but actually applied the Central Hudson
test. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 164–65 (2d Cir. 2012).
116. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563–64.
117. E.g., Rodney A. Smolla, SMOLLA & NIMMER, COMMERCIAL SPEECH 20:15 (2017
Update) (considering it “drastic medicine” to treat a statement as inherently misleading
because that would give regulators a “free pass” from the usual requirement of proof and
causation” and suggesting suggesting courts treat claims with a “healthy dose of skepticism”).
118. This was true in a number of cases involving marketing of dietary supplements to
consumers. E.g., Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 637 (6th Cir. 2010)
(concluding that proposed claim informs consumers of a “meaningful distinction,” contrary to
FDA position and “at worst . . . misleads” them to believe that milk untreated with rbST harms
their health); Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (dismissing FDA
concerns of consumer confusion and analogizing FDA presumptions concerning consumers
as based on mistaken presumption that “consumers were asked to buy something while
hypnotized, and therefore they are bound to be misled”). In fact, one court even asserted that
it would not be inclined to find statements to be inherently misleading without proof of two
different things: minimal factual support for the allegedly false statement and empirical
support that consumers would be confused. Whitaker v. Thompson, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10
(D.D.C. 2002) (citing Pearson, 164 F.3d at 659–60). Although there is an argument that
consumers may be more likely confused by marketing than doctors, the same burden of proof
would apply to an argument that doctors are confused.
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government interest, and the regulation must be no more extensive than necessary.119
In other words, even if the government has a substantial interest in the regulation, a
complete ban might not withstand First Amendment scrutiny if it is considered more
restrictive than necessary to serve that interest.
In many situations involving government interest regarding regulation of
commercial speech relating to foods and drugs, courts have overruled government
regulations, finding them more extensive than necessary. For example, Thompson v.
Western States, the first Supreme Court commercial speech case involving drugs,
held in a 5-4 decision that specialty compounding pharmacies were permitted to
advertise their products (and could not be banned from all advertising) because there
were other nonspeech restrictions that could be used to satisfy the government
interest in discouraging large-scale manufacturing by these pharmacies, such as
forbidding or limiting compounded drug sales. 120 Also, in Washington Legal
Foundation v. Friedman, the District Court for the District of Columbia similarly
found prior FDA regulations regarding distribution of scientific articles and industrysponsored education relating to off-label use to be overly restrictive on speech.121
This was based on an assumption that providing complete disclosure of the
manufacturer interest would be a less burdensome restriction.122 Along similar lines,
courts have invalidated FDA regulations that attempt to bar health claims for dietary
supplements without significant scientific support; although the courts recognized a
substantial interest in protecting consumers from deceptive marketing practices, the
courts found a complete bar more extensive than necessary without empirical proof
that a disclaimer would fail to correct deceptiveness. 123
II. REVEALING AND DEBUNKING SCHEMAS THAT SUPPORT FIRST
AMENDMENT FALLACIES
This Part explains the existence of two distinct schemas that courts have
perpetuated in cases expanding commercial speech protection for pharmaceutical
marketing: the sophisticated doctor schema and the more information schema. These
schemas are not intended to entirely account for all of commercial speech
jurisprudence. Instead, the goal is to show that some legal presumptions reflect these
schemas rather than empirically supported fact. Understanding these schemas helps
shed light on recent First Amendment cases discussed in Part III, and also serves as

119. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
120. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002). The relatively lax oversight
of drug compounding has failed to promote public health. For example, in 2012, over 60
people were killed and over 700 suffered from meningitis when a company shipped
contaminated drugs. Doris Browne, Fixing a Crisis of Confidence in Drug Compounding,
WASH. EXAMINER (Jan. 16, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/fixing-a
-crisis-of-confidence-in-drug-compounding/article/2645969 [https://perma.cc/2QGL-BECU].
121. 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 72–73 (D.D.C. 1998).
122. Id.
123. Pearson, 164 F.3d. 650; Whitaker, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1. However, in the case of dietary
supplements, it has been noted that the potential for deception is “severely limited,” in that no
serious physical harm will result from consumption of such supplements. Whitaker, 248 F.
Supp. 2d at 16.
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an important foundation for proposed changes suggested in Part IV. This Part begins
with an introduction to schemas based on the literature on cognitive biases. Then, the
existence of each schema in the case law is discussed before explaining why the
schema is not completely supported by fact.
A. Introduction to Schemas
This Section provides fundamental information concerning key aspects from the
vast areas of cognitive bias and behavioral economics that is essential to
understanding the existence of two key schemas introduced in the next two sections.
Essentially, researchers in these areas have repeatedly shown that all individuals,
regardless of education or experience, acquire and process information subject to
certain largely subconscious mental flaws. In particular, although individuals believe
that they approach information systematically and with deductive reasoning, research
shows this is often not the case due to reliance on cognitive biases, heuristics, and
schemas, which are essentially mental shortcuts.124 Incomplete cognitive processing
is actually considered adaptive to deal with an information-rich world and especially
to help efficiently deal with ambiguous situations and/or time-limited situations.125
On some level, individuals seem to intuit this since people often believe that others
are subject to bias—while simultaneously discounting the possibility of having their
own bias.126 Although all individuals are subject to cognitive biases, doctors may be
especially likely to use such processing not only because they are busy, but also
because the process of diagnosis often involves ambiguity and incomplete

124. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011).
125. In addition, although literature often refers to cognitive biases and the word “bias”
may suggest a flaw, they are important for psychological well-being. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1172 (2003)
(only individuals free of biased self-perceptions suffered from clinical depression); see also
LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 2–3 (1957) (noting that individuals
are motivated to ignore or discredit information inconsistent with prior views to prevent
psychological distress that would otherwise result; in other words, people try to avoid
“cognitive dissonance”).
126. This is referred to as naïve realism. Robert J. Robinson, Dacher Keltner, Andrew
Ward & Lee Ross, Actual Versus Assumed Differences in Construal: “Naive Realism” in
Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 404 (1995);
Brad J. Sagarin, Robert B. Cialdini, William E. Rice & Sherman B. Serna, Dispelling the
Illusion of Invulnerability, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 526 (2002). For example, in
the 2012 presidential election, some Republicans assumed Nate Silver was biased, and thus,
his data predicting an Obama win was suspect. Nate Silver, When Internal Polls Mislead, a
Whole Campaign May Be to Blame, N.Y. TIMES: FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 1, 2012, 6:01 AM),
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/when-internal-polls-mislead-a-whole
-campaign-may-be-to-blame [https://perma.cc/33NV-S4P7].
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information, 127 which studies repeatedly show are situations where individuals are
especially likely to rely on cognitive biases. 128
1. Schemas Shape Information Processing
An important type of cognitive flaw in processing information for this Article is
a schema. Essentially, a schema is a mental framework through which individuals
perceive and filter information.129 Schemas are developed through concrete
experiences as well as personal morals and societal roles; some examples of schemas
that are part of popular culture include lawyers as mercenaries, women as shoppers,
and men as relationship avoidant. Schemas operate like other cognitive flaws by
occuring largely outside of conscious awareness.
All individuals, including highly educated individuals such as doctors, scientists,
and judges, hold schemas. Doctors are vulnerable to relying on schemas since the
process of diagnosis typically involves great ambiguity, a situation in which schemas
flourish.130 Studies indicate that doctors tend to generate an early hypothesis that
impacts subsequent information gathering and may result in a faulty diagnosis.131
Similarly, doctors may have schemas that impact how they prescribe drugs; they
could assume that new drugs are superior, or, alternatively, that new drugs pose more
risks.132
Importantly, a schema impacts how new information is perceived. So, for
example, news that a huge iceberg has broken off from the Antarctic shelf is likely
perceived differently by those who believe in global warming, versus those who do
not.133 Schemas also impact how individuals perceive accuracy of information, as

127. See Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to
Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 480–82 (1988) (noting that, contrary
to the assumption that doctors systematically evaluate possible treatments, they rely on general
rules or “heuristics” to deal with the fact that uncertainty pervades practices, given that many
procedures have not been subject to rigorous clinical trials); Jessica Mantel, The Myth of the
Independent Physician: Implications for Health Law, Policy and Ethics, 64 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 455, 471 (2013); see also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH ON THE
COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF MEDICAL TREATMENTS 9 (2007) (noting that less than half
of medical decisions are supported by adequate evidence regarding effectiveness).
128. E.g., Dennis A. Gioia & Peter P. Poole, Scripts in Organizational Behavior, 9 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 449, 454 (1984).
129. AUGOUSTINOS ET AL., supra note 3, at 68–69.
130. Mark P. Higgins & Mary P. Tully, Hospital Doctors and Their Schemas About
Appropriate Prescribing, 39 MED. EDUC. 184 (2005).
131. Elke U. Weber, Ulf Böckenholt, Denis J. Hilton & Brian Wallace, Determinants of
Diagnostic Hypothesis Generation: Effects of Information, Base Rates, and Experience, 19 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1151 (1993).
132. See Cynthia M. Ho, Drugged Out: How Cognitive Bias Hurts Drug Innovation, 51
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 419, 499–504 (2014); Peter R. Mansfield, Healthy Skepticism’s New
AdWatch: Understanding Drug Promotion, 179 MED. J. AUST. 644 (2003) [hereinafter
Mansfield, Healthy Skepticism]; Clement J. McDonald, Medical Heuristics: The Silent
Adjudicators of Clinical Practice, 124 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 56, 57, 59 (1996).
133. Compare Ilissa Ocko, Huge Antarctic Iceberg Breaks Off. Here’s Why It Worries
Scientists, ENVTL. DEF. FUND (July 12, 2017), https://www.edf.org/blog/2017/07/12/huge
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well as whether that information is persuasive. The same information will be
processed differently by those with different schemas. More specifically, schemas
can influence the extent to which an individual considers or discounts research results
depending on whether or not it is consistent with their schema. 134
2. Schemas are Reinforced by Other Cognitive Biases
Schemas are notably resistant to change. According to research, the more people
rely on a schema, the more the schema is resistant to any inconsistent evidence, since
schemas dictate what information an individual will remember.135 In other words,
once a schema is established, individuals view new information consistent with that
schema and even seek out similar information. Schemas are often maintained by a
host of ancillary cognitive biases including confirmation bias, availability, and
overconfidence;136 studies have found doctors to rely on these and other cognitive
biases.137
Confirmation bias is very important to maintaining a schema. This refers to the
tendency to view information consistent with preconceptions and even skew searches
for more information to be consistent with such preconceptions. 138 Essentially,

-antarctic-iceberg-breaks-heres-why-it-worries-scientists [https://perma.cc/D6WH-NM32],
with Dave Mosher, Scientists Say the Delaware-Size Iceberg that Broke Off Antarctica Could
Have Happened Without Global Warming, BUS. INSIDER (July 18, 2017, 3:29 PM), https://
www.businessinsider.com/iceberg-a68-did-climate-change-cause-crack-2017-7
[https://
perma.cc/2G9A-B64K]; see also Justin Worland, New Discovery in Antarctica Suggests Ice
Sheets Could Disappear Way Faster than Previously Thought, TIME (Apr. 19, 2017),
http://time.com/4745827/antarctica-water-climate-change [https://perma.cc/U8UJ-W5VP].
134. In a classic study, subjects were preselected based on their preference for or against
capital punishment. Individuals were more critical of research methods inconsistent with their
beliefs, citing issues such as insufficient sample size, nonrandom sample selection, or absence
of control for key variables. Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation
and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered
Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979); see also Harold H. Kassarjian &
Joel Benjamin Cohen, Cognitive Dissonance and Consumer Behavior, 8 CAL. MGMT. REV. 55
(1965) (smokers were motivated to disregard evidence of health risks of smoking); Ziva
Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 490 (1990) (showing
subjects with high caffeine consumption likely to disbelieve article that supposedly correlated
caffeine with a serious disease and to consider the research less sound).
135. E.g., RICHARD E. NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 146–50 (1980).
136. In addition, a schema may be also reinforced by “anchoring,” a cognitive bias that
gives undue weight to initial information. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1128 (1974). So, once a schema is
established, it may have an anchoring effect against which new information is processed.
137. E.g., Gustavo Saposnik, Donald Redelmeier, Christian C. Ruff & Philippe N. Tobler,
Cognitive Biases Associated with Medical Decisions: A Systematic Review, 16 BIOMED CENT.
138 (2016) (finding that all studies over a thirty-five year period indicate doctors are subject
to at least one cognitive bias and certain ones are associated with diagnostic errors, including
overconfidence).
138. Internet searches can even feed into this since current algorithms are designed to tailor
search results to prior searches.
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people see what they want to see. So, individuals with different prior beliefs may
have very different reactions to the same “facts” (i.e., they will be more likely to
accept new information similar to existing views and be skeptical to information that
is inconsistent with those views). Confirmation bias is most likely to play a role when
trying to comprehend ambiguous information that would be more susceptible to
different interpretations.139 In such situations, individuals with opposing schemas
may become more rooted in those schemas after viewing the same “evidence.”140 In
addition, even if the conclusion from our confirmation biases is objectively
unsupported, the bias is difficult to combat. 141 Studies have shown that even after
information is discredited an individual may continue to believe it; empirical studies
have shown this is the case with the myth that President Obama is not a U.S. citizen,
and especially so among conservatives who would typically be more likely to hold a
negative view of him.142
Doctors are also subject to confirmation bias. Doctors may favor their initial
hypotheses or assumptions due to confirmation bias. 143 For example, while some
doctors erroneously assumed most patients are resistant to aspirin as a low-cost
diuretic, which some companies with more expensive drug alternatives to aspirin had
promoted, this assumption was recently shown to have no scientific justification. 144
Doctors could have been influenced by company advertising to favor the selfinterested corporate idea that patients are resistant to aspirin as a type of confirmation
bias.
The creation, as well as propagation, of a schema can also be related to the
“availability” bias. Essentially, this cognitive shortcut refers to individuals more
easily recalling readily accessible information and assuming it is necessarily
important. In the medical context, the availability heuristic may explain why a 2005

139. One of the most striking examples is that researchers found that conservatives
assumed that the political satire The Colbert Report, was in fact truthful because the show
reflected their own political view. Heather L. LaMarre, Kristen D. Landreville & Michael A.
Beam, The Irony of Satire: Political Ideology and the Motivation to See What You Want to
See in The Colbert Report, 14 INT’L J. PRESS/POL. 212, 222–23 (2009).
140. For example, believers and nonbelievers became more entrenched in their views after
reading a fictitious report concerning religious resurrection. C. Daniel Batson, Rational
Processing or Rationalization?: The Effect of Disconfirming Information on a Stated
Religious Belief, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 176, 176 (1975); see also Lord et al.,
supra note 134 (finding similar results after subjects were provided “evidence” about the
deterrent effects of capital punishment).
141. E.g., George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff, Colin Camerer & Linda Babcock,
Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 139
(1993).
142. E.g., Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of
Political Misperceptions, 32 POL. BEHAV. 303, 323 (2010).
143. See Weber et al., supra note 131.
144. Tilo Grosser, Susanne Fries, John A. Lawson, Shiv C. Kapoor, Gregory R. Grant &
Garret A. FitzGerald, Drug Resistance and Pseudoresistance: An Unintended Consequence of
Enteric Coating Aspirin, 127 CIRCULATION 377, 382–83 (2013); Katie Thomas, Study Raises
Questions on Coating of Aspirin, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2012), https://www.nytimes
.com/2012/12/05/business/coating-on-buffered-aspirin-may-hide-its-heart-protective-effects
.html [https://perma.cc/V2WH-CRNW].
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study found that doctors were undertreating patients’ pain because they had concerns
about addiction to painkillers due to the high publicity of opiate addiction. 145 The
availability heuristic can impact the strength of a schema. If information is more
available in the sense of being repeated, it is presumed correct.146 Moreover, the
repetition of information is often remembered even better than its source, 147 with
repeated information often assumed to be from a credible source when the source is
not recalled.148 Repeated information is especially powerful to individuals that lack
motivation or opportunity to scrutinize the message. 149 Notably, even when
individuals are told that repeated statements are not more likely to be true or even
that the source of the information is biased, they still seem inclined to assume
repeated statements are true.150 This is especially relevant to the context of
pharmaceutical marketing to doctors who realize that information from companies is
likely to be biased. In particular, this data suggests that doctors repeatedly told
information from companies may assume that company information is true.
In addition, a schema may be supported by an overconfidence bias.151 The
overconfidence bias refers to an individual’s overestimation of likely being correct
regarding abilities or knowledge.152 For example, the vast majority of entering law
students believe they will be in the top ten percent of the class when, statistically,
that is impossible. The overconfidence bias applies to all individuals, including

145. See Jill G Klein, Five Pitfalls in Decisions About Diagnosis and Prescribing, 330
BRIT. MED. J. 781, 782 (2005).
146. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 124, at 129–35.
147. Danielle C. Polage, Making Up History: False Memories of Fake News Stories, 8
EUR. J. PSYCHOL. 245, 248–49 (2012).
148. Alison R. Fragale & Chip Heath, Evolving Informational Credentials: The
(Mis)attribution of Believable Facts to Credible Sources, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 225, 225–26 (2004); Kimberlee Weaver, Stephen M. Garcia, Norbert Schwarz & Dale
T. Miller, Inferring the Popularity of an Opinion from Its Familiarity: A Repetitive Voice Can
Sound Like a Chorus, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 821, 821–22 (2007).
149. Scott A. Hawkins & Stephen J. Hoch, Low Involvement Learning: Memory Without
Evaluation, 19 J. CONSUMER RES. 212, 212–13 (1992); see also Sunita Sah, Don A. Moore &
Robert J. MacCoun, Cheap Talk and Credibility: The Consequences of Confidence and
Accuracy on Advisor Credibility and Persuasiveness, 121 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 246 (2013) (individuals are strongly influenced by confident messages
and will not attempt to ascertain whether the message is correct if that requires effort).
150. Linda A. Henkel & Mark E. Mattson, Reading Is Believing: The Truth Effect and
Source Credibility, 20 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 1705, 1705–06 (2011); see also
Frederick T. Bacon, Credibility of Repeated Statements, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM.
LEARNING & MEMORY 241, 251 (1979) (showing that repeated statements are more likely to
be judged as true, whereas contrary statements are likely to be viewed as false).
151. Doctors likely also overestimate the effectiveness of patient treatments pursuant to an
over optimism bias, pursuant to which an individual may overestimate likely positive
outcomes. Tali Sharot, The Optimism Bias, 21 CURRENT BIOLOGY R941, R943 (2011). This
may not perpetuate a schema, but could make doctors vulnerable to marketing.
152. Barbara Mellers & A. Peter McGraw, Self-Serving Beliefs and the Pleasure of
Outcomes, in 2 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS: REASONS AND CHOICES 31, 37
(Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo eds., 2004); Rachlinski, supra note 125, at 1172–73.

2019]

A DA N GE R OUS C O N CO C TIO N

807

doctors.153 A doctor or judge may thus be overly confident that his schema is correct
and maintain it even in the face of contradictory evidence.
Although there are many individual cognitive biases, these examples should
underscore how schemas become entrenched and difficult to combat, even in the face
of contrary evidence. There is no comprehensive list of schemas, since they are
informed, in part, by individual experience. However, as discussed in the next
sections, there are two key schemas that have played an important role in commercial
speech jurisprudence regarding off-label marketing.
B. The Sophisticated Doctor Schema
This Section argues that there is an important, yet generally unrecognized, schema
overemphasizing how sophisticated doctors are in evaluating information from
companies, including marketing information, as well as peer review publications.
Although considering doctors more knowledgeable than lay consumers is consistent
with other areas of the law, such as the learned intermediary doctrine, 154 the
sophisticated doctor schema may result in courts unrealistically assuming that
doctors are invulnerable to marketing influences. This Section first provides
evidence of the schema in court opinions, as well as from scholarly literature and
doctors themselves. Then, this Section will explain why this schema is fundamentally
not empirically supported, even if it is a widespread presumption.
1. What Is the Sophisticated Doctor Schema?
In Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman,155 the sophisticated doctor schema
played an important role in the first direct challenge to FDA regulation of off-label
promotion. In this case, Washington Legal Foundation, an organization that focuses
on challenging “undue influence from government” regulation,156 challenged two
FDA guidance documents, one of which intended to restrict the type of printed
materials manufacturers could provide doctors concerning off-label uses and the
other intending to limit manufacturer involvement in continuing medical

153. See Andrea O. Baumann, Raisa B. Deber & Gail G. Thompson,
Overconfidence Among Physicians and Nurses: The ‘Micro-Certainty, Macro-Uncertainty’
Phenomenon, 32 SOC. SCI. MED. 167, 172–73 (1991) (doctors overconfident in “correct”
treatment in situation where there was no empirically supported superior method of treatment);
François Laure, Sophie M. Colleau, Alain Fontaine & Louis Brasseur, Oncologists and
Primary Care Physicians’ Attitudes Toward Pain Control and Morphine Prescribing in
France, 76 CANCER 2375 (1995) (explaining that doctors are overly confident in the ability to
control pain).
154. See Sterling Drug Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966). However, whether
this doctrine is applicable has been challenged by one scholar. Kate Greenwood, Physician
Conflicts of Interest in Court: Beyond the “Independent Physician” Litigation Heuristic, 30
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 759 (2014).
155. 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54 (D.D.C. 1988).
156. Wash. Legal Found., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 54 (quoting from complaint); see also About
WLF, WASH. LEGAL FOUND., https://www.wlf.org/about-washington-legal-foundation/
[https://perma.cc/C9CN-ENXC].
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education.157 The district court held that the FDA guidance documents were
unconstitutional violations of commercial speech rights 158 despite the government
interest in encouraging supplemental applications for new drug uses because the
regulation was viewed as more extensive than necessary. 159 The court recognized
that since companies clearly want to increase sales,160 they would likely aggressively
promote a single article supporting use of a drug—even if there is considerable
evidence to the contrary—with a potential to mislead.161 Nonetheless, when it applied
the Central Hudson test, the court seemed unconcerned about the potential to mislead
physicians. It stated that “despite the FDA’s occasional statements in its briefs to the
contrary, physicians are a highly educated, professionally-trained and sophisticated
audience”162 in contrast with the “general consumer public.” 163
The Washington Legal Foundation court seemed strongly influenced by the
sophisticated doctor schema in rejecting out of hand the FDA’s interest in ensuring
doctors have accurate and unbiased information. The court asserted that the FDA’s
interest in providing doctors complete and unbiased information was not a substantial
government interest that could support government regulation pursuant to the
Central Hudson test.164 The court asserted that doctors are “certainly capable of
critically evaluating” information provided by self-interested companies.165 The
court claimed that it was “unclear” why a doctor might not critically evaluate
scientific findings if presented by a company, even though earlier in the opinion the
court noted that companies have an interest in selectively providing partial
information to doctors.166
An important part of the sophisticated doctor schema is the idea that doctors are
capable of evaluating articles provided by self-interested companies concerning
whether an unapproved use of a drug is effective, such that there is no need to rely
on the FDA to assess whether drugs are safe and effective. For example, the
Washington Legal Foundation court stated that “a physician’s livelihood depends
upon the ability to make accurate, life-and-death decisions based upon the scientific
evidence before them. They are certainly capable of critically evaluating journal

157. Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activities, 62 Fed.
Reg. 64074 (Dec. 3, 1997); Advertising and Promotion; Guidance, 61 Fed. Reg. 52800 (1996).
158. Wash. Legal Found., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 74 (finding guidance documents more
extensive than necessary, such that the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test fails); see also
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002) (noting that it is a “questionable
assumption that doctors would prescribe unnecessary medications,” with regard to the
possibility that doctors might prescribe drugs that are advertised to consumers, in striking
down a ban against advertising of compounded drugs).
159. Wash. Legal Found., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 69.
160. Id. at 64.
161. Id. at 65.
162. Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
163. Id. at 70 (“[M]anufacturers are not seeking to distribute this information to the general
consumer public, who likely lack the knowledge or sophistication necessary to make informed
choices on the efficacy of prescription drugs.”).
164. Id. at 69–70.
165. Id. at 70; see also id. at 69 (asserting that limiting material from doctors out of concern
for doctor misuse to be “wholly and completely unsupportable”).
166. Id. at 70.
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articles or textbook reprints that are mailed to them, or the findings presented at CME
seminars.”167 The fact that doctors may be making life-and-death decisions based on
such information does not mean that the incomplete information is not misleading.
In addition, even if doctors realize the information is biased, and somewhat discount
the results as more favorable than necessary, doctors still lack complete information.
Since Washington Legal Foundation, the sophisticated doctor schema has been
embraced not only by other courts, as will be subsequently discussed in Part III, but
also by physicians. For example, some doctors participated as plaintiffs alongside
the company Amarin that was seeking to promote off-label uses of its drugs in a suit
challenging FDA regulations limiting off-label promotion on First Amendment
grounds.168 These doctors clearly do not share the FDA’s concern that they may be
misled by drug manufacturers; rather, they assume that information from companies
will be valuable.169
The views of the doctors in this suit are consistent with other studies indicating
that doctors have a generally positive view regarding the most common type of
information from companies: pharmaceutical detailing (i.e., information from
individual sales representative visits to doctors). Although some doctors recognize
detailing information may be biased or inaccurate, 170 many consider detailing to be
a valuable source of information.171 Most studies indicate that doctors believe their

167. Id.
168. Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (four medical
doctors joined with the pharmaceutical company Amarin in suing the FDA); see also Sorrell
v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 578 (2011) (noting that doctors find detailing “very
helpful”).
169. Amarin Pharma, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 213 (alleging that FDA rules operate “to keep
doctors . . . in the dark about all the options for drug therapy they are legally empowered to
prescribe” (quoting paragraphs 8–9 of the Complaint)).
170. See David Strang, Micheline Gagnon, William Molloy, Michel Bédard, Peteris
Darzins, Edward Etchells & Warren Davidson, National Survey on the Attitudes of Canadian
Physicians Towards Drug-Detailing by Pharmaceutical Representatives, 29 ANNALS ROYAL
C. PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS CAN. 474 (1996) (finding that eighty percent of doctors agree that
detailing overstates drug effectiveness). The reality is that detailing tends to be incomplete.
See Barbara Mintzes, Joel Lexchin, Jason M. Sutherland, Marie Dominique Beaulieu, Michael
S. Wilkes, Geneviève Durrieu & Ellen Reynolds, Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives and
Patient Safety: A Comparative Prospective Study of Information Quality in Canada, France
and the United States, 28 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1368, 1374 (2013).
171. E.g., Elisabeth H. Creyer & Ilias Hrsistodoulakis, Marketing Pharmaceutical
Products to Physicians: Sales Reps Influence Physicians Impressions of the Industry,
MARKETING HEALTH SERVS., Summer 1998, 34, 36–38 (noting that sales representatives are a
key source of information and that fifty-five percent of residents surveyed believed
information was accurate, even though less than half considered representatives to be
trustworthy); Lisa D. Spiller & Walter W. Wymer, Jr., Physicians’ Perceptions and Uses of
Commercial Drug Information Sources: An Examination of Pharmaceutical Marketing to
Physicians, 19 HEALTH MARKETING Q. 91, 97 (2001) (finding that a vast majority of
physicians considered the visits “somewhat helpful,” with nearly twenty percent considering
the visits “extremely helpful”); Michael G. Ziegler, Pauline Lew & Brian C. Singer, The
Accuracy of Drug Information from Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives, 273 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N, 1296, 1298 (1995) (noting that seventy-four percent of residents found pharmaceutical
representative information to be useful); see also HOUSE OF COMMONS: HEALTH COMM., THE
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prescription behavior is not influenced by detailing and claim that they are able to
critically evaluate information from sales representatives; 172 although some doctors
realize that there may be some influence.173 However, in general, doctors believe
only other doctors are susceptible.174 This is an apt example of the overconfidence

INFLUENCE OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, 2004–05, HC 42-II, at 64 (UK) (criticizing
doctors for uncritically relying on industry information); Helen Prosser, Solomon Almond &
Tom Walley, Influences on GPs’ Decision to Prescribe New Drugs – The Importance of Who
Says What, 20 FAM. PRAC. 61, 64 (2003) (noting that seventy percent of UK doctors considered
sales representatives an efficient way of obtaining information about drug information).
172. See Freek Fickweiler, Ward Fickweiler & Ewout Urbach, Interactions Between
Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry Generally and Sales Representatives Specifically
and Their Association with Physicians’ Attitudes and Prescribing Habits: A Systematic
Review, 7 BRIT. MED. J. OPEN 1, 3 (2017) (noting that a majority of studies found that doctors
do not believe interactions with industry reps had any impact on prescription behavior);
Melissa A. Fischer, Mary Ellen Keough, Joann L. Baril, Laura Saccoccio, Kathleen M. Mazor,
Elissa Ladd, Ann Von Worley & Jerry H. Gurwitz, Prescribers and Pharmaceutical
Representatives: Why Are We Still Meeting?, 24 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 795, 796 (2009)
(finding that although most doctors recognized that there were studies indicating the influence
of detailing on prescriptions, they nonetheless believed that they were not unduly influenced,
with some asserting that they were able to adequately glean useful information from the
marketing). The same phenomena is seen with doctors in other countries. E.g., Prosser et al.,
supra note 171, at 64 (noting that general practitioners in the UK felt able to separate credible
from misleading information, even though they generally questioned the objectivity of the
industry); Aldo De Ferrari, Cesar Gentille, Long Davalos, Leandro Huayanay & German
Malaga, Attitudes and Relationship Between Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry in a
Public General Hospital in Lima, Peru, PLOS ONE, June 2014, at 3 (noting that almost ninety
percent of doctors in Peru assumed gifts and free lunches had no impact on prescribing
behavior); Mário César Scheffer, Interactions Between Pharmaceutical Companies and
Physicians Who Prescribe Antiretroviral Drugs for Treating AIDS, 132 SAO PAULO MED. J.
55, 58 (2014) (noting that forty percent of doctors in Brazil claimed that interactions with
representatives had no influence whatsoever on their prescriptions).
173. Fickweiler et al., supra note 172, at 3 (noting studies where some doctors admit
possible influence of pharmaceutical detailing); see also Klaus Lieb & Armin Scheurich,
Contact Between Doctors and the Pharmaceutical Industry, Their Perceptions and the Effects
on Prescribing Habits, PLOS ONE, Oct. 2014, at 3 (finding forty-two percent of German
doctors believed their prescribing habits were influenced).
174. John A. Hopper, Mark W. Speece & Joseph L. Musial, Effects of an Educational
Intervention on Residents’ Knowledge and Attitudes Toward Interactions with
Pharmaceutical Representatives, 12 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 639, 641 (1997) (doctors strongly
disagreed that interactions with pharma representatives would influence their own prescription
behavior, but assumed that most other doctors would be susceptible); M. A. Morgan, J. Dana,
G. Loewenstein, S. Zinberg & J. Schulkin, Interactions of Doctors with the Pharmaceutical
Industry, 32 J. MED. ETHICS 559 (2006) (most OB-GYN doctors surveyed believed that others
would be more likely to be influenced); Michael A. Steinman, Michael G. Shlipak & Stephen
J. McPhee, Of Principles and Pens, 110 AM. J. MED. 551 (2001) (finding that sixty-one percent
of internal medicine residents claimed that promotions, such as gifts, had no impact on them,
but only sixteen percent thought this was true of other doctors). However, how questions are
phrased in studies may get different results. Stephen K. Sigworth, Mary D. Nettleman & Gail
M. Cohen, Pharmaceutical Branding of Resident Physicians, 286 J. AM MED. ASS’N 1024,
1025 (2001) (finding over ninety percent of residents admitted that detailing had “some
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bias in action, as studies indicate doctors are in fact influenced by pharmaceutical
marketing, as discussed in the next section.
The sophisticated doctor schema is also consistent with the fact that doctors
strongly value their clinical autonomy. In fact, the FDA’s current circuitous attempt
to regulate off-label use of drugs may be a reaction to physician opposition to more
direct regulation. For example, in the 1960s, the FDA was reportedly criticized by
the medical community when the FDA asked the author of a medical textbook to
warn against unsafe dosage of a product that resulted in several deaths. 175 Physician
opposition to adding information about dangerous dosages of a product is consistent
with doctors holding a schema that they do not need information from someone
outside their profession about dangers of a drug. This schema is consistent with a
general culture of resisting perceived intrusions on independent professional
judgments, with some suggesting that medical training and professional orientation
make them wary of ceding clinical discretion to a nonphysician.176 Some studies note
that initial medical training has a long-term impact and that disregard of evidencebased information may be a function of their experience during residency where the
attending physician’s opinion was considered all-important over other information
sources.177
The sophisticated doctor schema may also result in some doctors valuing their
own clinical experience over data in peer review publications. Studies indicate that
doctors consider their own clinical experience very important in deciding what to
prescribe.178 Some studies indicate that doctors not only express disbelief about
scientific studies that contradict their perceived clinical practice, but also express a
strong belief that their clinical experience is superior.179 In other words, the

influence”).
175. Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 5, at 321.
176. E.g., Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to
Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 451, 462–63 (1988); see also James
L. Reinersten, Zen and the Art of Physician Autonomy Maintenance, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 992 (2003) (noting common physician objections to guidelines).
177. Johnson, supra note 22, at 76–77 (citing Stefan Timmermans & Alison Angell,
Evidence Based Medicine, Clinical Uncertainty, and Learning to Doctor, 42 J. HEALTH & SOC.
BEHAV. 342, 345–47 (2001)).
178. Jerry Avorn, Milton Chen & Robert Hartley, Scientific Versus Commercial Sources
of Influence on Prescribing Behavior of Physicians, 73 AM. J. MED. 4 (1982) (noting that
eighty-eight percent of doctors considered their own experience very important and more
important than scientific papers or other sources); see also Niteesh K. Choudhry, Robert H.
Fletcher & Stephen B. Soumerai Systematic Review: The Relationship between Clinical
Experience and Quality of Health Care, 142 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 260, 262–63 (2005)
(finding that doctors relied on their own beliefs rather than empirical studies or guidelines by
institutions such as the National Cancer Institute).
179. Rebecca K. Schwartz, Stephen B. Soumerai & Jerry Avorn, Physician Motivations
for Nonscientific Drug Prescribing, 28 SOC. SCI. & MED. 577, 579 (1989) (noting that doctors
claim that their “‘real-world medicine,’ was more relevant to clinical practice than academic
studies”); see also Narcyz Ghinea, Ian Kerridge, Miles Little & Wendy Lipworth, Challenges
to the Validity of Using Medicine Labels to Categorize Clinical Behavior: An Empirical and
Normative Critique of “Off-Label” Prescribing, 23 J. EVALUATION CLINICAL PRAC. 574, 577
(2017) (noting that doctors are skeptical that regulatory approval is more meaningful than their

812

INDIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 94:773

sophisticated doctor schema not only makes doctors believe they are invulnerable to
commercial marketing, but also that their experience is more valuable than scientific
evidence. Understanding this helps to explain why doctors are resistant to changing
their practices in light of scientific evidence. For example, one study shows that it
takes from ten to twenty years of evidence before there is widespread adoption of
scientifically supported clinical changes, 180 and doctors are often resistant to
adopting guidelines from organizations such as the National Cancer Institute or the
National Cholesterol Education Program.181 In extreme cases, doctors sometimes
continue with medical practices that studies have affirmatively shown to be
inferior.182 This resistance could be a result of the same sophisticated doctor schema.
Of course, for the purpose of this discussion, doctors in general are considered to all
share this trait, although there are some differences by age and gender. 183
In addition, legal academics may also indulge in the sophisticated doctor bias. For
example, one First Amendment scholar argued that if doctors often prescribe
medicine for off-label use
[i]t cannot be that doctors do not know what they are doing, do not care
for their patients, or have somehow been seduced or suckered by drug
companies . . . . The most plausible intuitive answer . . . is that doctors .
. . have made the independent, professional medical judgment that the

own clinical opinion since countries are not consistent in approval of the same drugs). This is
consistent with the overconfidence cognitive bias.
180. E. A. Balas & S. A. Boren, Managing Clinical Knowledge for Health Care
Improvement, Y.B. MED. INFORMATICS, 2000, at 66 (noting that it requires seventeen years for
research evidence to result in clinical changes and ten years before treatment recommendations
for new therapies appear in medical textbooks).
181. John A. Sbarbaro, Can We Influence Prescribing Patterns?, 33 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS
DISEASES S240, S241 (2001).
182. For example, in 2007, after an influential medical journal published research showing
that the then-common procedure of heart surgery using stents to unclog blocked arteries was
no more effective than drugs alone, although the stent procedure briefly declined, it began to
increase again. Keith J. Winstein, A Simple Health-Care Fix Fizzles Out, WALL ST. J. (Feb.
11, 2010, 1:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870365210457465240
1818092212?ns=prod/accounts-wsj [https://perma.cc/MZ49-VLX2]. Of course, the doctor
resistance in this case may be linked to an issue not present with drug prescription—a higher
level of reimbursement for a procedure rather than drugs alone. However, doctors seem to
generally resist changing practices long after empirical data shows the need to do so. Aaron
E. Carroll, It’s Hard for Doctors to Unlearn Things. That’s Costly for All of Us, N.Y. TIMES:
UPSHOT (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/10/upshot/its-hard-for-doctors
-to-unlearn-things-thats-costly-for-all-of-us.html [https://perma.cc/VZE2-8F3K] (discussing
a study indicating that doctors continue to use procedures even after they have been proved
ineffective).
183. Jette V. Le, Line B. Pedersen, Helle Riisgaard, Jesper Lykkegaard, Jørgen Nexøe,
Jeannette Lemmergaard & Jens Søndergaard, Variation in General Practitioners’
Information-Seeking Behaviour – A Cross-Sectional Study on the Influence of Gender, Age
and Practice Form, 34 SCANDINAVIAN J. PRIMARY HEALTH CARE 327, 328 (2016) (finding
female and younger physicians more likely to know about and adhere to guidelines).
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prescription, on balance, holds more promise of doing good for the
patient than harm.184
This may sound intuitive, but it is an intuition that may not be actually supported, as
the next Section shows. Of course, other legal academics have recognized that
doctors are not so sophisticated, although without recognizing the existence of an
overarching schema.185
2. Debunking the Sophisticated Doctor Schema
This Section provides evidence to contradict the sophisticated doctor schema held
by judges, academics, and even doctors themselves. This Section begins by showing
that a substantial number of doctors are actually not sophisticated regarding their
knowledge of approved uses of drugs—even though they consider what uses are
approved to be important. Not only does this support the existence of a misplaced
sophisticated doctor schema, but it has implications for doctors’ vulnerability to
marketing they may assume is for on-label, as opposed to off-label use. Then, this
Section builds upon the fact that doctors are not sophisticated about what is an
approved use of a drug to show why doctors are far more vulnerable to marketing
influences than they realize.
In evaluating whether doctors are able to cull out valid information from selfinterested promotion about off-label uses that have not been reviewed by the FDA
for accuracy (which the sophisticated doctor schema assumes is possible), a helpful
starting point is the extent to which doctors are knowledgeable about approved uses.
After all, if a doctor cannot readily distinguish which uses are approved, it will be
more difficult for a doctor to identify when marketing focuses on unapproved uses
and to be more suspect of such information. Unfortunately, a substantial number of
doctors are confused about approved uses, even though they consider this to be an
important factor regarding what drugs to prescribe. A 2009 study found that a
significant number of doctors falsely believed some drugs uses were FDA approved
in situations that the FDA had warned against.186 In other words, a substantial number

184. Smolla, supra note 5, at 87; see also Bagley et al., supra note 7, at 386 (arguing that
doctors are sophisticated consumers as noted in Sorrell and thus arguably there can be no harm
to any “scientific” information provided by industry representatives); Thea Cohen, The First
Amendment and the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Marketing: Challenges to the
Constitutionality of the FDA’s Interpretation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 49 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1945, 1967 (2012) (noting that there is trust in prescribers to make “life or death
decisions” and be able to “evaluate health-related information, whatever its source”).
185. E.g., Stephanie M. Greene, Debate, FDA Prohibitions on Off-Label Marketing Do
Not Violate Drug Manufacturers’ First Amendment Rights, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 239,
243 (2014) (stating that courts have mistakenly assumed that doctors are able to discern
misleading from nonmisleading information, citing the Sorrell court’s reference to doctors as
“sophisticated” in particular, even though that is contrary to literature showing doctors learn
about products primarily from the industry); see also Jonathan J. Darrow, Pharmaceutical
Gatekeepers, 47 IND. L. REV. 363, 368–69 (2014) (noting that doctors rely on company
information and often assume new drugs are better).
186. Donna T. Chen, Matthew K. Wynia, Rachael M. Moloney & G. Caleb Alexander,
U.S. Physician Knowledge of the FDA-Approved Indications and Evidence Base for
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of doctors were fundamentally confused on what was FDA approved, even when
they considered this to be relevant and important information. Similar findings have
been reported in studies in other countries.187
Troublingly, doctors have been found to conflate warnings against a use with the
assumption that the use has actually been approved. For example, in the same 2009
study, one-third of doctors thought that a drug was approved for chronic anxiety
when in fact the FDA had warned against this use, which could reflect conflation of
off-label marketing of the drug for such use with a “black box” warning on the
label,188 although this particular study did not focus on that issue.189 Similarly, nearly
one in five doctors prescribed a drug for what they thought was an FDA-approved
use, when in fact at the time of the survey, that use had a black box warning for
increased risk of death.190 This experimental finding about black box warning
confusion is not an isolated incident; there are other situations where black box
warnings do not appear to limit use, and sometimes use seems to increase—even
after a manufacturer sends a letter directly to doctors. 191 Doctors could be unaware

Commonly Prescribed Drugs: Results of a National Survey, 18 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY &
DRUG SAFETY 1094, 1098 (2009) (finding that nineteen percent of doctors prescribed Seroquel
for dementia with agitation believing it was FDA approved for such use when in fact the FDA
required a black box warning for use in elderly patients, and over seventy percent of doctors
prescribed lorazepam to treat chronoic anxiety assuming it was approved for this use when in
fact the FDA warned against such use).
187. E.g., Ghinea et al., supra note 179, at 576 (stating that Australian doctors are often
unaware they are prescribing off label or even what that means); Constans C. A. H. H. V. M.
Verhagen, Anne G. H. Niezink, Yvonne Y. Engels, Yechiel Y. A. Hekster, Joan J. Doornebal
& Kris C. P. Vissers, Off-Label Use of Drugs in Pain Medicine and Palliative Care: An
Algorithm for the Assessment of Its Safe and Legal Prescription, 8 PAIN PRAC. 157, 158 (2008)
(finding that staff members in the Netherlands were not always aware they were prescribing
pain medication off label).
188. Chen et al., supra note 186, at 1098. This is the most severe warning that appears on
approved drugs and appears in a box on the label to warn of serious health risks, including
health-threatening risks. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(1) (2018) (noting a boxed warning may be
appropriate for serious warnings and “particularly those that may lead to death or serious
injury” and is usually based on clinical data); see also Judith E. Beach, Gerald A. Faich, F.
Gail Bormel & Frank J. Sasinowski, Black Box Warnings in Prescription Drug Labeling:
Results of a Survey of 206 Drugs, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 403, 405–08 (1998) (stating that
although the FDA has not clearly indicated bases for black box warnings, empirical data
concerning situations in which black box warnings are provided fall into six categories,
primarily focused on high-risk patients and are generally based on clinical studies submitted
as part of new drug applications, but possibly from postmarket reporting or epidemiological
surveys); Shirley Murphy & Rosemary Roberts, “Black Box” 101: How the Food and Drug
Administration Evaluates, Communicates, and Manages Drug Benefit/Risk, 117 J. ALLERGY
& CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY 34 (2006).
189. Chen et al., supra note 186, at 1098.
190. Id.
191. E.g., Walter Smalley, Deborah Shatin, Diane K. Wysowski, Jerry Gurwitz, Susan E.
Andrade, Michael Goodman, K. Arnold Chan, Richard Platt, Stephanie D. Schech & Wayne
A. Ray, Contraindicated Use of Cisapride: Impact of Food and Drug Administration
Regulatory Action, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3036, 3036–37 (2000). The public health problem
only terminated after the manufacturer voluntarily withdrew the product from market on the
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of black box warnings,192 but other studies suggest that doctors are aware of such
warnings and simply do not follow them. 193 So, even rigorous FDA efforts to warn
doctors about drug risks may have less impact than commercial marketing.194
The sophisticated doctor schema is also well illustrated by a key 1982 study that
reveals doctors are much more influenced by commercial rather than scientific
sources.195 The study chose two drugs for which there was substantial scientific
literature showing that the drugs were not effective,196 or at least no better than overthe-counter options, and interviewed a random sample of primary care physicians. 197
Given this, questions about the perceived value of these drugs that correlate with
commercial promotion could appropriately link actual impact of commercial forces.
A substantial majority (sixty-two percent) stated that academic sources were “very
important” in shaping their decisions and a majority similarly claimed commercial
sources to be of “minimal importance.”198 However, responses regarding
scientifically unsupported statements touted by the industry indicate more
commercial influence than doctors reported. For example, nearly half of doctors
thought one drug, propoxyphene, was more potent than aspirin, contrary to scientific

eve of an FDA review of the drug’s benefit versus risks, as well as after eighty reported deaths.
Gardiner Harris & Eric Koli, Lucrative Drug, Danger Signals and the F.D.A., N.Y. TIMES
(June 10, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/10/business/lucrative-drug-danger
-signals-and-the-fda.html [https://perma.cc/7Z7E-ZZ2Z]; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Heartburn
Drug Linked to Deaths to Be Withdrawn, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2000), http://www.
nytimes.com/2000/03/24/us/heartburn-drug-linked-to-deaths-to-be-withdrawn.html [https://
perma.cc/J5FD-DVRC].
192. Larkin et al., Restrictions, supra note 64, at 1021 (suggesting a lack of awareness of
FDA-approved indications for psychiatric drugs, as well as black box warnings as possible
explanations for significant increase in off-label prescribing of some drugs after detailing was
limited).
193. See Supriya K. Bhatia, Amy J. Rezac, Benedetto Vitiello, Michael A. Sitorius, Bruce
A. Buehler & Christopher J. Kratochvil, Antidepressant Prescribing Practices for the
Treatment of Children and Adolescents, 18 J. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY
70, 73–75 (2008) (finding that nearly ninety-seven percent of surveyed psychiatrists were
aware of black box warnings relating to antidepressants for children, but few adhered to the
FDA guidelines).
194. The persistence of the sophisticated doctor schema may be reinforced by other
cognitive biases. For example, the overconfidence bias likely makes doctors assume they are
not vulnerable to marketing. In addition, the availability bias may make doctors rely more on
information that is most repeated (i.e., commercial marketing).
195. Avorn et al., supra note 178, at 7.
196. One drug was a vasodilator widely promoted for senile dementia contrary to clinical
literature showing lack of utility, whereas the other drug, propoxyphene, was promoted for
severe pain even though more than eight studies showed no advantage over a placebo. Id. at
4–5.
197. Although the sample was randomly chosen among doctors in Boston who listed
internal medicine or general medicine as their area of practice, two-thirds were solo
practitioners, who in other studies seem to be more influenced by commercial marketing since
they do not have readily accessible colleagues. Id. at 5.
198. Drug advertising was considered of minimal importance to sixty-eight percent and
drug representative visits were of minimal importance to fifty-four percent. Id. Less than thirty
percent considered each to be of moderate importance. Id.
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data, yet consistent with commercial promotion. 199 Similarly, almost half thought
that vasodilators were effective for senile dementia, which is consistent with
advertising, but inconsistent with actual scientific literature.200 Accordingly, this
study indicates that doctors are substantially impacted by commercial sources, even
if the sources actually contradict what scientific studies report, contrary to doctors’
claims that they value scientific studies more.201 The study did not look at actual
prescription data, but national prescribing data on these drugs are consistent with the
study (i.e., the drugs are overprescribed relative to their actual utility).202
A follow-up study in 1989 by one of the same authors as the 1982 study similarly
debunks the sophisticated doctor schema. The 1989 study involved the same drugs
as the original study, as well as one additional drug; this second study yielded similar
data.203 Although doctors were not specifically asked about reliance on commercial
sources, more than a quarter of statements made by doctors in interviews contradicted
the scientific literature, but mirrored commercial promotions. 204 Moreover, when
confronted about the discrepancy, some doctors rejected the scientific data; one
doctor claimed clinical experience was more relevant than academic studies and
others asserted that their own “studies” prove the opposite. 205 In other words,
although doctors assume that they are highly sophisticated in discerning accurate
information from promotions, not only are they vulnerable to these promotions, but
they also do not realize it.
A related problem is that, contrary to court assumptions that doctors are
sophisticated enough to evaluate peer review articles presented by self-interested
companies, the reality is likely different. First, although doctors are trained in

199. Id.
200. Id.; see also Schwartz et al., supra note 179, at 579 (finding that twenty-six percent
of doctors claimed therapeutic advantages of vasodilators on senile dementia, as well as the
benefit of propoxyphene, despite a lack of scientific support).
201. One small caveat is that although doctors generally dismissed patient preferences as
not relevant to their prescriptions, answers to some questions suggest that they were
influenced. See Avorn et al., supra note 178, at 6 (stating that over eighty percent of doctors
stated that they “often” prescribe a drug for pain because patients were not satisfied with overthe-counter drugs); see also J. Gambrill & C. Bridges-Webb, Use of Sources of Therapeutic
and Prescribing Information by General Practitioners, 9 AUSTL. FAM. PHYSICIAN 482, 483
(1980) (noting that doctors reported journals as the most useful source for prescribing, with
sales representatives listed second). But see Donald P. Connelly, Eugene C. Rich, Shawn P.
Curley & John T. Kelly, Knowledge Resource Preferences of Family Physicians, 30 J. FAM.
PRAC. 352, 356–59 (1990) (finding that family physicians reported scientific articles to be not
credible or accessible, albeit based on self-reported data).
202. See Avorn et al., supra note 178, at 7.
203. Schwartz et al., supra note 179, at 578. The study focused on possible interventions
—one involving a mailing of a visually appealing “un-advertisement” including scientific and
economic costs and benefits to prescribing the scientifically unsupported drugs, whereas the
other involved the same mailing as well as a visit by a pharmacist to educate doctors about the
drugs, suggest practical alternatives, and answer questions. The mailing group did not reduce
prescriptions significantly, whereas the group that was visited in-person reduced prescription
of the studied drugs by fourteen percent. Id.
204. See id. at 579.
205. Id.
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science, as busy individuals, they often do not read more than abstracts, which have
been found to be inaccurate.206 In addition, not only is there a general publication
bias on positive outcomes, but companies will selectively present only favorable
articles to doctors,207 which sometimes have been “ghostwritten” by the industry. 208
Although doctors should know that they are only presented with selective
information, they may not actually be capable of processing that biased information.
Notably, one study found that when doctors were presented with a study that reported
the positive results of a drug based on only one of the five trials conducted, they were
more likely to prescribe the drug, even without being given the other data, let alone
an opportunity to evaluate its veracity. 209 In addition, once doctors have been
influenced by the industry, it may be difficult to change their behavior. For example,
after many articles touted off-label use of a coagulant, more than ninety-seven
percent of prescriptions were made for such uses—even after a systematic review
concluded that off-label use was unwarranted.210
Although doctors realize that the goal of sales representatives is to promote sales,
they do not seem as sophisticated as courts and some scholars assume in evaluating
such information. They seem unaware of what information is reliable. For example,
some doctors improperly assume that detailing is more reliable than printed
advertising.211 However, in reality, advertisements are regulated by the FDA whereas
sales representatives are generally not regulated, and they have been found to provide
false or misleading statements in detailing.212 In addition, although studies have

206. See Sanjay Saint, Dimitri A. Christakis, Somnath Saha, Joann G. Elmore, Deborah E.
Welsh, Paul Baker & Thomas D. Koepsell, Journal Reading Habits of Internists, 15 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 881, 883 (2000). Another, but slightly different, problem is that abstracts do
not disclose potential conflicts of interest, which could put a doctor on notice that a study was
funded by a self-interested company. See Céline Buffel du Vaure, Isabelle Boutron, Elodie
Perrodeau & Phillipe Ravaud, Reporting Funding Source or Conflict of Interest in Abstracts
of Randomized Controlled Trials, No Evidence of a Large Impact on General Practitioners’
Confidence in Conclusions, a Three-Arm Randomized Controlled Trial, BIOMED CENT. MED.,
2014, at 2.
207. E.g., Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 65 (D.D.C. 1998).
208. Essentially, the industry hires freelance writers to provide a draft to a sham academic
author to publish, and journals are generally not aware of the problem since the author will not
disclose any conflict of interest. See Marcia Angell, Industry-Sponsored Clinical Research: A
Broken System, 300 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1069 (2008); Jeffrey R. Lacasse & Jonathan Leo,
Ghostwriting at Elite Academic Medical Centers in the United States, PLOS MED., Feb. 2010,
at 1; Joseph S. Wislar, Annette Flanagin, Phil B. Fontanarosa & Catherine D. DeAngelis,
Honorary and Ghost Authorship in High Impact Biomedical Journals: A Cross Sectional
Survey, 343 BRIT. MED. J. 1192 (2011). Natasha Singer, Medical Papers by Ghostwriters
Pushed Therapy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/health
/research/05ghost.html [https://perma.cc/U3WS-9QDQ].
209. Gabriel K. Silverman, George F. Loewenstein, Britta L. Anderson, Peter A. Ubel,
Stanley Zinberg & Jay Schulkin, Failure to Discount for Conflict of Interest When Evaluating
Medical Literature: A Randomised Trial of Physicians, 36 J. MED. ETHICS 265, 267 (2010).
210. N. Ghinea, W. Lipworth, I. Kerridge & R. Day, No Evidence or No Alternative?
Taking Responsibility for Off-Label Prescribing, 42 INTERNAL MED. J. 247, 248 (2012).
211. Ziegler et al., supra note 171, at 1297–98.
212. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2017); Beth Synder Bulik, Pharma Sales Rep Regulations
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shown that detailing tends to exclude negative information,213 doctors sometimes
erroneously believe that negative effects are disclosed by detailers.214 The most
extreme example of lack of physician sophistication in evaluating detailing
information is from a study that found that doctors are often unable to discern false
statements from drug representatives. 215 The representatives made statements that
were contradicted by readily available sources, including company literature, as well
as the Physician’s Desk Reference, despite the fact that the study involved the unique
situation where drug representatives knew that their statements were actually being
recorded.216 Improbable claims also went unchallenged.217 Of particular concern, two
false statements were not only undetected, but would result in dangerous outcomes
if accepted at face value. For example, one statement claimed that there was no need
to monitor for hematologic side effects, contrary to the package insert with a boxed
warning.218
Even doctors who are skeptical about whether industry information is accurate
may nonetheless rely on inaccurate information due to the cognitive bias of
accessibility. For example, since company detailing is more readily available and
easier to process than scientific articles, studies showing that doctors consider
detailing more “valuable” than scientific articles, even if less credible, should not be
surprising. Along similar lines, advertising may have more of an impact than peer
reviewed articles on prescriptions because it is similarly more accessible. 219 This
seems to be consistent with the 1982 study that indicates doctors were more
influenced by commercial sources than scientific sources with respect to
scientifically discredited drugs. In particular, it could be that doctors believe that they
should be influenced more by academic than commercial sources, but in reality,
commercial sources are more accessible and thus more influential.
C. The More Information Schema
This Section explains the schema in commercial speech cases that favors more
information and why several long-standing principles in the law are not supported

Proposal Stalls in Philadelphia, but the Battle’s Not over Yet, FIERCEPHARMA (Jan. 7, 2019,
9:07 AM), https://www.fiercepharma.com/marketing/sales-rep-regulations-proposal-stalls
-philly-but-city-vs-pharma-not-over-yet [https://perma.cc/5HAH-AS5A] (noting a failure to
pass legislation in Philadelphia that would require regulation of sales represenatives, and only
Chicago and the state of Nevada have passed this type of legislation thus far); see also supra
note 50 (discussing misrepresentations that have contributed to the opiod epidemic); infra note
283 (discussing misrepresentations made by sales representative in the Caronia case).
213. E.g., Sales Representatives: A Damning Report by Prescrire Reps Monitoring
Network, 8 PRESCRIRE INT’L 86 (1999).
214. See Strang et al., supra note 170, at 476.
215. Ziegler et al., supra note 171, at 1297.
216. Id. at 1296, 1298.
217. Id. at 1298.
218. Id. at 1297.
219. See Pierre Azoulay, Do Pharmaceutical Sales Respond to Scientific Evidence?, 11 J.
ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 551, 586 (2002) (finding that, in a study of H2 blockers, although
scientific studies had some impact, marketing and especially detailing had a pronounced
effect).
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by empirical data. In particular, it shows how courts have relied on this schema to
favor and expand commercial speech in three ways. First, courts require a high
burden of proof for allegedly misleading information. Second, courts treat potentially
misleading information as legally interchangeable with true information. Third,
courts presume disclaimers will alleviate confusion or deception. However, this
Section explains that empirical studies do not support these current commercial
speech hallmarks.
1. What Is the More Information Schema?
The more information schema is deeply embedded in commercial speech case law
that generally favors permitting commercial speech. As discussed earlier,
commercial speech case law prefers permitting information over suppression since it
is presumed to provide valuable information to the audience that will promote
informed decisions. The Washington Legal Foundation district court noted that “[i]f
there is one fixed principle in the commercial speech arena, it is that ‘a State’s
paternalistic assumption that the public will use truthful, nonmisleading commercial
information unwisely cannot justify a decision to suppress it,’”220 and any such
restriction is “practically an engraved invitation to have the restriction struck.” 221
This preference towards more information has been consistent from the first Supreme
Court case to clearly hold commercial speech entitled to First Amendment
protection. In that first case, the Court stated that “people will perceive their own
best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that
end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close them,”222 which
many subsequent courts have cited.223
The more information schema also supports the current high burden of proof on
establishing that commercial speech is inherently misleading to permit it to be
absolutely barred without consideration of any other factors. For example, in
Washington Legal Foundation, the court rejected the suggestion that scientific claims
are presumptively misleading unless approved by the FDA, which seems consistent
with the more information schema. 224 As will be explained, scientific claims made
even in peer review journals are likely to be misleading and potentially even false.
Along similar lines, one court rejected the FDA’s assertion that commercial claims
regarding supplements are inherently confusing when not supported by substantial
scientific evidence; the FDA’s contention was characterized as “almost frivolous,”

220. Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 69–70 (D.D.C. 1998) (quoting
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 497 (1996)).
221. Id. at 70.
222. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976) (emphasis added); see also id. at 765 (stating that the goal of commercial speech is to
ensure that decisions are “intelligent and well informed” and that promoting “the free flow of
commercial information is indispensable”).
223. E.g., Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 497; Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60,
79 (1983); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562
(1980); Am. Acad. of Implant Dentistry v. Parker, 152 F. Supp. 3d 641, 651 (W.D. Tex. 2016);
Whitaker v. Thompson, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2002).
224. Wash. Legal Found., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 67.
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and the court analogized the FDA claim to suggesting consumers would be
hypnotized to buy a product.225
In addition, the more information schema supports the current law that treats
potentially misleading information identically to truthful information that is clearly
not misleading. Notably, although courts consistently recognize harms from actually
misleading information, it seems questionable to assume that potentially misleading
information is not harmful. Admittedly, the difference in treatment is largely a
reflection of the fact that some information can be entirely barred due to harms, even
without full consideration of all Central Hudson factors. However, treating
potentially misleading information as legally equivalent to information that is
completely truthful and not misleading seems to rely on the assumption that more
information—even if potentially misleading—is preferable. The more information
schema assumes that additional information from another source will correct any
information flaws. However, as noted earlier, that is not likely in the context of
marketing of pharmaceutical drugs for which the marketplace is one sided.
The more information schema also explains court views on disclaimers and
clarifications in the context of commercial speech decisions. In particular, courts
often reject government assertions that commercial speech will be potentially
misleading based on the assumption that a less restrictive—and presumed effective—
alternative would be a disclaimer or warning concerning information that is
considered misleading.226 For example, in Washington Legal Foundation, even
though the court noted that a company would selectively provide only favorable peer
review publications to doctors with potential to mislead,227 the court dismissed
concerns that this could be potentially misleading for physicians and stated that the
documents could have “conspicuous notifications” that the use being discussed was
not approved.228 In one extreme situation, a court assumed a disclaimer is not
confusing unless there is empirical evidence of such a fact. 229 However, as the next
Section will establish, this presumption concerning disclaimers is contrary to
empirical evidence.
2. Evidence Debunking “More Information Is Better” Schema
This Section provides empirical evidence to contradict the seemingly logical
presumption that more information provides more informed results. Consistent with
the earlier discussion of cognitive limits, this Section explains that there are serious
cognitive limits to processing disclaimers, which is very important to the popular

225. Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also Int’l Dairy Foods
Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 636–37, 639 (6th Cir. 2010) (relying on amici information and
discounting the FDA view that a statement that milk from cows not treated with hormone
might improperly suggest milk is safer and asserting that any possible problem with
misleading claims is alleviated by a disclaimer).
226. E.g., United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 168 (2d Cir. 2012).
227. Wash. Legal Found., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 65 (stating this in the context of concluding
that distribution of scientific articles constitutes commercial speech, rather than scientific and
academic speech that is deserving of more First Amendment protection).
228. Id. at 68.
229. Whitaker v. Thompson, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2002).
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First Amendment solution of providing disclaimers as a less speech restrictive means
that allegedly will protect against misleading information.230 Although there are no
known studies of disclaimers regarding off-label drug use, there are studies in two
related contexts that indicate disclaimers do not result in more informed decisions:
disclaimers to health claims for dietary supplements as well as disclaimers in articles
regarding industry funding.
Although disclaimers on dietary supplements may initially seem less analogous
to off-label promotion of drugs to doctors since supplement disclaimers focus on
consumers, supplement disclaimers importantly refer to the lack of FDA review
regarding health benefits, which is analogous to off-label uses of drugs that have not
been approved by the FDA.231 In particular, dietary supplement companies can make
claims lacking significant scientific agreement if they include a disclaimer that the
health claim(s) are not reviewed by the FDA and that the supplement is not intended
to treat any condition or disease.232 However, a recent systematic review of seventeen
published articles to empirically test a court suggestion that disclaimers could
effectively warn doctors regarding unapproved uses of drugs concluded that
consumers, including those that use supplements with disclaimers, are generally
unaware of their existence, or that they did not attach any weight to the information
in the disclaimer, as will be discussed.233

230. Courts seem to intuit this in another context; in particular, in products liability cases
involving failure to warn, courts have suggested that more warnings would not be better due
to information overload. Hood v. Ryobi Am. Corp., 181 F.3d 608, 611 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting
that too many warnings make a label too long to read and too technical to understand); James
A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty
Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 297–98 (1990) (noting that judges and juries
erroneously assume warnings are costless in terms of harm). In addition, recent scholarship
suggests that although many areas of the law suggest more information is better, consumers
are not well poised to understand compelled disclosures. E.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E.
Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PENN. L. REV. 647, 718 (2011); Kesten
C. Green & J. Scott Armstrong, Evidence on the Effects of Mandatory Disclaimers in
Advertising, 31 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 293, 302 (2012).
231. As a result of changes in the law that permit dietary supplements to be sold without
the rigorous review of drugs, as well as First Amendment challenges, the FDA currently
permits claims that lack significant scientific agreement to be made with certain disclaimers.
Guidance for Industry: Interim Procedures for Qualified Health Claims in the Labeling of
Conventional Human Food and Human Dietary Supplements, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July
2003),
https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatory
Information/LabelingNutrition/ucm053832.htm [https://perma.cc/VTA4-HGAK]. This is
relatively recent, given changes in the regulatory framework in the mid-1990s, followed by
First Amendment challenges. See Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act, Pub. L. No.
103-417, 108 Stat. 4325 (1994); Whitaker, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 2; Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d
650, 655–60 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
232. 21 C.F.R. § 101.93(c) (2018) (“This statement has not been evaluated by the Food
and Drug Administration. This product is not intended to diagnose, treat, cure, or prevent any
disease.”).
233. E.g., Kesselheim et al., Mandatory Disclaimers, supra note 96, at 444 (evaluating
suggestion noted in United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 179–80 (2d Cir. 2012)).
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Multiple studies established that disclaimers on supplements had no effect on
consumer belief regarding whether the product would have the claimed effect, or on
the belief that the FDA had evaluated the claims.234 The largest qualitative study to
date involving 3500 adults indicated that about half of all surveyed adults believed
that over-the-counter herbal products and weight-loss supplements are approved by
a government agency, even though these products have disclaimers that clearly state
they have not been reviewed by the FDA for effectiveness. 235 In addition, studies
found that even for supplement-using consumers aware of disclaimers, some still
believed that the FDA had tested the supplements or otherwise verified the accuracy
of manufacturer claims.236 Although supplement users may have cognitive biases that
motivate them to believe in the safety of products they are using, the fact that even
nonusers assume the FDA verifies claims suggests that such bias does not completely
explain failure to understand FDA disclaimers. 237 Rather, it may be that in an

234. E.g., Tonya Dodge & Annette Kaufman, What Makes Consumers Think Dietary
Supplements Are Safe and Effective? The Role of Disclaimers and FDA Approval, 26 HEALTH
PSYCHOL. 513, 516 (2007) (finding that FDA-required disclaimer resulted in only slight
reduction in effectiveness belief with disclaimer, but no impact on beliefs about risks); Mary
Meer, Scottie Misner & Ralph Meer, Labeling of Dietary Supplements: Consumer Awareness
and Industry Compliance, 4 J. NUTRACEUTICALS FUNCTIONAL & MED. FOODS 29, 35 (2004)
(finding that almost thirty percent of study participants were unaware of the existence of a
disclaimer); Carla K. Miller & Teri Russell, Knowledge of Dietary Supplement Label
Information Among Female Supplement Users, 52 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 291, 294–
96 (2004) (in a study of dietary supplement users, two-thirds thought that the product had been
approved by the FDA); Karen Russo France & Paula Fitzgerald Bone, Policy Makers’
Paradigms and Evidence from Consumer Interpretations of Dietary Supplement Labels, 39 J.
CONSUMER AFF. 27, 47 (2005) (finding that a disclaimer appeared to have no effect on belief
that the product would have the claimed effect or that the FDA had reviewed the claimed
effectiveness).
235. Janine L. Pillitteri, Saul Shiffman, Jeffrey M. Rohay, Andrea M. Harkins, Steven L.
Burton & Thomas A. Wadden, Use of Dietary Supplements for Weight Loss in the United
States: Results of a National Survey, 16 OBESITY 790, 791, 793 (2008) (finding that 48.8% of
self-identified supplement users and 45% of nonusers agreed with statement that over-thecounter herbal products and weight-loss supplements must be approved for efficacy, or
effectiveness by a government agency).
236. E.g., Marlys J. Mason & Debra L. Scammon, Unintended Consequences of Health
Supplement Information Regulations: The Importance of Recognizing Consumer Motivations,
45 J. CONSUMER AFF. 201, 211 (2011); see also Miller & Russell, supra note 234, at 294
(noting that when presented with an actual disclaimer, more than thirty percent of participants
failed to understand the FDA had not specifically approved or regulated the product).
237. In particular, supplement users are likely to have an over optimism bias that leads
them to believe products they use are safer than they are. See Robert J. Blendon, Catherine M.
DesRoches, John M. Benson, Mollyann Brodie & Drew E. Altman, Americans’ Views on Use
and Regulation of Dietary Supplements, 161 ARCHIVE INTERNAL MED. 805, 808 (2001). In
addition, to the extent that they have a general belief that supplements are safe, that assumption
will remain in the face of contrary evidence pursuant to confirmation bias, which seems to be
reflected in studies. See id. at 807 (finding sixty-seven percent of supplement users indicated
that if the FDA said a supplement was ineffective, that would not impact their decision to
continue to take the supplement); Mason & Scammon, supra note 236, at 210, 214–15 (finding
that supplement users who understood the FDA does not regulate supplements focused on
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information-rich world already saturated with legal disclaimers, consumers are
inured to them.238 In addition, although disclaimers in real life could be
overshadowed by other marketing messages, including more prominent images, such
that there is incomplete processing, 239 even in controlled experimental settings
without competing information or the presence of brand loyalty to a specific
supplement, individuals still fail to understand the disclaimers.
Admittedly, the studies about disclaimers on supplements and lay consumers may
not seem directly applicable to the allegedly more sophisticated doctors. However,
studies consistently show that all individuals, including highly educated ones like
doctors, are subject to the same cognitive biases. In addition, there are specific
studies indicating physician behavior mirrors consumer behavior in marketing
contexts, such that other researchers have suggested that supplement studies
regarding consumers are analogous given the lack of any studies regarding
physicians in particular.240 In addition, there are studies on doctors in particular, and
the impact of conflict of interest disclosures, as discussed below, that suggest there
are serious limitations to the use of disclaimers to adequately inform doctors.
Accordingly, if companies present their alleged facts to doctors who are
vulnerable to accepting such facts given the lack of competing information, any
disclaimer to doctors about the lack of FDA review may similarly fall on deaf ears.
This problem is compounded by the cognitive bias of anchoring in that the initial
information from companies will be given more weight, or at least weight that is
disproportional to the actual data. In addition, to the extent that companies tend to
flood doctors with promotional materials, this information will seem more available
and thus more relevant and accurate according to cognitive bias studies. However,
all individuals, including experts, are subject to cognitive biases, and doctors are
vulnerable to overconfidence bias that would likely make them even less likely to
realize the impact of these heuristics. In addition, although the threat of a malpractice
claim may theoretically seem a promising avenue to guard against bad decisions, that
seems inconsistent with literature about the strength of cognitive biases. Moreover,
malpractice claims are inherently tied to standard of care, and if there is no clear
standard of care involving some off-label uses, malpractice threats would seem to be
of little impact.
Just as disclaimers on nutritional supplements are intended to help provide
information to ensure adequate discounting of possible bias, medical journals inform
doctors about conflicts of interest to ensure that messages are appropriately
discounted.241 However, despite a more expert audience, there seem to be similar

prior problems with FDA-regulated products and attributed disclaimers as some legal or
bureaucratic necessity).
238. E.g., Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 230, at 689–90.
239. See, e.g., Paul Biegler & Patrick Vargas, Ban the Sunset? Nonpropositional Content
and Regulation of Pharmaceutical Advertising, 13 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3, 8 (2013) (noting
consumers may be more influenced by positive associations suggested in advertisement than
specific claims).
240. E.g., Kesselheim et al., Mandatory Disclaimers, supra note 96, at 440.
241. E.g., Editorial Policies, NEW ENG. J. MED., https://www.nejm.org/about
-nejm/editorial-policies [https://perma.cc/HRF3-JB7H] (providing guidelines to ensure
publication is free from commercial influence); Instructions for Authors, JAMA
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problems processing these disclosures—even when they are actually made. 242 The
disclosure statement may be entirely ignored,243 or have the ironic effect of
enhancing the trustworthiness of the discloser.244 Although studies sometimes
indicate doctors are more skeptical of industry-funded articles,245 perhaps because

https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/pages/instructions-for-authors#SecDecisionsand
ManagementofEditorialConflictsofInterest [https://perma.cc/MR2Z-5XHW] (providing
guidance on conflicts of interest); see also Phil B. Fontanarosa & Howard Bauchner, Conflict
of Interest and Medical Journals, 317 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1768, 1768–69 (2017) (explaining
policy of all JAMA-related journals to mandate disclosure of conflicts regardless of amount
of funding that will be disclosed in the acknowledgements section); INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE OF MEDICAL JOURNAL EDITORS, Recommendations for the Conduct, Reporting,
Editing, and Publication of Scholarly Works in Medical Journals, INT’L COMM. MED. J.
EDITORS, Dec. 2017, at 3–4, http://www.icmje.org/icmje-recommendations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2VLA-9BWB] (providing disclosure guidelines that many medical journals
follow). Disclosure of conflicts is also an issue with continuing medical education. E.g.,
ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR CONTINUING MED. EDUC., STANDARDS FOR COMMERCIAL
SUPPORT: STANDARDS TO ENSURE THE INDEPENDENCE OF CME ACTIVITIES 2 (2014) (stating
that content not promoting a specific commercial interest and source of support from
commercial interest must be disclosed to learners). However, there are some that believe
merely identifying conflicts is not enough. E.g., AM. ACAD. FAMILY PHYSICIANS, CME POLICY
AND PROCEDURES FOR FULL DISCLOSURE AND IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS
OF
INTEREST
paras.
4(B),
(D),
https://www.aafp.org/fpm/forms/coipolicy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3E8Q-8CE8] (requiring that conflicts not merely be identified, but resolved,
which could involve assigning a different topic for the individual, or else ensuring valid
content through prior peer review or using evidence-based content); Bernard Lo & Chelsea
Ott, What is the Enemy in CME, Conflicts of Interest or Bias?, 310 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1019,
1019–20 (2013) (suggesting that identification of conflicts is only a rough proxy for
commercial bias, and suggesting improvements to assess bias).
242. Sometimes articles are “written” by doctors paid by the industry, but this is not
disclosed. See Aaron S. Kesselheim, Bo Wang, David M. Studdert & Jerry Avorn, Conflict of
Interest Reporting by Authors Involved in Promotion of Off-label Drug Use: An Analysis of
Journal Disclosures, PLOS MED., 2012, at 1, 7.
243. Silverman et al., supra note 209.
244. Steven D. Pearson, Ken Kleinman, Donna Rusinak & Wendy Levinson, A Trial of
Disclosing Physicians’ Financial Incentives to Patients, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 623,
625–26 (2006).
245. E.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim, Christopher T. Robertson, Jessica A. Myers, Susannah L.
Rose, Victoria Gillet, Kathryn M. Ross, Robert J. Glynn, Steven Joffe & Jerry Avorn, A
Randomized Study of How Physicians Interpret Research Funding Disclosures, 367 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1119, 1122 (2012) (doctors in experimental conditions were less likely to consider
industry-funded trials as rigorous or inclined to prescribe drugs based on these studies
compared to studies purportedly from the NIH based on the abstracts of hypothetical drugs);
see also Samena Chaudhry, Sara Schroter, Richard Smith & Julie Morris, Does Declaration
of Competing Interests Affect Readers’ Perceptions? A Randomised Trial, 325 BRIT. MED. J.
1391, 1392 (2002) (subjects finding article that disclosed conflict of interest to be
“significantly less interesting, important, relevant, valid, and believable” compared to article
with no such disclosure); Sara Schroter, Julie Morris, Samena Chaudhry, Richard Smith &
Helen Barratt, Does the Type of Competing Interest Statement Affect Readers’ Perceptions of
the Credibility of Research? Randomised Trial, 328 BRIT. MED. J. 743, 743 (2004) (finding
that readers of British Medical Journal considered a study to be less important, relevant, valid,
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they are aware that such articles disproportionately yield positive results, 246 other
studies suggest that disclosure of industry funding or other conflict of interest do not
impact how articles are perceived.247 Most notably, one study showed that although
doctors say they find industry-funded studies less persuasive, in an experimental
setting regarding an abstract of a fictitious new drug, disclosure of funding from a
company had no significant impact on self-reported prescribing likelihood.248 Indeed,
almost forty percent reported that they would not consider any type of conflict of
interest by the author in deciding what to prescribe. 249 In other words, doctors seem
to believe that they should discount for conflicts of interest, but have difficulty doing
so; rather, doctors did not discount for bias at all. This is consistent with literature
showing that people have difficulty ignoring information, such as a conflict of
interest, in making decisions, even if they know that this information may bias their
judgment.250 In addition, this effect could also be a function of the fact that many
doctors have relationships with pharmaceutical representatives and are motivated,
albeit unconsciously, to ignore conflicts with pharmaceutical companies to preserve
any potential cognitive dissonance.
There is additional data to debunk the more information schema in the context of
conflict of interest disclosures in peer review articles that are presumed to lead to
more reasoned judgments. Doctors generally only read abstracts,251 which typically
do not include conflict of interest disclosures since these usually appear at the end of

or believable when associated with a financial interest disclosure). Of course, there are some
that suggest financial interests alone do not necessarily indicate whether a study is reliable.
E.g., David B. Resnik & Kevin C. Elliott, Taking Financial Relationships into Account when
Assessing Research, 20 ACCOUNTABILITY IN RES.: POLICIES & QUALITY ASSURANCE 184, 194
(2013) (suggesting several factors be used to assess whether financial relationships impact
research credibility).
246. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
247. One study of actual abstracts from industry-funded trials indicated no statistically
significant difference in interpretation of abstract findings regarding quality of methodology
or treatment benefit. Buffel du Vaure et al., supra note 206, at 7–8.
248. See Silverman et al., supra note 209, at 267–68.
249. Id. at 267.
250. See, e.g., Lee Ross, Mark R. Lepper & Michael Hubbard, Perseverance in SelfPerception and Social Perception: Biased Attributional Processes in the Debriefing
Paradigm, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 880 (1975); Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy
Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments
and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117 (1994).
251. See Saint et al., supra note 206, at 883 (finding internists reported only reading
abstracts for two-thirds of articles and suggesting that this may be an underestimation); see
also Sally Hopewell, Anne Eisinga & Mike Clarke, Better Reporting of Randomized Trials in
Biomedical Journal and Conference Abstracts, 34 J. INFO. SCI. 162, 162–63, 166 (2008)
(noting that doctors may make treatment decisions based on reading abstracts); Robertson,
supra note 60, at 368 (stating that physicians commonly choose to read only abstracts of
articles through services such as PubMed). In addition, abstracts also may provide inaccurate
conclusions. Roy M. Pitkin, Mary Ann Branagan & Leon F. Burmeister, Accuracy of Data in
Abstracts of Published Research Articles, 281 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1110, 1110–11 (1999)
(noting that eighteen to sixty-eight percent of abstracts report findings inconsistent with or
absent from the article’s body, even in large-circulation medical journals).
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an article. So, the inclusion of this additional information seems to realistically have
no chance of actually informing doctors—even if the doctor was aware that industrysupported studies tend to be correlated with positive studies. 252 Moreover, even in
the unlikely situation that a doctor reads the entire article, studies suggest that the
abstract could have predominant influence pursuant to cognitive science studies
regarding the effects of “anchoring”; in other words, initial information is given more
weight, even if other information follows. This would also seem to be true in the
unlikely event that a doctor skipped the abstract and read the article; since the conflict
of interest disclosures do not come until the end, the doctor’s opinion is likely already
anchored to the information disclosed before such disclosures. Moreover, even if
doctors actually read the conflict of interest disclosure and were appropriately
skeptical of industry-funded articles, that might be of no utility if industry-funded
articles are the only source of information.
III. IMPLICATIONS
This Part evaluates how commercial speech law currently overprotects marketing
of off-label uses of drugs. Section A explains why the previously unrecognized
schemas discussed above have contributed to an expansion of commercial speech
rights in this area. Then, Section B examines whether there are better First
Amendment policies to emphasize with such promotion.
A. Retrospective View on First Amendment Expansion Informed by Cognitive Bias
This Section takes a fresh look at recent commercial speech cases regarding offlabel marketing of prescription drugs. This Section first reviews key facts from recent
cases. Then, it examines how schemas have impacted evaluation of facts, as well as
application of the law. Finally, this Section explains how FDA capitulation to judicial
challenges has resulted in the fact that schemas are currently baked into precedent.

252. There is consistent evidence that studies financially supported by self-interested
industries are more likely to provide outcomes favorable to those industries. E.g., Justin E.
Bekelman, Yan Li & Cary P. Gross, Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in
Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review, 289 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 454, 456 (2003); Joel
Lexchin, Lisa A. Bero, Benjamin Djulbegovic & Otavio Clark, Pharmaceutical Industry
Sponsorship and Research Outcome and Quality: Systematic Review, 326 BRIT. MED. J. 1167,
1168–69 (2003); Andreas Lundh, Joel Lexchin, Barbara Mintzes, Jeppe B. Schroll & Lisa
Bero, Industry Sponsorship and Research Outcome, COCHRANE LIBR., 2013, at 12; Sergio
Sismondo, Pharmaceutical Company Funding and Its Consequences: A Qualitative
Systematic Review, 29 CONTEMP. CLINICAL TRIALS 109 (2008); see also Bodil Als-Nielsen,
Wendong Chen, Christian Gluud & Lise L. Kjaergard, Association of Funding and
Conclusions in Randomized Drug Trials: A Reflection of Treatment Effect or Adverse Events?,
290 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 921, 925 (2003) (noting that studies supported by for-profit
organizations are more likely to recommended experimental drug for treatment).

2019]

A DA N GE R OUS C O N CO C TIO N

827

1. Relevant Case Law Expanding Commercial Speech for Off-Label Promotion
Before analyzing the impact of schemas on how courts evaluate facts and conduct
legal analysis, a brief review of the core facts of cases is essential. As discussed
earlier, the first commercial speech case involving off-label promotion was the 1998
Washington Legal Foundation decision.253 In that case, two FDA guidance
documents that barred pharmaceutical companies from showing doctors scientific
articles relating to drugs were deemed unconstitutional for restricting free speech.254
The FDA did not challenge this district court decision.255 Accordingly, the next
important commercial speech case involving pharmaceutical companies is the 2011
Supreme Court Sorrell decision.256
In 2011, the Supreme Court issued the Sorrell decision, which is related to offlabel promotion of drugs but does not squarely address the extent to which the FDA
can regulate such promotion consistent with commercial speech.257 Sorrell involved
a challenge by drug companies to a Vermont law barring companies from buying
data concerning doctor prescriptions to use it to more effectively sell drugs to doctors
(i.e., for detailing by representatives).258 A 6-3 majority found that the Vermont law
unduly hindered commercial speech and even suggested that commercial speech
might be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny if it is content or speaker based. 259
Although the majority found that Vermont’s law targeted only pharmaceutical
companies, and thus was arguably speaker based, it did not ultimately propose any
new standard and instead found the Vermont law failed under the traditional Central
Hudson test.260
The first true First Amendment challenge to off-label marketing was in United
States v. Caronia, which involved a criminal prosecution for misbranding. 261 The
case involved an unusual situation where the pharmaceutical sales representative was
not only caught on tape promoting the drug for an unapproved uses, but also for
situations subject to a black box warning.262 In other words, the sales representative
was actually providing untruthful information. The FDA, however, made the
strategic decision not to challenge the falsity of the information. The Second Circuit
majority opinion in Caronia reversed the conviction against the sales representative,

253. Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998).
254. Id. at 54, 73–74.
255. The FDA and Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) reached an agreement that
guidance documents were merely “safe harbors” from prosecution that mooted the need for an
appeal of this decision as well as a related challenge to a new law permitting manufacturer
dissemination of off-label use if the manufacturer had applied or intended to apply for a new
use. Krause, supra note 83, at 409.
256. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
257. See id.
258. Id. at 558–61.
259. Id. at 580.
260. Id. at 572.
261. 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
262. Id. at 155–57 (although the black box warning stated that drug safety and efficacy had
not been established for those under sixteen and that the drug had “very limited” experience
among elderly patients, the sales representative was recorded saying that the drug was “a very
safe drug” to patients, including those as young as fourteen and greater than sixty-five).
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finding that the FDA improperly relied on off-label promotion alone as the basis of
the misbranding claim, rather than as evidence of intent to misbrand.263
Subsequently, pharmaceutical manufacturer Amarin, together with four doctors,
sought a preliminary injunction against the FDA in the Southern District of New
York, where Caronia was precedential.264 In particular, Amarin wanted the court to
enjoin the FDA from bringing a misbranding action265 for an unapproved use of a
drug after the FDA denied approval for that use as not scientifically justified.266
Although only the FDA can approve a new use, Amarin’s legal challenge was
effectively an attempt to overrule the FDA decision denying approval. Amarin,
however, characterized its effort as simply an attempt to shield itself from
prosecution for making truthful statements in a format different than the FDA
prefers.267
2. Examining Key Cases Through the Lens of the Revealed Schemas
Examining recent commercial speech cases concerning off-label promotion
through the lens of the two schemas provides new insight to complement existing
criticism of these cases. As will be discussed, these schemas impact how courts
evaluate facts, as well as the application of relevant law.
Schemas serve as an important framework through which facts are evaluated. This
is well illustrated in the Sorrell majority opinion which found a Vermont law barring
pharmaceutical companies from obtaining and using doctor prescriptions to inform
their detailing to violate protections on commercial speech.268 The majority stated
that there were “divergent views” regarding the value of detailing, as well as the
value of prescribing brand name drugs, but nonetheless seemed more inclined to
assume the information valuable and consistent with the more information schema.269
This schema likely led the majority to fail to recognize the inherently unbalanced
prescription marketplace where companies have outsized resources and incentives to
promote a view that cannot be matched by a state. 270 The dissent, on the other hand,

263. Id. at 168–69.
264. Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); see also Krause,
supra note 83, at 414–15 (noting that the case was intentionally filed in a district where
Caronia would be precedential).
265. See Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 221.
266. Id. at 209 (noting desire to promote unapproved drug use for patients with merely
“persistently” high triglyceride levels in addition to the approved use for patients with very
high levels).
267. Id. at 223. This case was different than the prior cases not only because of its
procedural posture, but also because the drug at issue, marketed as Vascepa, is actually a
purified version of fish oil, and supplements made of unpurified fish oil may be marketed
without the rigorous review required of drugs, so long as a company provides a disclaimer to
note the lack of a review. See id. at 237. In addition, although the FDA had a legal basis to
deny approval of the proposed new use, Amarin had entered into a special agreement with the
FDA before doing the clinical trial for the proposed new use that typically leads to approval.
Id. at 210.
268. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
269. Id. at 578.
270. See id.
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recognized that the majority’s suggestion that the state could promote contrary
speech was not realistic, citing information in the record to counter the majority’s
presumptions.271 The more information schema may also underlie the majority’s
emphasis on the possible value of new drugs that are subject to detailing—when the
issue was not about promoting all new drugs. Rather, as recognized by the dissent,
the challenge was only regarding whether companies could more successfully market
new drugs not based on a superior product, but on knowledge of doctor
preferences.272
The schemas also play an important role in how courts evaluate regulations that
impact commercial speech. The traditional benchmark for evaluating such speech is
the intermediate scrutiny test announced in Central Hudson. Although
the Sorrell majority suggested heightened scrutiny should apply to any regulation
that it is not content neutral (i.e., allegedly targeting only pharmaceutical
companies)273 it did not articulate, let alone apply, such a test nor have any
subsequent cases, as noted earlier. Accordingly, how schemas impact judicial
evaluation of the Central Hudson factors remains an issue. Examples of the impact
of schemas on judicial interpretation of the factors in key cases relating to promotion
of off-label use of drugs are discussed below within the framework of the Central
Hudson factors.
i. False or Inherently Misleading?
The schemas have played a role in judicial analysis of the first Central Hudson
factor (i.e., whether the commercial speech is aimed at a lawful purpose and whether
the speech is false or inherently misleading).
The first case to embrace First Amendment challenges to off-label use restrictions,
Washington Legal Foundation, seemed influenced by these schemas in rejecting the
FDA suggestion that publications from companies were false or inherently
misleading. The court acknowledged that the FDA had provided the court with
“substantial evidence” that research from companies impacted actual prescriptions

271. Id. at 593–95. As recognized by the dissent, attempts to mirror the methods of the
prescription drug industry with “academic” or “counter” detailing (i.e., a presentation by an
individual to a doctor on the benefits of generic drugs or alternative treatments) have not been
found adequate to counter the imbalanced sales tactics at issue here. Id. at 601 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
272. See id. at 595, 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that because, as the majority stated,
state law intended to impose a “specific, content-based burden,” heightened judicial scrutiny
is warranted in evaluating government regulation of speech because of disagreement with the
message). Arguably, this suggestion could be a result of the convergence of the sophisticated
doctor and more information schemas. Of course, this is not to suggest that these schemas are
the only possible explanation. Alternatively, the majority could be reflecting a return to the
Lochner era where courts substituted their own judgment in evaluating regulations. See id. at
591–93 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (cautioning that second-guessing legislative decisions would
be a dangerous return to the “happily bygone era” in Lochner when judges abused their power
to impose their own economic theories). Nonetheless, recognizing the effect of combining
both schemas in this case may help explain the majority’s suggestion for this new standard.
273. Id. at 565.
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and sales,274 and even acknowledged that manufacturers would only “disseminate
information that presents their product in a favorable light,” with the potential to
mislead in the context of concluding that the information was commercial speech.275
However, the court did not mention these issues in analyzing whether the information
was in fact inherently misleading, even though it acknowledged that determining
whether something is inherently misleading depends upon possibilities for deception,
which its earlier discussion seemed to suggest is possible.276 Even though the court
realized that companies would likely selectively provide certain data to companies,
the court asserted that publications could not be inherently deceptive when provided
by one self-interested company versus another.277 Although the court did not
explicitly say so, it may have been relying on the sophisticated doctor schema to
assume that doctors would know publications from companies were not reliable and
thus perhaps merely “potentially,” rather than inherently, misleading. 278
This lack of concern for deception may be tied to another issue the court notes as
important in evaluating what is inherently misleading—the ability of the audience to
evaluate the claims made.279 Although doctors cannot actually evaluate any of the
scientific claims on their own without conducting their own research, which is highly
unlikely, the court’s lack of concern that doctors will be misled seems to be tied to
the sophisticated doctor schema. For example, in noting that a prior court had denied
a constitutional challenge to FDA regulations requiring health claims to be supported
by significant scientific agreement, the court asserted that the case at issue concerned
a “professional audience,” without discussion of whether that audience could
actually evaluate the scientific claims.280 In addition, the more information schema
may have influenced the court to conclude that publications from a manufacturer
were not inherently misleading because the FDA could indicate that uses had not
been approved and require publications only from “bona fide peer-review” journals
and independent publishers, presumably based on the assumption that such sources
are scientifically reliable.281
The more information schema may have played a particularly powerful role in the
Caronia decision that overruled a criminal conviction against a sales representative
for misbranding, based in part from promoting an off-label use that could have led
to serious public health harm and was subject to a black box warning.282 This schema
may explain something that has perplexed scholars—the fact that the majority
repeatedly emphasized that the information was “truthful,” when in fact it was

274. Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 63 (D.D.C. 1998).
275. Id. at 65.
276. See id. at 66–69.
277. See id.
278. The court stated “the exact same journal article or textbook reprint cannot be
inherently conducive to deception and coercion when it is sent unsolicited” by a manufacturer.
Id. at 67. However, this seems contrary to the court’s prior acknowledgement that
manufacturers will, in fact, selectively send only information favorable to their product.
279. See id. at 67.
280. Id. at 68.
281. Id.
282. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 155–56 (2d Cir. 2012).
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patently false.283 Of course, it is true that the FDA never alleged that the information
was false, such that the court was legally permitted to infer the information was
truthful.284 In addition, in the preliminary discussion of facts, the majority did note
that the sales representative promoted uses with populations that the FDA not only
had not approved, but for which there was a “black box” warning; such a warning is
the most serious warning possible for prescription labels.285 However, the more
information schema could help explain why the court did not explicitly state in the
text to its Central Hudson analysis that it was presuming the information was not
false or misleading because it was uncontested even though the discussion of facts
acknowledged the information was not only false, but dangerous. 286 In other words,
this case demonstrates how the more information schema not only results in treating
potentially misleading information equivalent to truthful information, but that it may
also result in a court presuming information is truthful contrary to actual facts. Even
though the court was permitted as a matter of law to presume the information was
true, the more information schema provides an important explanation for why the
court seemed to discount the facts in its own opinion that contradict this assumption.
ii. Substantial Government Interest?
The same schemas may have contributed to the court’s decision in Washington
Legal Foundation that no substantial government interest in ensuring doctors have
accurate and unbiased information. In particular, although the court recognized that
there was a substantial government interest in encouraging companies to submit new
drug uses to the FDA for approval,287 the court completely rejected the FDA’s
suggestion that there was a substantial government interest in ensuring doctors had
accurate and unbiased information.288 This rejection seems grounded in the more
information schema that assumes even potentially misleading information can be
“informative,” as well as the sophisticated doctor schema that erroneously assumes
doctors will not be misled by marketing information.
Similarly, the schemas may have contributed to the Sorrell majority narrowly
defining the relevant government interest behind the state law intended to bar drug

283. Krause, supra note 83, at 432 (noting that the court’s conclusion was “curious” since
Caronia’s statement directly contradicted the black box warning); see also Caronia, 703 F.3d
at 166, 168.
284. This likely reflected the litigation strategy since a holding that does not rely on false
statements would be broader. See Greene, supra note 5, at 683 (noting that the government
believed it only needed to show that the drug was promoted for off-label use).
285. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 155–56; see also supra note 262 and accompanying text
(providing details of the black box warning); supra note 188 and accompanying text
(explaining black box warnings).
286. See id. Of course, the existence of an information schema does not mean that there
are not additional issues contributing to the decision, such as that the court might have been
concerned about criminal liability for a sales person for misbranding, as opposed to a
corporation or a high-level executive. E.g., id. at 174 (Livingston, J., dissenting). Nonetheless,
the information schema can add insight.
287. Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 71–72 (D.D.C. 1998).
288. Id. at 69–70.
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companies from using doctor prescription records. In particular, in discussing the
government interest, the majority characterized the main interest as medical privacy,
as well as preventing harassing behavior by sales representatives.289 In addition, the
majority relied on the sophisticated doctor schema to dismiss the suggestion that the
state law did not directly advance the goal of minimizing harassing behavior because
doctors can and do deny meetings with detailers.290 The majority also embraced the
more information schema in arguing that detailers had valuable information for
doctors—even though the information sought was only valuable to the detailers to
promote sales, and not doctors.291 The majority discounted a state interest in limiting
the success of pharmaceutical detailing to help reduce drug costs because the state
did not vigorously pursue this during oral argument. 292 However, there was a
substantial legislative record behind the policy goal of reducing detailing success to
reduce costs, as duly noted by the dissent.293 The majority seemed to thoroughly
embrace the more information schema in characterizing detailing as “benign and,
many would say, beneficial speech,” and also by asserting that the possibility that
detailing might persuade “provides no lawful basis for quieting it.” 294
iii. Direct Advancement of Interest?
Although the Sorrell majority narrowly defined the government interest, and thus
easily rebutted why these interests were not advanced, it still considered whether the
government interest of reducing brand name drug costs was directly advanced—all
while being influenced by the schemas. However, as the dissent pointed out, the
challenged state law did directly advance a government interest by ensuring
discussion is based on actual facts about drugs, rather than using past doctor
prescriptions to sway doctors.295
The Sorrell majority repeatedly relied on schemas to support its assertion that the
regulation did not directly advance any government interest. For example, the
majority noted that doctors find detailing “instructive”—consistent with the
sophisticated doctor schema, as well as the more information schema. 296 The court
also noted that the common First Amendment refrain that truthful information should
not be suppressed based on the fear of bad decisions (i.e., the more information
schema) applies with “full force” when the audience consists of “sophisticated and
experienced consumers.”297 In doing so, the majority quoted Edenfield, a case that
found a law banning certified public accountants (CPAs) from personal solicitation
to be unconstitutional since prospective clients were likely sophisticated and

289. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 572–74 (2011).
290. Id. at 575.
291. Id. at 575–77.
292. Id. at 576–78.
293. Id. at 597–98 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding a broader substantial interest to regulate
public health consistent with police powers).
294. Id. at 576 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)) (noting that fear of
persuasion is not a lawful basis for quieting speech in most situations, including this case).
295. Id. at 597 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
296. Id. at 578.
297. Id. at 577 (emphasis added) (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 775 (1993)).
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experienced business executives not prone to manipulation.298 However, that case
found no dangers for professionals subject to in-person solicitation by a CPA who is
not trained in the “art of persuasion.”299 Although doctors are professionals, they
are being approached by pharmaceutical representatives whose livelihood
fundamentally depends on being persuasive. 300 In fact, companies are known to hire
those they consider most likely to be persuasive. 301
The schemas may help explain some of the discussion in the Caronia majority
opinion concerning the direct advancement of interest. Although the majority
recognized that the government has a substantial interest in preserving the integrity
of the drug approval process and reducing patient harm from unsafe and ineffective
drugs, its reliance on the information schema seemed to unduly contribute to its
conclusion that a bar on off-label marketing of “truthful” information fails to directly
advance this interest.302 In particular, the majority’s assertion that FDA regulations
legalize off-label use, but “prohibit[] the free flow of information that would inform
that outcome,”303 reflects the more information schema in conjunction with the
sophisticated doctor schema that falsely presumes doctors are not misled by
marketing. So, the majority’s assertion that drug companies were providing
“potentially relevant treatment information” that will provide “informed and
intelligent treatment decisions” does not comport with reality. 304 There are also
systematic problems with relying on the schemas. As recognized by the dissent,
permitting a company to promote a drug for any use after the drug has been only
approved for one would fundamentally disrupt the entire process for drug approval
and portends that the entire process could be found unconstitutional. 305
iv. Narrowly Tailored
In addition, the Caronia majority’s suggestion that prosecution of off-label
marketing is not narrowly tailored is also questionable once cognitive biases are
taken into consideration.306 For example, the majority suggested that a less speech-

298. Id. In addition, in Edenfield, the Court noted that CPA training emphasizes
independence and objectivity, not advocacy, which are likely inapplicable to drug
representatives. See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 775.
299. Id. (emphasis added).
300. Not only are pharmaceutical representatives hired to be persuasive, but about a quarter
of their overall compensation is tied to prescriptions written by physicians. See Christopher v.
SmithKlein Beecham Corp., No. CV-08-1498-PHX-FJM, 2009 WL 4051075, at *3 (D. Ariz.
Nov. 20, 2009).
301. E.g., Stephanie Saul, Gimme an Rx! Cheerleaders Pep Up Drug Sales, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 28, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/28/business/gimme-an-rx-cheerleaders
-pep-up-drug-sales.html [https://perma.cc/49YU-88VG].
302. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166 (2d Cir. 2012).
303. Id. at 167.
304. Id. at 166.
305. See id. at 179.
306. In contrast, the Caronia dissent seemed to implicitly understand that more
information is not always better in considering misbranding to be the least restrictive way to
advance the government interest in protecting the new drug approval process, which the
Supreme Court has previously recognized as an important government interest. Id. at 178.
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restrictive alternative could be to educate doctors regarding potentially misleading
information.307 However, this suggestion is questionable based on what studies have
shown: doctors are already skeptical of the accuracy of information from
pharmaceutical companies, and yet are still vulnerable to the marketing messages far
more than they realize.308 In addition, as discussed earlier, it is difficult to change
preexisting schemas due to confirmation bias that impacts all individuals. 309 That is,
if a doctor believes that she is capable of distinguishing misleading information from
true information—even if she is in fact incapable of doing so—she is likely to ignore
subsequent information inconsistent with her beliefs. So, simply telling doctors that
they are vulnerable to being misled is not likely to be adequate alone.
The information schema also seemed highly relevant to the Amarin decision that
followed Caronia. The court noted that it wanted to “err on the side of caution,”
which meant providing doctors with more, not less, information, consistent with the
more information schema.310 Since the plaintiff-doctors alleged the information was
helpful, the court did not question this belief, even though, as previously discussed,
studies show doctors are in fact far less sophisticated than they realize. 311
The more information schema is reflected in the Amarin court’s evaluation and
approval of a proposed statement regarding how certain omega-3 fatty acids, present
in Amarin’s drug marketed as Vascepa, may reduce heart disease according to
“[s]upportive but not conclusive research.” 312 Although the FDA considered this to
be potentially misleading, the court focused on the fact that the FDA did not
challenge the claim as completely misleading.313 In other words, the court’s lack of
concern regarding potentially misleading information is consistent with the more
information schema that does not question harm from potentially misleading
information.314 The court noted that the accompanying disclosures would easily
address any such problem. 315 However, as explained in Section II.C, relying on
disclosures to actually inform is not supported by empirical studies.

307. Id. at 168.
308. See supra Section II.B.2.
309. See supra Section II.A.2.
310. Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
311. See supra Section II.B.
312. Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 214. Amarin proposed the following Statement (#1):
“Supportive but not conclusive research shows that consumption of EPA and DHA omega-3
fatty acids may reduce the risk of coronary heart disease.” Id. at 234. Similarly, the information
schema likely led the court to permit Amarin to add additional language to the FDA’s proposed
statement regarding the fact that recent trials failed to demonstrate the cardiovascular benefit
of adding a second lipid-altering drug when it characterized the industry desired language as
“factually accurate,” and relegated to a footnote its dismissal of the FDA’s assertion that the
language was misleading. Id. at 233 n.65.
313. Id. at 235.
314. See id. at 234.
315. Id. at 235 (noting FDA concern that a doctor might improperly conclude that “there
is currently sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that drug-induced decreases in
triglyceride levels lead to a reduction in the risk of cardiovascular events in patients on statin
therapy.”). The other agreed upon disclosures are that the “FDA has not approved Vascepa to
reduce the risk of coronary heart disease” (Amarin Disclosure #1); “[t]he effect of Vascepa on
the risk of cardiovascular mortality and morbidity has not been determined” (Amarin
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3. Schemas Baked into Precedent Result in FDA Capitulation
The two schemas are currently entrenched in commercial speech precedent in part
as a result of a lack of government challenges to prior rulings. Although the lack of
government challenges to prior rulings can be considered reasonable to avoid
potential court decisions that could threaten the entire FDA new drug-approval
process, government inaction could ironically lead to the same conclusion. To best
understand the current situation, it is important to begin with the first case to use the
First Amendment to challenge FDA regulation of off-label uses (i.e., Washington
Legal Foundation) since the FDA’s response to that has impacted subsequent cases.
Washington Legal Foundation was a key case in finding FDA regulations barring
companies from distributing peer-reviewed articles concerning off-label uses to
violate commercial speech. After losing the summary judgment motion in
Washington Legal Foundation, the FDA effectively conceded companies could
distribute peer-reviewed articles that support off-label uses.316 However, empirical
studies conducted since the case was decided in 1998 now show serious problems
with peer-reviewed articles, even if they have the veneer of objectivity.317 But,
because the FDA settled, subsequent courts have used this decision to suggest that
the FDA itself acknowledges that such articles are helpful.318

Disclosure #3); “[a] cardiovascular outcomes study of Vascepa designed to evaluate the
efficacy of Vascepa in reducing cardiovascular mortality and morbidity in a high risk patient
population on statin therapy is currently underway” (Amarin Disclosure #4); and “Vascepa
may not be eligible for reimbursement under government healthcare programs . . . to reduce
the risk of coronary heart disease . . . .” (Amarin Disclosure #5); as well as contested Amarin
Disclosure #2, which stated that the “FDA has not approved Vascepa for the treatment of
statin-treated patients with mixed dyslipidemia and high . . . triglyceride levels.”
316. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF
MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON
UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED DRUGS AND APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES
(2009), https://www.fda.gov/regulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm125126.htm [https://perma
.cc/K5QV-4SG5]. The details that led to this are a bit complex. Basically, before the district
court ruling in favor of the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF), Congress passed the Food
and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA), which permitted information
about unapproved uses so long as the manufacturer had applied or intended to apply for a new
use. Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360). Although
the FDA initially thought the WLF ruling enjoining its previously challenged guidance
documents did not apply to the new statute, after the district court enjoined enforcement of
FDAMA and its implementing regulations, the government initially appealed, but reached an
agreement with WLF that it had no independent prosecutorial authority, only the ability to
provide a “safe harbor” from prosecution. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 335–
36 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also Krause, supra note 83. In addition, although FDAMA provisions
were written to sunset in 2006, the 2009 FDA guidance document was more beneficial to
companies because they could provide documents concerning off-label uses without any need
to have an intent to submit an application to the FDA for approval of that use. Krause, supra
note 83, at 410.
317. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
318. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166–67 (2d Cir. 2012).
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More recently, the Amarin court recognized that there was a “vigorous dissent”
in Caronia but also noted that the FDA failed to challenge this decision, seeming to
suggest that this means that the Caronia majority was necessarily correct.319
Although many commentators recognize that the FDA’s failure to challenge
judgments and enter into settlements is inherently tied to concern about further
erosion of its regulatory powers, its inaction has opened the door to courts
questioning its basic regulatory authority. For example, the Amarin court asserted
that the FDA process for approving even new drugs “predates modem [sic] First
Amendment law respecting commercial speech.”320 The FDA did not challenge this,
likely because an appeal would have been futile since the case was filed in the
Southern District of New York and governed by Caronia.321 Nonetheless, the Amarin
suggestion is a troubling one that subsequent courts can now rely on. In addition, this
troubling suggestion may result in further FDA capitulation to settlements in other
cases.
B. The Mismatch Between First Amendment Policy and Pharmaceutical Marketing
There is currently a stark mismatch between First Amendment policy and
marketing of prescription drugs. Although commercial speech cases consistently
assert that well-informed decisions are a goal, this is often an elusive one, with
dangerous public health consequences looming in the context of promoting
unapproved uses of prescription drugs. As previously discussed, it is difficult for
doctors to make informed prescription decisions when they rely on information from
self-interested companies. This Section explains that although case law recognizes
misleading commercial speech as raising policy concerns that justify more
regulation, cases thus far fail to see that many of these concerns exist in the context
of potentially misleading speech from pharmaceutical companies that speak in a onesided marketplace. This Section explains why recognition of these similarities is
important to achieve the policy goal of informed decisions.
1. Policy Similarities Between Inherently and Potentially Misleading Speech
Although it is undisputed that inherently misleading commercial speech may be
barred, the policy concerns behind such speech are actually similar to those of
potentially misleading speech. For example, the Amarin court stated that “[w]hether
speech is ‘inherently misleading’ depends on . . . the ‘possibilities for deception,’ . .
. whether ‘experience has proved that in fact that such advertising is subject to abuse,’
. . . and ‘the ability of the intended audience to evaluate the claims made.’”322

319. Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 227.
320. Id. at 226.
321. The FDA promptly settled after the court’s holding in favor of granting a preliminary
injunction against the FDA, essentially permitting the company to assert their desired claims.
See Eric Palmer, With FDA Settlement, Tiny Amarin Creates Opening for Pharma in Off-Label
Marketing, FIERCEPHARMA (Mar. 9, 2016, 10:10 AM), https://www.fiercepharma.com
/pharma/fda-settlement-tiny-amarin-creates-opening-for-pharma-off-label-marketing [https://
perma.cc/KS9X-72AY].
322. Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 235 (quoting Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp.
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Although not recognized by courts thus far due to the two schemas, doctors, who are
the intended audience of pharmaceutical marketing, have no ability to verify
accuracy of pharmaceutical marketing since there is no other source of information.
In addition, although not yet recognized by courts, studies show that doctors are
vulnerable to advertising, yet are largely unaware of their vulnerability.
Detailing has characteristics similar to those previously noted as problematic in
commercial speech cases regarding misleading information that can be banned. In
particular, the Supreme Court has previously given states more liberty to restrict
speech in situations where there is a danger of overreaching. This can happen when
someone who is “trained in the art of persuasion” is in a situation that would breed
“undue influence,” such as an attorney who is soliciting at an accident site or hospital
room.323 As noted earlier, sales representatives are hired to be persuasive, and their
livelihood depends on it.324 Studies show that these representatives have undue
influence on doctors based not on a superior product, but on their effective use of
marketing techniques known to take advantage of psychological biases. Indeed, the
fact that many doctors claim the information from representatives is useful without
impacting them—contrary to actual studies from evidence—shows that they are
subject to influence. Whereas there is general consumer skepticism concerning
attorneys that might make even an accident victim leery of such a solicitation,
doctors’ assertions of the value of pharmaceutical detailing underscore that
representatives are so persuasive that doctors are largely unaware that they are being
manipulated.
Also, the Supreme Court has noted that deception is more likely when there is a
limited ability to self-police and a lack of standardization in the product.325 Although
these comments were made about attorney advertisements (where the product is
attorney advice, which is usually individualized), the absence of self-policing and a
standard product apply equally to the field of pharmaceutical marketing. 326 It is clear
that the industry is not self-policing its own conduct considering a long history of
companies being fined for improperly advertising off-label use of drugs.327 In
addition, there is no standardization for off-label drug marketing; the FDA only
regulates the uses that it has evaluated, not off-label uses.328 Of course, the case that

2d 51, 67 (D.D.C. 1998) (internal citations omitted)).
323. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 461, 464–65 (1978).
324. See supra notes 300–301 and accompanying text.
325. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202 (1982) (relying extensively on Bates v. State Bar
of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977), to establish that there is no absolute bar on potentially
misleading information and that the attorney advertising in case at issue was not actually
misleading to include information about where the attorney was licensed to practice or to mail
cards announcing the opening of an office).
326. In addition, they are arguably even more concerning in the context of off-label
marketing since there are public health harms from misleading drug advertisements but
generally not regarding attorney advertisements.
327. See, e.g., supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text; see also Amarin, 119 F. Supp.
3d at 204 (“There are many examples in which prescriptions of an approved drug for off-label
use has caused harm.”).
328. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(a)(3) (2015) (requiring labeling only for approved uses of
drugs). The FDA regulates labeling of approved uses of drugs, but does not directly regulate
unapproved uses. Id.; see also supra Section I.A (explaining that the FDA approves drugs for
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mentioned these issues also noted the public’s comparative lack of knowledge as a
key factor, which would seem initially inapplicable to doctors. 329 However, as
explained in Part II, although doctors are highly educated, they are far less
sophisticated than the sophisticated doctor schema assumes, and studies show that
they actually have been misled. So, rather than deception being simply a theoretical
issue that courts readily dismiss as improbable, it is in fact often the reality.
2. Potentially Misleading Pharmaceutical Marketing Is Unlikely to Be
Corrected, with Significant Public Harm, but Limited Benefit
An important issue with marketing of prescription drugs is that the traditional
presumptions concerning how potentially misleading speech will be corrected are
false. In particular, as previously discussed, cases traditionally assume that
potentially misleading speech will be corrected either by another source of speech,
or, alternatively, by a disclaimer. However, as will be explained, neither can combat
alleged facts presented by a self-interested company in the unique prescription drug
marketplace. In addition, although commercial speech case law generally does not
focus on how persuasive the speech is, that presumption may be less justified in the
unique circumstance of off-label drug promotion when there is no contrary speech
and the potential public health harm is severe.
Additional information, whether from a source other than the self-interested
company or in the form of a disclaimer, is unlikely to make potentially misleading
information from such companies no longer misleading. As noted earlier, disclaimers
are ineffective at minimizing confusion, even for well-educated audiences such as
scientists. In addition, when a new drug is first introduced, and for a number of years
after that, there is only one company that has information to speak about this drug. 330
Accordingly, unlike the typical market that commercial speech law presumes, where
there can be a marketplace of different ideas, the abnormal pharmaceutical market
unduly represents the views of the industry. Furthermore, as noted in Part II, doctors
are vulnerable to being misled by pharmaceutical marketing—and may continue to
improperly rely on marketing even in the face of contrary evidence. This is consistent
with the fact that studies show repeated information is more likely to be considered
true.331 Moreover, independent research typically results in peer-reviewed articles
that are inherently less accessible than detailing and also not as likely to be repeated
as commercial marketing messages. Subsequent independent information will also
be considered less due to the cognitive bias of anchoring, whereby initial information
tends to be the basis upon which subsequent information is perceived. So, any initial
misinformation is not truly corrected by another source of speech.
In addition, the potential to mislead a doctor into prescribing a drug for an
unapproved use has serious public health consequences but little of the traditional

specific uses); supra Section I.C (noting that there is no direct regulation of off-label uses, but,
rather, liability for introducing misbranded drugs based on any indication of drug use that has
not been FDA approved).
329. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 202.
330. This is likely since new drugs are typically patented, and patent rights give their owner
the right to exclude all others from making or selling the same thing during the term of a patent.
331. See supra text accompanying notes 145–147.
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First Amendment benefits with respect to promoting democratic principles. 332
Commercial marketing of drugs is unlikely to promote debate on public policy. The
sole goal of drug marketing is to increase sales. Since there is already extensive
skepticism concerning the value of commercial marketing for uses of drugs that are
entirely FDA approved, marketing of uses not approved by the FDA should be
cautiously considered since these are associated with more adverse effects. As noted
earlier, the potential harms may be serious. Although government interests play a
role in evaluation of the Central Hudson factors for potentially misleading speech,
recognizing that stated policy concerns about misleading speech have some
similarities with the area of prescription drug promotion is also important in
considering how to address issues.
IV. AN INFORMED APPROACH TO DRUG ADVERTISING AND DEVELOPMENT
This Part proposes possible solutions to directly address the implications of the
previously unveiled and debunked schemas. Section A focuses on legal steps to
correct the current undue influence of schemas in commercial speech jurisprudence.
Section B goes beyond the legal realm to suggest structural changes to minimize the
impact of schemas.
A. Aligning First Amendment Law and Policy with Reality
This Section proposes several changes to commercial speech law to better
recognize that the current lopsided marketing of drugs to doctors results in their being
misled, even though they are dangerously unaware of this. There are four specific
changes to the law that are recommended. First, courts should recognize that
“potentially” misleading information is different than “truthful and non-misleading”
information and treat it differently as a matter of law in evaluating commercial
speech; specific factors are provided to guide courts on how to provide an appropriate

332. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995);
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988); see also TAMARA R. PIETY,
BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 165–85 (2012)
(raising issues concerning protection of commercial speech in the context of promoting
democracy); Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV.
1, 4, 49 (2000) (noting that whereas the First Amendment bars the state from suppressing
public discourse due to democratic governance, this policy issue does not apply to commercial
speech that is intended instead to focus on promoting information); supra notes 100–109 and
accompanying text (explaining different treatment of commercial speech versus
noncommercial speech). Of course, there are some that believe that commercial speech can
nonetheless be tied to democratic self-governance. E.g., Martin H. Redish, Commercial
Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67, 81 (2007) (“[S]peech concerning commercial products and services can
facilitate private self-government in much the same way that political speech fosters collective
self-government.”); Daniel E. Troy, Advertising: Not “Low Value” Speech, 16 YALE J. ON
REG. 85 (1999) (challenging the notion that commercial information or advertising is less
valuable than other forms of speech).
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balance between promoting First Amendment protections while still recognizing the
possible harms of such information. Second, the burden of proof should be shifted
regarding disclaimers; rather than have the FDA prove that information would be
misleading, the burden should be on the company to establish that a disclaimer will
not be misleading. Third, FDA guidance should be reevaluated and informed by
cognitive biases. Fourth, courts should defer more to FDA decisions regarding
whether information is potentially misleading.
1. An Informed Treatment of Potentially Misleading Information
Whereas current First Amendment law treats completely truthful and potentially
misleading information as equivalent as a matter of law, these two types of
information should be legally distinct—and treated as such when evaluating the
Central Hudson factors.333 It is a legal fiction that completely truthful and potentially
misleading information are the same. Accordingly, if information is potentially
misleading, the government should be given more flexibility in regulating that speech
since it has a higher likelihood to mislead. In addition, courts should consider that
the FDA has a substantial interest in regulating potentially misleading information
that has important public health consequences. This is particularly true in the case of
off-label uses that are often not scientifically supported and can result in negative
public health outcomes.
Embracing a different treatment for potentially misleading information would
help to avoid oddities like Caronia where not only was the information not truthful,
but the court relied on statements in prior case law that seem questionable with regard
to information that is potentially misleading. For example, the Caronia majority cited
prior Supreme Court precedent that a ban on “truthful and non-misleading” speech
rests “solely on the offensive assumption that the public will respond ‘irrationally’
to the truth.”334 While it may seem “offensive” that individuals respond irrationally
to the truth, cognitive bias studies consistently indicate that individuals often do not
respond rationally.335 In addition, pharmaceutical marketing favors
misrepresentation that is necessarily potentially misleading. Unlike other
commercial speech challenges involving facts that can be easily verified, such as
advertised prices, off-label marketing is a situation where the alleged facts cannot be
verified since the only source of information is the self-interested company.336

333. Given the cognitive biases at issue and serious public health risks implicated, there
could be an argument for presuming that all marketing of off-label uses should be presumed
actually misleading unless proven otherwise. After all, pharmaceutical marketing often
involves alleged facts for which a court cannot readily assess validity. However, recognizing
that this would seem to give the government a complete free pass to bar speech that runs totally
contrary to First Amendment jurisprudence. This Article instead makes the more modest
suggestion that potentially misleading information be viewed more skeptically.
334. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166–67 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (striking down ban on price advertisement of
alcohol)).
335. See supra Section II.A.2 (explaining a number of cognitive biases that result in
individuals maintain incorrect beliefs).
336. Moreover, even with an advertisement about prices for attorney services, not all
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Treating potentially misleading information differently than actually truthful and
non-misleading information would likely also have been beneficial in Amarin. The
court stated that the FDA “argues only that the claim is ‘potentially misleading,’” as
if there are no possible harms with potentially misleading doctors on an issue that
impacts public health.337 Of course, the statement is consistent with current case law.
However, some have questioned whether a key claim the court considered truthful
and unlikely to mislead even had any factual basis. 338 In particular, the claim that
there is “supportive but not conclusive research” that the drug at issue “may reduce
the risk of coronary heart disease” has been suggested as equivalent to saying that it
“may or may not reduce the risk.”339 In other words, Amarin’s statement is “true” in
the sense that it has relatively little factual content such that its content is not
affirmatively false. Nonetheless, it could still be potentially misleading, which the
court did not actually consider since it did not need to under current law that treats
potentially misleading information as equivalent to completely nonmisleading and
truthful information. However, given the lack of actual sophistication of doctors,
there is a potential to mislead.
Of course, the question is how a court should assess whether commercial speech
has the potential to mislead. There are two key factors that courts can and should
consider whether information is potentially misleading: (1) whether the commercial
information can be verified by at least one other source, and especially whether that
source is objective and reliable; and (2) the societal cost of misinformation, including
the scope of public health harm. The existence of at least one should be considered
by a court in coming to the legal determination that information is potentially
misleading. Each of these factors will be briefly explained.
An initial issue is whether the commercial speech can be verified by at least one
other source, and whether such source(s) are objective and reliable. Importantly, it is
essential to look beyond merely whether the source is a peer-reviewed journal article
because of previously noted problems with the peer-reviewed articles, including that
the industry may have undue influence with these articles. In other words, contrary
to prior cases, courts should not assume that a peer-reviewed journal article is
objective and unbiased. In addition, sometimes peer-reviewed journals will not even
be necessary to find that the commercial information is not accurate and thus has the
potential to mislead. For example, in Caronia, there was contrary evidence to the
commercial speech concerning off-label use of the strongest type of weight—an
FDA black box warning specifically cautioning against the proposed use.340

justices agreed that such advertisements are not misleading. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz.,
433 U.S. 350, 386 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part) (noting
skepticism that legal services can be generally considered “standardized” such that advertising
is not misleading); id. at 391 (Powell & Stewart, JJ., concurring in part, and dissenting in part)
(noting that advertising of legal services has “long been thought . . . inevitably . . . misleading
because such services are individualized”).
337. Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
338. See Spencer Phillips Hey & Aaron S. Kesselheim, An Uninformative Truth: The Logic
of Amarin’s Off-Label Promotion, PLOS MED., Mar. 2016, at 2.
339. Id.
340. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 at 155.
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Another important issue is the public health and societal cost of the
misinformation. For example, in Caronia, encouraging off-label use that is subject
to a black box warning could have tragic consequences that should have strong
weight in concluding information is potentially misleading. However, this factor
should not be limited to considering only tragic consequences. If the commercial
speech would encourage avoiding other treatments, especially ones known to be
effective and less expensive, that would also impose a societal cost in terms of
unnecessary expense. So, for example, with a drug that would not likely result in
serious public health harm, such as the purified fish oil sold by Amarin, the desired
commercial speech concerning an unapproved use could still be considered
potentially misleading if it would impose unnecessary costs for the drug without
substantial benefit.
2. A Modified Burden on Disclaimers
An important change to the law that is well supported by empirical data is to
fundamentally change the burden of proof regarding disclaimers before considering
that a disclaimer is a less restrictive alternative to barring potentially misleading
speech. As discussed earlier, courts currently presume that disclaimers will be
effective in minimizing confusion and place the burden on the party seeking to
restrict speech, such as the FDA, to show that the disclaimer will confuse. Moreover,
some courts require that this showing be grounded in empirical evidence. 341
However, empirical evidence shows that disclaimers actually are not understood by
consumers.342 Case law should comport with actual evidence of how consumers
process, or, more appropriately, fail to process disclaimers. 343 In particular, drug
companies should have the burden of establishing why a disclaimer would be
effective in minimizing the possibility of being misled before a court can consider
that as a viable less speech-restrictive alternative. If a company cannot establish that
a disclaimer will actually make its proposed speech less confusing or misleading,
then a court can more easily find government regulation, such as barring off-label
marketing, to be narrowly tailored since a disclaimer would not be a true alternative.
Admittedly, permitting a company to speak with a disclaimer is always less speech
restricting, but the current presumption that a disclaimer is effective at minimizing
confusion is flawed.
The proposed burden shift would help address oddities in prior cases. For
example, in Caronia, the company would need to explain how a disclaimer would
adequately protect doctors from being misled. In other words, Caronia would be
forced to argue what type of disclaimer could guard against its representative
asserting that off-label use was not harmful for an elderly patient when that exact use

341. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Thompson, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2002).
342. See supra Section II.C.2.
343. In the context of trademark infringement, courts have sometimes recognized that
consumers do not necessarily read disclaimers based on similar studies based on consumer
psychology. See Jacob Jacoby & Robert Lloyd Raskopf, Disclaimers in Trademark
Infringement Litigation: More Trouble than They Are Worth?, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 35 (1986);
Gita Venkataramani Johar & Carolyn J. Simmons, The Use of Concurrent Disclosures to
Correct Invalid Inferences, 26 J. CONSUMER RES. 307 (2000).

2019]

A DA N GE R OUS C O N CO C TIO N

843

was subject to a black box warning. Not only does this seem like a tall order, but
given prior studies showing that doctors are not always aware of black box warnings
on other products, it is questionable that the black box warning or any other
disclaimer could counteract the more easily accessible information provided in
detailing.
3. More Judicial Deference to FDA Evaluation
Courts should also be more deferential to FDA determinations concerning
whether scientific information is either misleading or potentially misleading, or at
least no longer require the FDA to provide empirical evidence that a disclaimer will
confuse consumers. As noted earlier, there is extensive literature showing that
disclaimers are ineffective. This is obviously relevant to any litigation regarding
marketing of off-label uses, as well as marketing of products to consumers such as
dietary supplements.344 This is not to suggest that courts should accept FDA
assertions at face value without any inquiry. However, the current standards seem
premised on the more information schema. For example, courts have suggested that
information can only be banned as actually misleading if there is no empirical support
at all, or alternatively, only one to two studies that support a claim in addition to
empirical evidence that an additional disclaimer would still result in consumer
confusion.345 This might be relevant to whether information is actually misleading,
but information could be potentially misleading if only a minority of studies, even if
more than one to two in total, support a claim.
Although courts routinely evaluate scientific information in general, these cases
show that courts are vulnerable to the more information and sophisticated doctor
schemas. In contrast, the FDA has not been vulnerable to these positions. To the
contrary, the FDA’s original position of limiting companies from distributing peerreviewed articles to doctors for fear of the potential to mislead shows that the FDA
does not embrace either position. And, as discussed earlier, the FDA’s original
position is now empirically supported. On some level, courts recognize that they are
less equipped to evaluate key information. For example, although the judge in
Amarin evaluated a number of statements for alleged truthfulness, at the actual
hearing he admitted: “You’re talking to somebody who has difficulty using a toaster
. . . I’m the last person who should opine on this.” 346 In addition, a judge in a single

344. Of course, the context in which the FDA may be opining on whether information is
potentially or actually confusing will be different. For example, since the FDA does not review
off-label uses, it is only in the context of a First Amendment challenge, such as Amarin, that
this would be likely. In contrast, the FDA regularly opines on whether claims concerning
dietary supplements and food products are potentially confusing when manufacturers of such
products submit proposed health claims for FDA review to ensure that there is “significant
scientific agreement” in support of the claim. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(3)(B)(i) (2012) (health
claims on food); id. § 343(r)(5)(D) (health claims on dietary supplements); see also 21 C.F.R.
§ 101.14(c) (2017) (standard of FDA approval premised on totality of publicly available
scientific evidence and significant agreement among experts that there is evidence in support
of the claim); Id. § 101.14(a)(1) (defining health claim that requires FDA approval).
345. E.g., Whitaker, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 10.
346. Amy Kapczynski, Free Speech and Pharmaceutical Regulation—Fishy Business, 176
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case will not have the same depth of experience as the FDA and could be persuaded
by information that may not be scientifically valid.
Recognizing and respecting FDA expertise is an important and timely issue given
proposals to remove traditional judicial deference to all agency determinations
generally, which would also impact the FDA. In particular, in 2017, the House passed
a bill to overturn the common-law principle of “Chevron deference,”347 which arose
from the 1984 Supreme Court case, Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council.348 Under the Chevron deference, if a law passed by Congress is silent or
ambiguous with respect to an issue, courts should defer to agency interpretation
unless it is unreasonable (i.e., “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute”).349 Accordingly, courts are not to substitute their view for that of the agency,
even if another interpretation is reasonable. Although the legislation applies to
agencies’ interpretations of all statutes, and has already been criticized, the schemas
revealed in this article provide additional report for opposing such legislation, which
is currently under consideration by the Senate. 350 This legislation would make the
situation even worse than it currently is.
4. Reevaluating FDA Guidance
In addition, the FDA should carefully consider existing cognitive biases if it
considers further revising its existing guidelines regarding pharmaceutical marketing
of off-label uses. The FDA has already relaxed the guidelines in light of pressure
after judicial decisions such as Caronia and Amarin.351 However, although the FDA

J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL. MED. 295, 295 (2016) (quoting Transcript of Preliminary
Injunction Hearing at 79, Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
(No. 15 Civ.V 3588 (PAE))).
347. H.R. 5, 115th Cong. (2017–2018). In addition, it passed through the committee phase
of the Senate. S. 951, 115th Cong. (2017).
348. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
349. Id. at 844; see also Thomas A. Lorenzen & Sharmistha Das, The Decline of
Deference: Is the Supreme Court Pruning Back the Chevron Doctrine?, TRENDS: ABA SEC.
OF ENV’T, ENERGY, & RESOURCES NEWSL., Sept./Oct. 2015.
350. For critiques of proposed legislation, see, for example, Jonathan J. Darrow, Erin C.
Fuse Brown & Aaron S. Kesselheim, The Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017 –
Implications for FDA Regulation and Public Health, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 412 (2018);
William Funk, Requiring Formal Rulemaking Is a Thinly Veiled Attempt to Halt Regulation,
REG. REV. (May 18, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/05/18/funk-formal
-rulemaking-halt-regulation [https://perma.cc/TJH7-ANWJ].
351. In June 2018, the FDA issued two guidance documents that expand the scope of
permissible corporate communications beyond its proposed 2017 guidelines. See supra note
81. The guidance documents were long anticipated. See, e.g., GIBSON DUNN, 2017 YEAR-END
FDA AND HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT UPDATE – DRUGS AND DEVICES
(2018) (noting that the FDA had not provided updated guidance as of January 2018 after two
years of anticipation); ELIZABETH RICHARDSON, HEALTH AFFAIRS, HEALTH POLICY BRIEF:
OFF-LABEL DRUG PROMOTION. DRUG COMPANIES ARE LARGELY PROHIBITED FROM
PROMOTING A DRUG FOR USES THAT HAVE NOT BEEN APPROVED BY THE FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION (2016) (noting that the FDA had announced that it would be providing new
guidance in 2016).
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guidelines may seem consistent with these decisions, even the prior 2014 guidelines
concerning the safe harbor from prosecution for misbranding permitted action that
cognitive bias studies suggest exposes doctors to undue influence. For example, since
2014, after the FDA capitulated to a prior challenge, companies can share peerreviewed articles supporting off-label use with doctors contrary to long-standing
FDA concerns that recent studies show is now justified; 352 in particular, there are
recognized problems with the publication process that tend to favor publication of
positive results—even before considering that drug companies may be selectively
presenting only supportive articles. 353 In addition, even though doctors know at the
time that companies show them articles that are likely self-selected, the articles may
still be unduly persuasive. Over time, doctors may forget what information they
learned from the biased source and simply remember the information that gets
repeated, as it may be through multiple articles, and erroneously assume that it is
true.354 In other words, contrary to the 2014 FDA guidance documents permitting
companies to share peer-reviewed articles on off-label uses, the FDA’s original
instinct to bar companies from sharing such information for fear of undue influence
of unsupported information was correct. It seems unlikely that the FDA will retreat
from the increasingly expanded safe harbor for off-label marketing practices.
Nonetheless, recognizing that existing case law may be inconsistent with empirical
evidence should give the FDA pause before further capitulating to industry demands.
B. Suggestions for Structural Reforms
This Section sketches suggestions for structural reforms to address the issues
raised. This Section first suggests increasing awareness of the extent and
effectiveness of marketing influence to minimize the sophisticated doctor schema.
This Section also proposes specific actions to limit marketing influences from selfinterested companies by both limiting the extent of marketing, as well as promoting
independent and accessible information. Finally, this Section argues that the data
revealed here support more extensive changes to the current system of drug
development reliant on profit-based companies.
1. Increase Awareness
To combat the sophisticated doctor schema, an important initial step is to increase
awareness of marketing influences on doctors. Lack of awareness is likely the reason
most doctors believe they are not adversely influenced by detailing and improperly
assume they are able to glean relevant information.355 This Section focuses primarily
on educating doctors who are being targeted with advertisements and for whom there
are existing channels to provide such information. Judges need to be informed as

352. For example, the Caronia majority quoted from the FDA’s own guidelines that the
FDA recognized the value of truthful and nonmisleading scientific information on unapproved
uses, such as through scientific journals. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166–67 (2d
Cir. 2012).
353. See supra Section I.B.
354. See supra Section II.A.2.
355. Fischer, supra note 172, at 796.
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well, although this can be done on a case-by-case basis through briefs by parties, as
well as amici.
Increasing awareness of the sophisticated doctor schema is consistent with
existing concerns. For example, the U.S. Accreditation Council for Continuing
Medical Education has expressed concern that residents learn how promotional
activities can influence their prescribing information and the World Health
Organization has urged countries to include information on commercial marketing
strategies in formal training.356 In addition, some academic institutions have also
limited promotional activity,357 and some doctors already turn away salespeople.358
However, more consistent revelation of marketing influences is important not only
in medical schools, but also through continuing medical education, since doctors of
all ages are vulnerable to marketing.
Increased awareness can build upon the work of Healthy Skepticism, an
international organization that aims to better inform doctors about their susceptibility
to subtle techniques used by advertisers. 359 They have already created training
modules about how people are vulnerable to persuasion,360 and also have training to
reduce overconfidence bias, including the mistaken belief by many doctors that
without any training, they can easily distinguish misleading claims from justified
ones.361 Some of these modules could be easily incorporated into medical education
(whether initial or continuing). There have also been promising results for better
educating doctors and residents to recognize that they are vulnerable to marketing by
limiting their overconfidence.362 For example, one established method is to expose

356. ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR CONTINUING GRADUATE MED. EDUC., PRINCIPLES TO
GUIDE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION, INDUSTRY, AND OTHER
FUNDING SOURCES FOR PROGRAMS AND SPONSORING INSTITUTIONS ACCREDITED BY THE
ACGME
(2011),
https://www.acgme.org/Portals/0/PFAssets/PublicationsPapers/GME
-Funding-Industry-Other-Sources.pdf [https://perma.cc/HZ2C-J6R4]; BARBARA MINTZES,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. & HEALTH ACTION INT’L, EDUCATIONAL INITIATIVES FOR MEDICAL AND
PHARMACY STUDENTS ABOUT DRUG PROMOTION: AN INTERNATIONAL CROSS-SECTIONAL
SURVEY (2005).
357. E.g., David L. Coleman, Establishing Policies for the Relationship Between Industry
and Clinicians: Lessons Learned from Two Academic Health Centers, 83 ACAD. MED. 882
(2008); Larkin et al., Physician Prescribing, supra note 64; see also PEW CHARITABLE TR.,
CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST POLICIES FOR ACADEMIC MEDICAL CENTERS 12 (2013)
(recommending barring pharmaceutical representatives as one type of best practice).
358. E.g., Robert Lowes, More Physicians Saying ‘No Drug Reps Allowed’, MEDSCAPE
(Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/868748 [https://perma.cc/CY5G
-XSEJ] (noting that approximately thirty-five percent turn away salespeople).
359. See Mansfield, Healthy Skepticism, supra note 132, at 644.
360. Id. at 645.
361. See id. The organization also aims to disabuse doctors of other unsupported schemas
that the industry promotes, such as the fiction that newer drugs are in general better, in contrast
to the reality where only about three percent are major advances. Id.
362. See Peter R. Mansfield, Joel Lexchin, Leana S. Wen, Luisella Grandori, Christopher
P. McCoy, Jerome R. Hoffman, Joana Ramos & Jon N. Jureidini, Educating Health
Professionals About Drug and Device Promotion: Advocates’ Recommendations, PLOS MED.,
Nov. 2006, at 1988 [hereinafer Mansfield et al., Educating Health]; see Sagarin et al., supra
note 126.

2019]

A DA N GE R OUS C O N CO C TIO N

847

individuals to a standard sales technique, allow individuals to express any beliefs,
and then debunk them, as well as explain what misleading techniques were used.363
Importantly, this has been shown to reduce overconfidence in feeling “skilled” at
critically appraising information from health representatives.364
In addition, informing doctors of the benefits of limiting industry interaction,
coupled with how to substitute the perceived benefits of industry marketing, would
also be valuable. For example, doctors frequently state that they find detailing a
convenient way both to learn about drugs and get drug samples for their patients,
while also praising the social and informative aspects of lunches paid for by
companies.365 However, some of these benefits are illusory. One family medicine
practice that took an inventory of free drug samples found that few were “first-line”
drugs for most common illnesses, and less expensive alternatives were available for
a majority.366 In addition, for a relatively low cost, the practice maintained
educational group lunches that were not influenced by marketing and instead
provided educational information about both new and old drugs based on peerreviewed articles.367 Although some doctors were initially resistant and skeptical of
removing all industry influence, seeing actual data regarding number of visits and
samples was helpful.368
This example illustrates that it may be important not only to make doctors aware
of the influence of marketing, but perhaps also to increase awareness with their own
peers. As noted earlier, doctors can be skeptical of those outside their own circles.
Also, there are some doctors, albeit a minority, that do recognize vulnerability to
marketing. Accordingly, there should be a pool of doctors that can assist in increasing
awareness among all doctors. In addition, if medical schools can follow the lead of
many academic centers in not only limiting pharmaceutical interaction, but also
educating students about their vulnerability, this could strongly facilitate increased
knowledge for a new generation of doctors.

363. Mansfield et al., Educating Health, supra note 362, at 1989.
364. Michael S. Wilkes & Jerome R. Hoffman, An Innovative Approach to Educating
Medical Students About Pharmaceutical Promotion, 76 ACAD. MED. 1271, 1274 (2001).
365. E.g., David Evans, Daniel M. Hartung, Denise Beasley & Lyle J. Fagnan, Breaking
Up is Hard to Do: Lessons Learned from a Pharma-Free Practice Transformation, 26 J. AM.
BD. FAM. MED. 332, 334 (2013). Even doctors that consider information from representatives
to be biased may enjoy detailing visits for the physical relationship or for gifts received from
doctors. Fischer et al., supra note 172, at 797–98; Spiller & Wymer, supra note 171, at 94
(internal citations omitted). In addition, many doctors consider the detailing useful
information. See supra note 171 and accompanying text; see also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
564 U.S. 552, 578 (2011) (noting that doctors find detailing “very helpful”).
366. Evans et al., supra note 365, at 334.
367. Id. at 334, 336 (noting that since some providers were initially resistant to terminating
free samples and all visits by pharmaceutical representatives, intermediate steps were taken to
transition providers and ultimately providers could see that there were cheaper options
available).
368. Some noted that they needed industry information to be current and there would be
negative social harm, but eventually all agreed that this was a positive step. Id. at 336.
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2. Beyond Conflicts of Interest - Reconsidering Drug Samples and Gifts
Although industry influence resulting in conflicts of interest prompted enactment
of the Sunshine Act, the cognitive biases discussed here provide additional reasons
to be concerned about manipulative marketing not only with off-label uses of drugs,
but for all prescription drugs. After all, the industry uses the same types of marketing
for all uses of prescription drugs.
Importantly, whereas the Sunshine Act was promulgated under the theory that
more transparency would limit industry influence since doctors would be hesitant to
accept money they would need to disclose, this legislation inherently fails to address
key cognitive biases that still subject doctors to the influence of industry marketing.
For example, the Sunshine Act seems to assume that smaller value items, such as
drug samples and gifts under $100 have no impact, and thus exempts these from
disclosure.369 However, both of these types of items can and do have an impact—
even though the law does not currently recognize this and doctors assume that there
are no dangers.370 The industry invests over $5 billion a year on these practices,
which yield profitable outcomes for companies.371 Studies consistently show that
samples impact prescriptions.372 This makes sense given the cognitive bias of
availability that impacts everyone, including doctors; since samples are available,
doctors are naturally inclined to think about them for prescribing. 373

369. Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
1128G(e)(10)(B)(i)-(ii), 124 Stat. 119, 696 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2012)).
370. See Allan S. Brett, Wayne Burr & Jamaluddin Moloo, Are Gifts from Pharmaceutical
Companies Ethically Problematic?: A Survey of Physicians, 163 ARCHIVE INTERNAL MED.
2213 (2003); Steinman et al., supra note 174. Although some scholars have previously
recognized the impact of small gifts to influence doctors, arguments that these resulted in
conflicts of interests perhaps led to the improper assumption that they are not of concern. See,
e.g., Susan Chimonas, Troyen A. Brennan & David J. Rothman, Physicians and Drug
Representatives: Exploring the Dynamics of the Relationship, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 184
(2007); Jason Dana & George Lowenstein, A Social Science Perspective on Gifts to Physicians
from Industry, 290 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 252 (2003); Wazana, supra note 20.
371. E.g., Persuading the Prescribers: Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing and Its
Influence on Physicians and Patients, PEW (Nov. 11, 2013), https://www.pewtrusts.org
/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2013/11/11/persuading-the-prescribers-pharmaceutical
-industry-marketing-and-its-influence-on-physicians-and-patients [https://perma.cc/APM7B6G5].
372. E.g., John M. Boltri, Elizabeth R. Gordon & Robert L. Vogel, Effect of
Antihypertensive Samples on Physician Prescribing Patterns, 34 FAMILY MED. 729 (2002);
Lisa D. Chew, Theresa S. O’Young, Thomas K. Hazlet, Katharine A. Bradley, Charles
Maynard & Daniel S. Lessler, A Physician Survey of the Effect of Drug Sample Availability
on Physicians’ Behavior, 15 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 478 (2000); Fickweiler et al., supra note
172, at 3; Adriane Fugh-Berman & Shahram Ahari, Following the Script: How Drug Reps
Make Friends and Influence Doctors, PLOS MED., Apr. 2007, at 621, 624.
373. In addition, direct to consumer advertising may prompt consumers to specifically
request brand name drugs. Richard L. Kravitz, Ronald M. Epstein, Mitchell D. Feldman, Carol
E. Franz, Rachman Azari, Michael S. Wilkes, Ladson Hinton & Peter Franks, Influence of
Patients’ Requests for Direct-to-Consumer Advertised Antidepressants: A Randomized
Controlled Trial, 293 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1995, 1998–99 (2005) (reporting that for some types
of issues, doctors were more likely to prescribe the specific drug requested by a patient) as a
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Doctors who embrace the sophisticated doctor schema may believe that they are
invulnerable to influence from these low-budget items and also provide justifications
that are not consistent with reality. For example, doctors often report that samples
make patients happy, or result in lower costs especially for low-income patients,374
and that receiving them has no impact on their prescriptions. 375 However, in fact,
data show that drug samples are typically provided to high, rather than low-income
patients and also ironically lead to higher costs, since (1) typically a patient will need
more than the initial sample and (2) samples are inevitably of high-priced patented
drugs.376 Furthermore, studies indicate that patients actually disapprove of both
samples and gifts.377
Given this reality, the question is what the next step should be. An easy first step
would be informing doctors of these data more broadly, perhaps through continuing
medical education. In particular, informing doctors of colleagues who have
successfully taken this step and have come to see the benefits, including those who
were initially skeptical, might be helpful.378 One small practice group has provided
a template for how a group can voluntarily extricate itself from such pharmaceutical
marketing.379 Some doctors may still be resistant to believing the data, given their
preexisting biases. Accordingly, a more drastic step would be to legally bar
companies from providing drug samples. Of course, this is a major change that would

result of advertising); Michael S.Wilkes, Robert A. Bell & Richard L. Kravitz, Direct-toConsumer Prescription Drug Advertising: Trends, Impact, and Implications, 19 HEALTH AFF.
110, 118 (2000) (finding that in one survey, nineteen percent of people asked for a specifically
advertised drug). When consumers ask for such drugs, doctors likely have samples since
companies use both methods to market drugs. Gagnon & Lexchin, supra note 53, Table 1
(noting expenditures on detailing as well as advertising to consumers).
374. E.g., Fischer et al., supra note 172, at 797 (noting that doctors claimed that samples
make patients happy and even that patients expect samples); Tim Lahey, The High Costs of
“Free” Drug Samples, CLINICAL & TRANSLATIONAL GASTROENTEROLOGY, 2014, at 1 (noting
that some doctors believe samples benefit low-income patients).
375. See, e.g., Richard F. Adair & Leah R. Holmgren, Do Drug Samples Influence Resident
Prescribing Behavior? A Randomized Trial, 118 AM. J. MED. 881, 883 (2005); Brian Hodges,
Interactions with the Pharmaceutical Industry: Experiences and Attitudes of Psychiatry
Residents, Interns and Clerks, 153 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 553, 558 (1995); Dana Katz, Arthur L.
Caplan & Jon F. Merz, All Gifts Large and Small: Toward an Understanding of the Ethics of
Pharmaceutical Industry Gift-Giving, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 11, 12 (2010); Steinman et al.,
supra note 174, at 555.
376. See Sarah L. Cutrona, Steffie Woolhandler, Karen E. Lasser, David H. Bor, Danny
McCormick & David U. Himmelstein, Characteristics of Recipients of Free Prescription
Drug Samples: A Nationally Representative Analysis, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 284, 285–87
(2008); Lahey, supra note 374, at 1.
377. Lynn Eaton, Readers Want Transparency in Link Between Doctors and Drug Firms,
326 BRIT. MED. J. 1352, 1352 (2003); Robert V. Gibbons, Frank J. Landry, Denise L. Blouch,
David L. Jones, Frederick K. Williams, Catherine R. Lucey & Kurt Kroenke, A Comparison
of Physicians’ and Patients’ Attitudes Toward Pharmaceutical Industry Gifts, 13 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 151, 152–53 (1998); James Jastifer & Sarah Roberts, Patients’ Awareness of
and Attitudes Toward Gifts from Pharmaceutical Companies to Physicians, 39 INT’L J.
HEALTH SERVS. 405, 411 (2009).
378. Fischer et al., supra note 172, at 798.
379. See supra notes 365–368 and accompanying text.
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likely be vigorously opposed by the well-funded pharmaceutical industry that spends
billions a year on promotional activity, with the vast majority being spent on detailing
and drug samples, such that it may not be a realistic recommendation in the near
future. Nonetheless, doing so is consistent with cognitive bias studies. 380
3. Other Mechanisms to Minimize Public Harm From Schemas
Given the serious potential public health hazards associated with off-label use in
addition to the lack of awareness of schemas, additional action could be taken to
minimize harm, including mechanisms that would require no change to the First
Amendment law or challenging existing schemas held by doctors. In particular, offlabel use that is not medically supported could, and arguably should, be limited. This
would be consistent with an evidence-based approach to medicine that many suggest
is how medicine should be practiced, even if that does not always happen. The
existing law governing Medicare payments could be amended to limit payments for
off-label use unless it is supported by high-quality evidence and what counts as
evidence is revisited. After all, current guidelines are fairly permissive and can rely
on compendiums381 that studies have shown to be sometimes not accurate or up to
date,382 as well as medical articles that are not always reliable.383 Of course, this
would likely be strongly opposed by the pharmaceutical industry. Alternatively,
private insurance companies could endeavor to modify their reimbursement for
unsupported off-label use. Insurance companies have a clear interest in not paying
for unnecessary treatment and in recent years have been more strictly limiting
payment for drugs with various tiered formularies. The proposed change would be
an expansion of the existing approach to not only consider drugs within the same
class differently, but also the use of the drug. This may be complicated under the
existing system where doctors generally do not need to indicate the use for a drug on
a prescription. However, electronic medical records make this easier, indicating that
this is not impossible.384

380. Gagnon & Lexchin, supra note 53, at 29, 31.
381. Medicare covers all “medically accepted indications,” which includes not just FDAapproved indications, but also compendia-based information. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(k)(6)
(2012) (defining medically accepted indication for Medicaid to include certain compendia);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g)(1)(B)(i) (2012); 42 C.F.R. § 423.100 (2015) (defining
Medicare Part D drug with reference to Medicaid definition of medically accepted indication).
382. E.g., Amy P. Abernethy, Gowri Raman, Ethan M. Balk, Julia M. Hammond, Lori A.
Orlando, Jane L. Wheeler, Joseph Lau & Douglas C. McCrory, Systematic Review: Reliability
of Compendia Methods for Off-Label Oncology Indications, 150 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 336,
341–42 (2009) (finding that compendia do not always link recommendations to evidence and
often are not the most current evidence used).
383. Medical literature may also be considered for Medicaid reimbursement, but is not
alone adequate except for anticancer treatment. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g)(1)(B)(ii) (2012); 70
Fed. Reg. 4194, 4228–29 (Jan. 28, 2005) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 423); see also Jennifer
L. Herbst, How Medicare Part D, Medicaid, Electronic Prescribing, and ICD-10 Could
Improve Public Health (But Only if CMS Lets Them), 24 HEALTH MATRIX: J. L.-MED. 209,
216 (2014).
384. See Eguale et al., supra note 96, at 56 (noting that in Quebec documentation of
treatment indication is mandatory).
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4. Towards More Independent and Accessible Information
A major issue with pharmaceutical marketing is its widespread availability and
accessibility, making doctors more likely to rely on it even if they realize it is skewed
and not well supported. Even informing doctors that they are relying on the
information unduly is not likely to be ideal since studies repeatedly show that all
individuals tend to rely on easily accessible information. To counteract industry
marketing, not only do different sources of information need to exist, but they need
to be as available and accessible as existing marketing. If such independent and
accessible information exists when drugs are first introduced, there would be less of
a need to train doctors about marketing influences. But, since such independent
information currently does not exist, greater awareness is essential, even if the best
possible results from that awareness are still suboptimal. Importantly, if the majority,
rather than a minority, of doctors were aware of their vulnerability to marketing,
perhaps that could help to better protect patients since doctors do consult with peers
and seem to generally value peer opinions, as opposed to those outside their
profession.
There is already some recognition of the need to develop independent data in the
broader medical context. A 2007 study found that less than half of recommended
treatments are based on sound science.385 Since then, Congress has included
appropriations to fund comparative effectiveness studies. 386 These studies are
essential to complement initial studies done by self-interested drug companies that
typically only evaluate a proposed new drug versus a placebo, rather than existing
treatments, and also under experimental, rather than typical scenarios. Even in the
limited situations where companies compare their drugs to others, the study may be
skewed due to different dosages or other modifications. Such maneuvers should
arguably be easy for physicians to spot. And, if companies presented all information
to doctors, that might be true. However, there is no incentive for companies to do so.
Assuming independent data can be developed, the next step is to make the data
easily available and accessible to doctors. One way to do so is to actually mirror the
effective drug detailing done by companies with “academic detailing,” whereby
scientifically trained individuals with no profit-based agenda are providing
information in a one-on-one format that has been shown to be accessible and
convenient for doctors.387 Studies have shown some success in improving care

385. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., LEARNING WHAT WORKS BEST: THE NATION’S
NEED FOR EVIDENCE ON COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH CARE 78 (2011) (citing 2007
study).
386. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009);
see also Robert Pear, U.S. to Compare Medical Treatments, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/16/health/policy/16health.html
[https://perma.cc/72L7
-PAG2].
387. See Jerry Avorn, Academic Detailing: “Marketing” the Best Evidence to Clinicians,
317 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 361 (2017); Michael A. Fischer & Jerry Avorn, Academic Detailing
Can Play a Key Role in Assessing and Implementing Comparative Effectiveness Research
Findings, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2206 (2012). In addition, although academic detailing is likely the
most accessible method, even continuing medical education can be made more effective if the
traditional pure lecture styles are replaced by more interactive formats that have been found
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through academic detailing.388 Of course, although academic detailing is beneficial,
it would be tough to rely on academic detailing alone to completely counteract
misleading marketing messages, contrary to the presumptions of the Sorrell majority
opinion. After all, the pharmaceutical industry has substantial funds to promote its
own products. Most academic detailing focuses on one or two limited areas.
Nonetheless, greater attention to academic detailing is better than none at all. It is
also a strategy that has no commercial speech problems, such that some scholars
recently suggested it as a strategy to address Sorrell.389
5. Additional Support for Reconsidering the Drug Development Process
The data presented here also provides additional support for questioning the
overall system of drug development, and not simply issues concerning off-label use
of drugs. This Article shows that companies have an incentive to promote off-label
uses that may not be supported by evidence. However, the problems with drug
development and marketing are much more extensive. Not only do companies have
an incentive to market off-label uses during the limited term of patent protection to
maximize profits, but they also have an incentive to develop the most profitable
drugs, which are not necessarily the ones that are most socially desirable.390 For
example, most drugs are developed for relatively wealthy countries that have the
ability to pay.391 This is not a new discovery. Indeed, legislation exists to try to
encourage companies to promote drugs that impact smaller classes with a variety of
incentives that include tax advantages, as well as commercial exclusivity. 392

useful in a wide array of educational contexts.
388. E.g., Avorn, supra note 387 (noting that since research started in the 1980s, studies
have shown success in improving care in a variety of settings, including controlling use of
sedating medications in nursing homes and reducing overuse of antibiotics).
389. George R. Gooch, J. James Rohack & Marisa Finley, The Moral From Sorrell:
Educate, Don’t Legislate, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 237, 262 (2013).
390. E.g., Steven J. Hoffman & Karen So, Assessing 15 Proposals for Promoting
Innovation and Access to Medicines Globally, 80 ANNALS GLOBAL HEALTH 432, 433 (2014).
Some have suggested that since the patent system contributes to this problem, alternatives are
needed to encourage socially valuable innovation. E.g., HO, supra note 11, at 367–71
(discussing proposals such as a health impact fund, publicly funded clinical trials, and a drug
development corporation); UNITED NATIONS, REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARYGENERAL’S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND
ACCESS TO HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES 7 (2016).
391. This is referred to as the 10/90 gap: less than ten percent of resources are devoted to
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However, the industry has managed to game this well-intended legislation to obtain
handsome profits while sometimes also charging exorbitant prices to consumers. 393
In light of these issues, there have been proposals to overhaul the domestic and
international system.394 Admittedly, a major overhaul to the drug development
process would be a major change and a complete discussion is beyond the scope of
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www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/06/06/vermont-drug-prices-transparency [https://perma
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this Article. However, the data in this Article lends further support to arguments that
the current system is broken, and more serious attention to fixing it is required.
CONCLUSION
The intersection of commercial speech and FDA regulation of unapproved uses
of FDA-approved drugs is an important area to commercial drug companies, as well
as policy makers concerned about public health. Given recent judicial expansion of
commercial speech, as well as pressure on the FDA to further liberalize corporate
speech concerning uses without clear scientific foundation, it is important to consider
the appropriate balance. This Article has revealed, and debunked, two key schemas
prevalent in key cases, as well as among doctors and policy makers. A better
understanding of these schemas would inform appropriate changes to commercial
speech law to mirror reality. Moreover, these schemas also support more systematic
changes to drug development and marketing in favor of an independent and
evidence-based system. In addition, the existence of these schemas provide strong
support for issues beyond off-label promotion of drugs. In particular, the schemas
suggest that the current minimal scrutiny of dietary supplements with a disclaimer
may not be wellfounded. Considering that doctors are more sophisticated than
consumers and still vulnerable to commercial advertising, the schemas revealed here
also suggest that direct-to-consumer advertisement should be more, rather than less,
restricted. Although it is unlikely that all of these changes could be made, even
understanding the existence and operation of these schemas is an important first step
towards an improved understanding that should yield the informed results that all
agree are desirable.

